Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in US Supreme Court
Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency
The Clean Air Act envisions a collaborative effort between states and the federal government to regulate air quality. When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets standards for common air pollutants, states must submit a State Implementation Plan (SIP), providing for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of those standards in their jurisdictions. In 2015, the EPA revised its air-quality standards for ozone, triggering a requirement for states to submit new SIPs. Years later, the EPA announced its intention to disapprove over 20 SIPs because the agency believed they had failed to address adequately obligations under the Good Neighbor Provision. During the public-comment period for the proposed SIP disapprovals, the EPA issued a single proposed Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) to bind all those states.The D.C. Circuit denied relief to a number of the remaining states and industry groups who challenged the FIP, arguing that the EPA’s decision to apply the FIP after so many other states had dropped out was “arbitrary” or “capricious.” They asked the court to stay any effort to enforce the FIP against them while their appeal unfolded. The parties renewed their request in the Supreme Court of the United States.The Supreme Court granted the applications for a stay, halting enforcement of the EPA’s rule against the applicants pending the disposition of the applicants’ petition for review in the D.C. Circuit and any petition for writ of certiorari, timely sought. The Court found that the applicants were likely to prevail on their claim that the EPA’s action was arbitrary or capricious because the agency failed to offer a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, and ignored an important aspect of the problem. The EPA’s alternative arguments were unavailing. View "Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law
Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency
Sackett began backfilling an Idaho lot with dirt to build a home. The Environmental Protection Agency informed Sackett that the property contained wetlands and that the backfilling violated the Clean Water Act, which prohibits discharging pollutants into “the waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The EPA ordered Sackett to restore the site, threatening penalties of over $40,000 per day. The EPA classified the Sacket wetlands as “waters of the United States” because they were near a ditch that fed into a creek, which fed into Priest Lake, a navigable, intrastate lake. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the EPA.The Supreme Court reversed. CWA jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland requires that the adjacent body of water constitutes waters of the United States (a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters) and a continuous surface connection between the wetland and that water, making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”The Court reviewed the history of judicial interpretation of “the waters of the United States” and enforcement by federal agencies, which argued that the significant-nexus test was sufficient to establish jurisdiction over “adjacent” wetlands. Under that test, nearly all waters and wetlands are potentially susceptible to regulation, “putting a staggering array of landowners at risk of criminal prosecution for such mundane activities as moving dirt.” The CWA’s use of “waters” encompasses only relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies, ordinarily called streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes. Wetlands qualify as “waters of the United States” only if “indistinguishable from waters of the United States,” having a continuous surface connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right, with no clear demarcation between waters and wetlands. View "Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law
West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency
In 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the Clean Power Plan rule, which addressed carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants, citing Section 111 of the Clean Air Act,” 42 U.S.C. 7411(d). Although the states set the enforceable rules governing existing sources, EPA determines the emissions limit with which they have to comply by determining the “best system of emission reduction” (BSER). In the Clean Power Plan, EPA determined that the BSER for existing coal and natural gas plants included “heat rate improvements” at coal-fired plants and “generation-shifting,” i.e., a shift in electricity production from existing coal-fired to natural-gas-fired plants and from both coal and gas plants to renewables (wind and solar). An operator could reduce the regulated plant’s production of electricity, build or invest in new or existing equipment, or purchase emission allowances as part of a cap-and-trade regime. No existing coal plant could achieve the emissions performance rates without generation-shifting.The Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan in 2016. It was later repealed when EPA determined that it lacked authority “of this breadth.” EPA then promulgated the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule, mandating equipment upgrades and operating practices. The D.C. Circuit held that EPA’s repeal of the Clean Power Plan rested on a mistaken reading of the Clean Air Act and vacated the ACE rule.The Supreme Court reversed. Congress did not grant EPA the authority to devise emissions caps based on the Clean Power Plan's generation-shifting approach. Restructuring the nation’s mix of electricity generation cannot be the BSER under Section 111. Under the major questions doctrine, an agency must point to “clear congressional authorization” for such an unprecedented exercise of authority. On EPA’s view of Section 111(d), Congress implicitly tasked it alone with balancing vital considerations of national policy. Issues of electricity transmission and distribution are not within EPA’s traditional expertise. The Clean Power Plan “conveniently enabled" EPA to enact a program, cap-and-trade, that Congress rejected numerous times. View "West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law
Guam v. United States
