Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under the Clean Water Act (CWA), alleging that Corona Clay illegally discharged pollutants into the navigable waters of the United States, failed to monitor that discharge as required by its permit, and violated the conditions of the permit by failing to report violations. The district court granted partial summary judgment to defendants and a jury returned a defense verdict on the remaining claims.The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation of Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 67 (1987), which held that the CWA bars citizen suits alleging only "wholly past" violations of permits, and held that if the required jurisdictional discharge into United States waters has occurred, a CWA citizen suit can be premised on ongoing or reasonably expected monitoring or reporting violations. The panel vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings in light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020), which held that an offending discharge must reach the "waters of the United States," either through a direct discharge or a "functional equivalent." View "Inland Empire Waterkeeper v. Corona Clay Co." on Justia Law

Environmental organizations challenged a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit issued by the EPA for Idaho Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) under the Clean Water Act. On CAFOs, manure is typically stored in lagoons; waste that leaks from lagoons can reach groundwater that can reach navigable waters. Since the 1970s, the EPA has regulated both CAFO production areas (animal confinement, storage, lagoons) and land-application areas (fields where manure and process wastewater are applied as fertilizer).The Ninth Circuit held that the challenge was timely, rejecting the EPA’s contention that the Permit largely relied on a 2003 Rule. The Permit lacked sufficient monitoring provisions to ensure compliance with the Permit’s “zero discharge” requirements for both production and land-application areas. EPA's discretion in crafting appropriate monitoring requirements for each NPDES permit is not unlimited. The Permit had sufficient monitoring requirements for above-ground discharges from production areas; CAFOs were required to perform daily inspections. The Permit had no monitoring provisions for underground discharges from production areas. While the Permit flatly prohibited discharges from land-application areas during dry weather it had no monitoring provisions, although the record showed that such discharges can occur during irrigation of fertilized CAFO fields. View "Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency approved California’s plan for meeting the air quality standard for ozone in the San Joaquin Valley (Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7408(a), 7409(a)). The plan contains a single contingency measure that will be activated if the other provisions do not achieve reasonable further progress toward meeting the standard.The Ninth Circuit remanded, finding the approval arbitrary after holding that AIR, a California nonprofit corporation with members who reside in the Valley, had Article III standing. AIR’s challenge was ripe for review. When an agency changes its policy, it must display awareness that it is changing position and show that there are good reasons for the new policy. In approving a contingency measure that provided a far lower emissions reduction, the EPA did not acknowledge that it had changed its understanding of what reasonable further progress meant. The EPA may not avoid the need for robust contingency measures by assuming that they will not be needed and did not provide a reasoned explanation for approving the plan. The court rejected AIR’s challenge to the approval of the State’s Enhanced Enforcement Activities Program. The program did not create an emission limitation that was less stringent than one in effect in the state plan so nothing in the Clean Air Act prohibited the state from pursuing it. View "Association of Irritated Residents v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) published the 2012 Integrated Action Plan/Environmental Impact Statement (IAP/EIS) for the Petroleum Reserve-Alaska. In 2014, BLM granted ConocoPhillips permission to construct a drill pad in the Greater Moose Tooth (GMT) Unit within the Reserve and issued a GMT supplemental EIS, relying on the 2012 IAP/EIS. In 2018, BLM granted ConocoPhillips permission to construct another GMT drill pad, issuing a second GMT supplemental EIS. In 2018, ConocoPhillips applied to drill in another Unit. BLM published an environmental assessment that purportedly incorporated the 2012 IAP/EIS and the two GMT supplemental EISs. BLM did not issue an EIS but found no new significant impact. ConocoPhillips completed the program in April 2019. In March 2019, objectors sued, citing the National Environmental Policy Act.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the case was moot because neither court could grant any relief. The only lasting physical features of the drilling were capped wells; there was no indication that ConocoPhillips could undo the drilling of those wells. The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply. Although a case generally will not be moot when the environmental report at issue will be used by the agency in approving a future project, the legal landscape has changed. The Council of Environmental Quality has issued new NEPA regulations. BLM issued a 2020 IAP/EIS for the Reserve, Plaintiffs have not shown a “reasonable expectation” that they will be subjected to an EA tiering to the 2012 IAP/EIS again. View "Native Village of Nuiqsut v. Bureau of Land Management" on Justia Law

BNSF Railway sought a declaration that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA) preempts Clark County, Washington’s permitting process. Clark County asserted that BNSF needed to obtain a permit for a project to upgrade an existing track and construct a second track in the Columbia River Gorge.The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of BNSF. Under the ICCTA, the Surface Transportation Board has exclusive jurisdiction over rail carriers and track construction. If an apparent conflict exists between the ICCTA and a federal statute, then the courts must strive to harmonize the two laws, giving effect to both if possible. The court rejected an argument that the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act is such a federal statute. The Gorge Act does not establish national environmental standards but provides a framework for a commission of state-appointed officials to adopt a management plan and implement it through county land use ordinances. The Columbia River Gorge Commission retains final say over the approval and enforcement of the management plan and local county ordinances; enforcement actions may be brought in state court. The Gorge Act is not comparable to federal environmental laws and nothing in the Gorge Act indicates that the local ordinances otherwise have the force and effect of federal law. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Friends of the Columbia River Gorge" on Justia Law

