Justia Environmental Law Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Town of Southold, et al. v. Wheeler, et al.
This dispute arises out of the efforts of the federal Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to designate a new waste disposal site on Long Island Sound for byproducts of local dredging activities. New York State and the Town of Southold, New York (“Southold,” and together with New York, the “Plaintiffs”) challenged the EPA’s designation of the site pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), alleging a violation of the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”). They appealed a district court’s judgment granting Defendants EPA and the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection’s cross-motions for summary judgment. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that contrary to Plaintiffs’ claim, the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review applies and that under that standard, the EPA’s designation of the new disposal site passes muster under the CZMA. The court also held that Southold’s claim under the National Environmental Protection Act is not properly before the court. The court explained that New York failed to show that the EPA’s decision to impose additional restrictions on the Eastern Site undermines the agency’s efforts to achieve full consistency with the New York Program. Further, the court concluded that the EPA’s determination that its activity is fully consistent with the Southold Program is not arbitrary and capricious and that Southold’s NEPA claim is waived. View "Town of Southold, et al. v. Wheeler, et al." on Justia Law
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement v. Environmental Protection Agency
The Second Circuit denied petitions for review of the EPA's final rule restricting access by consumers to methylene chloride, a dangerous chemical used in paint removal products. Petitioners contend that the Toxic Substances Control Act required the EPA to regulate commercial uses of methylene chloride as well as consumer uses. The court held that HSIA's challenge to the final rule fails because the final rule was supported by substantial evidence. In this case, EPA's implementation of a retailer distribution ban was a reasonable means to achieve its required goal of ensuring that the risks posed by consumer uses of methylene chloride were no longer presented. The court also concluded that the environmental petitioners' challenge is prudentially unripe for review at this time. View "Labor Council for Latin American Advancement v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law
Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental Response Trust v. National Grid USA
Racer, which was created and funded to clean up polluted locations connected to the former General Motors Corporation during that company's bankruptcy, appealed the district court's dismissal of their federal claims for violations of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and related state law claims. Racer alleges cost and recovery and contribution claims under CERCLA sections 107 and 113 against dozens of defendants, which RACER alleges contributed to pollution at one of the New York sites it has been tasked with cleaning up.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court was correct to require RACER Trust to substitute its trustee as plaintiff, because the trust lacks capacity to sue. On the merits, the court held that the district court erred in dismissing RACER's complaint at this early stage. In this case, RACER's section 107 claim is ripe because it is based on costs RACER has already incurred for which it may not receive repayment through the EPA investigation, and because further delay in adjudicating the claim would cause RACER hardship. Furthermore, the district court erred in dismissing RACER's section 113 claim where, to the extent that the district court concluded that it too was prudentially unripe, the court disagreed for the same reasons that apply to the section 107 claim. To the extent the district court's dismissal rested on other grounds, the court concluded that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasoning and the court remanded for further analysis.The court declined to address the other issues raised by the parties, which should be addressed by the district court in the first instance. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded the district court's dismissal of RACER's CERCLA claims, and vacated and remanded the district court's dismissal of RACER's state law claims so that the district court may reconsider its ruling. View "Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental Response Trust v. National Grid USA" on Justia Law
City of New York v. Chevron Corp.
The City filed suit against five multinational oil companies under New York tort law seeking to recover damages for the harms caused by global warming. In this case, the City asserts that its taxpayers should not have to shoulder the burden of financing the City's preparations to mitigate the effects of global warming. Rather, the City suggests that a group of large fossil fuel producers are primarily responsible for global warming and should bear the brunt of these costs.The Second Circuit held that municipalities may not utilize state tort law to hold multinational oil companies liable for the damages caused by global greenhouse gas emissions. The court explained that global warming is a uniquely international concern that touches upon issues of federalism and foreign policy. Consequently, it calls for the application of federal common law, not state law. The court also held that the Clean Air Act grants the Environmental Protection Agency – not federal courts – the authority to regulate domestic greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, federal common law actions concerning such emissions are displaced. Finally, the court held that while the Clean Air Act has nothing to say about regulating foreign emissions, judicial caution and foreign policy concerns counsel against permitting such claims to proceed under federal common law absent congressional direction. Because no such permission exists, the court concluded that each of the City's claims is barred and the complaint must be dismissed. View "City of New York v. Chevron Corp." on Justia Law
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the Commission's orders determining that the DEC had waived its authority under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act to issue or deny a water quality certification for a natural gas pipeline project sponsored by National Fuel. The court concluded that Section 401's one-year time limit may not be extended by the type of agreement between a certifying agency and an applicant used here. In this case, the Commission reasonably concluded that the Natural Gas Act's rehearing provision did not bar National Fuel from seeking a waiver determination outside of the 30-day window to file a rehearing request, and that FERC acted within its discretion in treating National Fuel's December 2017 filing as a timely motion for a waiver determination. Therefore, the Commission properly concluded that the DEC waived its certification authority. View "New York State Department of Environmental Conservation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law
MPM Silicones, LLC v. Union Carbide Corp.