The Ordot Dump was constructed on Guam by the Navy in the 1940s. Both the federal government and Guam allegedly deposited waste at Ordot. A 2004 consent decree between the EPA and Guam resolved litigation concerning Clean Water Act violations.About 13 years later, Guam sued the U.S. under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601. A section 107(a) action sought recovery of the costs of a “removal or remedial action” from the government based on its ownership or operation of the site at the time of the disposal of hazardous substances. A section 113(f) action sought "contribution," alleging that Guam “has resolved its liability to the United States…for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in [a] settlement." The D. C. Circuit held that cost recovery was not available if a party could have brought a contribution action and found the contribution claim untimely under a three-year limitations period in light of the 2004 settlement.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. A settlement of environmental liabilities must resolve a CERCLA-specific liability to give rise to a section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution action. That remedial measures under different environmental statutes might functionally overlap with a CERCLA response action does not justify reinterpreting section 113(f)(3)(B)’s phrase “resolved its liability . . . for some or all of a response action” to instead mean “settled an environmental liability that might have been actionable under CERCLA.” A party may seek CERCLA contribution only after settling CERCLA-specific claims, as opposed to resolving environmental liability under another law. View "Guam v. United States" on Justia Law
United States Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club, Inc.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed a rule in 2011 regarding cooling water intake structures. Because aquatic wildlife can become trapped in intake structures, the Endangered Species Act required the EPA to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service before proceeding. Issuance of a “jeopardy” biological opinion would require the EPA either to implement alternatives, to terminate the action, or to seek an exemption. After consulting with the Services, the EPA changed its proposed rule. Staff members at the Services concluded that the 2013 proposed rule was likely to jeopardize certain species and sent drafts of their opinions to the decision-makers within the Services. Those decision-makers neither approved the drafts nor sent them to the EPA but extended the consultation. In 2014, the EPA produced a revised proposed rule that differed significantly from the 2013 version. The Services issued a final “no jeopardy” biological opinion. The EPA issued its final rule.Sierra Club submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for records related to the consultations. The Services invoked the deliberative process privilege to prevent disclosure of the draft biological opinions analyzing the 2013 proposed rule. The Ninth Circuit held that the draft biological opinions were not privileged.The Supreme Court reversed. The deliberative process privilege protects from FOIA disclosure in-house draft biological opinions that are pre-decisional and deliberative, even if the drafts reflect the agencies’ last views about a proposal. The privilege is intended to encourage candor and blunt the chilling effect of possible disclosure; it distinguishes between pre-decisional, deliberative documents, which are exempt from disclosure, and documents reflecting a final agency decision and the reasons supporting it, which are not. A document does not represent an agency’s final decision solely because nothing follows it; sometimes a proposal “dies on the vine.” The privilege protects the draft biological opinions from disclosure because they reflect a preliminary view, not a final decision, about the proposed 2013 rule. The draft opinions were subject to change and had no direct legal consequences. View "United States Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club, Inc." on Justia Law
County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund
Maui’s wastewater reclamation facility collects sewage, partially treats it, and daily pumps around four million gallons of treated water into the ground through four wells. This effluent then travels about a half-mile, through groundwater, to the Pacific Ocean. Environmental groups brought a citizens’ suit under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365, alleging that Maui was “discharg[ing]” a “pollutant” to “navigable waters” without the required permit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the environmentalists.The Supreme Court vacated. The Act requires a permit when there is a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge. The Court rejected both the Ninth Circuit’s broad “fairly traceable” interpretation and the total exclusion of all discharges through groundwater, as urged by Maui and reflected in the EPA’s recent Interpretive Statement, that “all releases of pollutants to groundwater” are excluded from the scope of the permitting program." That interpretation is inconsistent with the statute’s reference to “any addition” of a pollutant from a "point source" to navigable waters, given the statute’s inclusion of “wells” in the “point source” definition; wells ordinarily discharge pollutants through groundwater.The statute is intended to provide federal regulation of identifiable sources of pollutants entering navigable waters without undermining the states’ longstanding regulatory authority over land and groundwater. A permit is required when there is a discharge from a point source directly into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge. Many factors may be relevant to determining whether a particular discharge is the functional equivalent of one directly into navigable waters. Time and distance will be the most important factors in most cases, but other relevant factors may include the nature of the material through which the pollutant travels and the extent to which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels. Although this interpretation does not present a clear line, the EPA has applied the permitting provision to some discharges through groundwater for over 30 years, with no evidence of inadministrability or an unmanageable expansion in the statute’s scope. View "County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund" on Justia Law
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian
For nearly a century, the Anaconda Copper Smelter contaminated 300 square miles with arsenic and lead. For 35 years, the EPA has worked with the now-closed smelter’s current owner, Atlantic Richfield, to implement a cleanup plan. Landowners sued Atlantic Richfield in state court for common law nuisance, trespass, and strict liability, seeking restoration damages, which Montana law requires to be spent on property rehabilitation. The landowners’ proposed plan exceeds the measures found necessary to protect human health and the environment by EPA. Montana courts rejected an argument that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, section 113, stripped them of jurisdiction. Section 113 states that no potentially responsible party (PRP) "may undertake any remedial action” at the site without EPA approval and provides federal courts with “exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under” the Act.The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in part. The Act does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over this lawsuit. The common law claims “arise under” Montana law, not under the Act. Section 113(b) deprives state courts of jurisdiction over cases “arising under” the Act while section 113(h) deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over certain “challenges” to remedial actions; section 113(h) does not broaden section 113(b).The Court vacated in part. The landowners are PRPs who need EPA approval to take remedial action. Section 107, the liability section, includes any “owner” of “a facility.” “Facility” is defined to include “any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.” Because arsenic and lead are hazardous substances that have “come to be located” on the landowners’ properties, the landowners are PRPs. Even “innocent landowners," whose land has been contaminated by another, and who are shielded from liability by section 107(b)(3), may fall within the broad definitions of PRPs in sections 107(a)(1)–(4). Interpreting PRPs to include property owners reflects the objective of a single EPA-led cleanup effort rather than thousands of competing efforts. The EPA policy of not suing innocent owners does not alter the landowners’ status as PRPs. View "Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian" on Justia Law
Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren
The company wants to mine raw uranium ore from a site near Coles Hill, Virginia. Virginia law completely prohibits uranium mining. The company alleged that, under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) preempts state uranium mining laws like Virginia’s and makes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) the lone regulator. The district court, the Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court rejected the company’s argument.The AEA does not preempt Virginia’s law banning uranium mining; the law grants the NRC extensive and sometimes exclusive authority to regulate nearly every aspect of the nuclear fuel life cycle except mining, expressly stating that the NRC’s regulatory powers arise only “after [uranium’s] removal from its place of deposit in nature,” 42 U.S.C. 2092. If the federal government wants to control uranium mining on private land, it must purchase or seize the land by eminent domain and make it federal land, indicating that state authority remains untouched. Rejecting “field preemption: and “conflict preemption” arguments, the Court stated that the only thing a court can be sure of is what can be found in the law itself and the compromise that Congress actually struck in the AEA leaves mining regulation on private land to the states. View "Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren" on Justia Law
Sturgeon v. Frost
The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) set aside 104 million acres of federally-owned land for preservation, creating 10 new national parks, monuments, and preserves (units), 16 U.S.C. 3102(4). In establishing boundaries, Congress followed natural features rather than enclosing only federally-owned lands, sweeping in more than 18 million acres of state, Native, and private land, which could have become subject to many National Park Service rules, 54 U.S.C. 100751 (Organic Act). ANILCA Section 103(c) states that only “public lands,” defined as most federally-owned lands, waters, and associated interests, within any unit’s boundaries are “deemed” part of that unit and that no state, Native, or private lands “shall be subject to the regulations applicable solely to public lands within units." The Service may “acquire such lands,” after which it may administer the land as public lands within units.Sturgeon traveled by hovercraft up the Nation River within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley Preserve unit. Park rangers informed him that the Service’s rules (36 CFR 2.17(e)) prohibit operating a hovercraft on navigable waters “located within [a park’s] boundaries.” That regulation, issued under the Service’s Organic Act authority, applies to parks nationwide without regard to the ownership of submerged lands, tidelands, or lowlands. The district court and the Ninth Circuit denied Sturgeon relief.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The Nation River is not public land under ANILCA. Running waters cannot be owned; under the Submerged Lands Act, Alaska, not the United States, holds “title to and ownership" of the lands beneath navigable waters, 43 U.S.C. 1311. Even if the United States has an “interest” in the River under the reserved-water-rights doctrine, the River itself would not be “public land.” Section 103(c) exempts non-public lands, including waters, from Park Service regulations, which apply “solely” to public lands within the units. View "Sturgeon v. Frost" on Justia Law
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service
In 2001, the Fish and Wildlife Service listed the dusky gopher frog as an endangered species, under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1533(a)(1), which required the Service to designate the frog's “critical habitat.” The Service proposed designating a site in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana (Unit 1). The frog had once lived in Unit 1, but the land had long been used as a commercial timber plantation; no frogs had been spotted there for decades. The Service concluded that Unit 1 met the statutory definition of unoccupied critical habitat because of its rare, high-quality breeding ponds and distance from existing frog populations. The Service commissioned a report, which found that designation might bar future development, depriving the owners of up to $33.9 million, but concluded that the potential costs were not disproportionate to the conservation benefits and designated Unit 1 as critical habitat. The owners sued, contending that the closed-canopy timber plantation on Unit 1 could not be critical habitat for the frog, which lives in open-canopy forests. The district court and Fifth Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court vacated. The decision not to exclude an area from critical habitat is subject to judicial review. An area is eligible for designation as critical habitat only if it is habitat for the species. Section 1533(a)(3)(A)(i), the sole source of authority for critical-habit designations, states that when the Secretary lists a species as endangered he must also “designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical habitat.” Whether the frog could survive in Unit 1; whether habitat can include areas where the species could not currently survive; and whether the assessment of the costs and benefits of designation and resulting decision were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, must be addressed on remand. View "Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service" on Justia Law