The Sacketts purchased a soggy residential lot near Idaho’s Priest Lake in 2004, planning to build a home. Shortly after the Sacketts began placing sand and gravel fill on the lot, they received an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrative compliance order, indicating that the property contained wetlands subject to protection under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251(a), and that the Sacketts had to remove the fill and restore the property to its natural state.The Sacketts sued EPA in 2008, challenging the agency’s jurisdiction over their property. During this appeal, EPA withdrew its compliance order. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in EPA’s favor. EPA’s withdrawal of the order did not moot the case. EPA’s stated intention not to enforce the order or issue a similar order in the future did not bind the agency. EPA could potentially change positions under new leadership. The court upheld the district court’s refusal to strike from the record a 2008 Memo by an EPA wetlands ecologist, containing observations and photographs from his visit to the property. The court applied the “significant nexus” analysis for determining when wetlands are regulated under the CWA. The record plainly supported EPA’s conclusion that the wetlands on the property were adjacent to a jurisdictional tributary and that, together with a similarly situated wetlands complex, they had a significant nexus to Priest Lake, a traditional navigable water, such that the property was regulable under the CWA. View "Sackett v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Army Corps of Engineers proposed the dredging of San Francisco Bay’s 11 navigational channels during and after 2017. The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission and the San Francisco Regional Water Control Board both approved the proposals subject to certain conditions. The Commission alleged that the Corps’ failure to comply with certain conditions violated the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. 1452(1). An environmental nonprofit organization intervened, contending that the Corps also violated the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1311(a), 1341(a)(1). The Commission sought a commitment from the Corps regarding what to do with the dredged material; in order to protect imperiled native fish, the Commission and Board sought to limit the Corps’ use of a certain dredging method (hydraulic dredging) in two specific Bay Channels.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in favor of the Corps. The condition about where to dispose of dredged material was not itself an enforceable policy under the CZMA and its implementing regulations, nor was it tied to any enforceable policy as contemplated by those regulations. The Corps was therefore not obligated to comply with that regulation. The Corps’ final 2017 plan complied with the express terms of the condition limiting the Corps’ hydraulic dredging in two particular channels. View "San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by SCAP challenging nonbinding guidance that the EPA issued to recommend a statistical method for assessing water toxicity. Plaintiffs alleged that the EPA had violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing the Test of Significant Toxicity (TST) guidance without following notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, and that the EPA had violated its own regulations by requiring and using the TST in discharge permits.After determining that it can consider both of the district court's dismissal orders, the panel explained that the APA allows a plaintiff to challenge only final agency action, and an agency's action is final only if it imposes legal consequences. In this case, the guidance at issue imposes no such consequences, and thus the APA does not permit this challenge. View "Southern California Alliance of Publicly Owned Treatment Works v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the EPA's findings and its conclusion that Arizona had achieved the statutory required reduction in ozone concentration by July 2018, in compliance with the Clean Air Act. After a major wildfire broke out in the San Bernardino National Forest in southeast California (the Lake Fire), three hundred miles east of the fire, six air quality monitors in the Phoenix region registered abnormally high concentrations of ozone, in excess of the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS).The panel concluded that EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding a clear causal connection between the Lake Fire and the June 20, 2015 exceedances. The panel explained that the evidence demonstrates that smoke (including ozone precursor chemicals) from the Lake Fire reached the exceedance monitors and caused abnormal ozone readings relative to similar historical conditions. Furthermore, petitioners failed to produce evidence sufficient to overcome the required deference to EPA's technical factual findings where EPA considered each of petitioners' comments during the proposed rule phase and addressed them with specificity; articulated a rational connection between the evidence and its own conclusions; and the resulting conclusion, based on the weight of the evidence, is rational.The panel also concluded that EPA did not act contrary to the Clean Air Act when it suspended the Phoenix nonattainment area's attainment contingency measures requirement after EPA issued a section 7511(b)(2) Attainment Determination. The panel concluded that the Clean Air Act is silent as to whether State Implementation Plans (SIPs) must contain attainment contingency measures after the attainment date and granted EPA's reasonable construction of 42 U.S.C. 7502(c)(9) under Chevron deference. View "Bahr v. Regan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in an action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that the Secretary violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to consider the environmental impacts of various immigration programs and immigration-related policies. Plaintiffs, organizations and individuals, seek to reduce immigration into the United States because it causes population growth, which in turn, they claim, has a detrimental effect on the environment.In regard to Count I, which challenged DHS's 2015 Instruction Manual, the panel concluded that the Manual does not constitute final agency action subject to the court's review under section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Therefore, the district court properly dismissed this count.In regard to Count II, which asserted that DHS implemented eight programs that failed to comply with NEPA, the panel concluded that Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), squarely foreclosed plaintiffs' request for judicial review of seven non-Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programs. Therefore, the panel agreed with the district court that none of these programs are reviewable because they are not discrete agency actions.In regard to Counts II, where plaintiffs challenged DACA, as well as Counts III-V, which facially challenged categorical exclusions (CATEXs), the panel concluded that plaintiffs lack Article III standing. In this case, the panel rejected plaintiffs' enticement theory and "more settled population" theory; plaintiffs made no attempt to tie CATEX A3 to any particular action by DHS; plaintiffs offered no evidence showing that population growth was a predictable effect of the DSO and STEM Rules, as well as the AC21 Rule; plaintiffs failed to show injury-in-fact or causation concerning their challenge to the International Entrepreneur Rule; any cumulative effect analysis required by NEPA did not bear on whether plaintiffs had standing to challenge the rules; plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the sufficiency of the environmental assessments and findings of no significant impact issued in relation to President Obama's Response to the Influx of Unaccompanied Alien Children Across the Southwest border. View "Whitewater Draw Natural Resource Conservation District v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law