MPM appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment dismissing its claims for recovery of "remedial action" costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) as barred by the statute of limitations in 42 U.S.C. 9613(g)(2). UCC cross-appealed the district court's holding after a bench trial that UCC is liable to MPM for 95% of the cost of future "removal action."The Second Circuit held that the district court's conclusion that MPM's claims for recovery of remedial action costs were time-barred relied on an incorrect interpretation of the court's decision in New York State Electric and Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 766 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2014). Although the court agreed with the district court that UCC's corrective actions undertaken in the 1990s were remediation, the court did not understand NYSEG to mean that, for purposes of determining the timeliness of a cost recovery action, all remediation activity at a site regardless of circumstances is deemed to be part of a single remediation, so that the six year limitations period necessarily begins to run at the start of the first remedial activity. The court also held that the district court did not err in adjudicating the allocation of future removal action costs, or in allocating 95% against UCC. View "MPM Silicones, LLC v. Union Carbide Corp." on Justia Law
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
The NRDC and the State of Vermont seek review of certain provisions of a rule promulgated by the EPA, pursuant to the Toxic Substances Control Act, that requires manufacturers to report information about their use of mercury. Specifically, petitioners argue that three exemptions for categories of manufacturers and importers are unlawful.The Second Circuit denied review of the exemption for manufacturers of assembled products with mercury-added components at 40 C.F.R. 713.7(b)(3) and the partial exemption for high-volume manufacturers at 40 C.F.R. 713.9(a). The court held that these exemptions are reasonable in light of Congress's directive to the EPA to avoid requiring duplicative or unnecessary reporting. However, the court granted review of and vacated the exemption for importers of assembled products with mercury-added components at 40 C.F.R. 713.7(b)(2), finding that the EPA failed to provide a reasoned explanation for this exemption. View "Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the EPA properly invoked the deliberative process privilege and Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to withhold a portion of its OMEGA computer program when responding to plaintiffs' FOIA request. The OMEGA model is an EPA computer program used to forecast the likely responses of automakers to proposed EPA greenhouse gas emissions standards. In this case, the record shows that to the extent the full OMEGA model reflects any subjective agency views, it does so in the input files, not the core model. Therefore, the core model is not deliberative and thus does not fall within the scope of the privilege and FOIA Exemption 5. View "Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA" on Justia Law
Friends of Animals v. Romero
FOA filed suit against NPS, alleging that the agency violated the National Environmental Policy Act in approving the Whitetailed Deer Management Plan for the Fire Island National Seashore.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of FOA's motion for summary judgment and grant of NPS's cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that NPS's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. In this case, NPS was not required to obtain the information about deer movement because it was not essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives; NPS took a hard look at the environmental consequences of the Plan; NPS has presented a rational basis for its decision to employ a Seashore-wide target deer density; and NPS considered all reasonable alternatives. View "Friends of Animals v. Romero" on Justia Law
Sierra Club v. Con-Strux, LLC
The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss an action brought by the Sierra Club under the Clean Water Act, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Sierra Club alleged that Construx was engaged in "industrial activity" within the meaning of the Act without a permit.The court held that Construx's business activity, which involved recycling debris and waste and subsequently wholesaling aggregate materials it has crushed from that debris and waste, was "industrial activity" within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, Sierra Club's allegations were sufficient to demonstrate, at the pleading stage, that Construx was engaged in "industrial activity," notwithstanding that part of its business could also be classified as activity not subject to the Act. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Sierra Club v. Con-Strux, LLC" on Justia Law