Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision rejecting challenges to the Forest Service's determination that EFR had a valid existing right to operate a uranium mine on land within a withdrawal area of public lands around Grand Canyon National Park that the Secretary of the Interior withdrew from new mining claims. The panel held that the Mineral Report was a major federal action under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332, and that the district court correctly held that Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2013), not Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006), governed this case; that action was complete when the plan was approved; resumed operation of Canyon Mine did not require any additional government action; and thus the EIS prepared in 1988 satisfied NEPA. The panel also held that the Mineral Report approved an "undertaking" under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA), 54 U.S.C. 306108; the Mineral Report did not permit, license, or approve resumed operations at Canyon Mine; and the original approval was the only "undertaking" requiring consultation under the NHPA. Finally, the environmental groups did not have prudential standing to challenge the Mineral Report. View "Havasupai Tribe v. Provencio" on Justia Law

The unconstitutional legislative veto embedded in section 204(c)(1) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1714, is severable from the large-tract withdrawal authority delegated to the Secretary in that same subsection. Invalidating the legislative veto provision does not affect the Secretary's withdrawal authority. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision rejecting challenges to the decision of the Secretary to withdraw from new uranium mining claims, up to twenty years, over one million acres of land near Grand Canyon National Park. In this case, the panel held that the environmental impact statement (EIS) did take existing legal regimes into account but reasonably concluded that they were inadequate to meet the purposes of the withdrawal; the Establishment Clause challenge failed under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); and the panel rejected challenges under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332, and the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1604(e). View "National Mining Ass'n v. Zinke" on Justia Law

The broad waiver of sovereign immunity found in section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) waived sovereign immunity for all non-monetary claims, and section 704 of the APA's final agency action requirement constrained only actions brought under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702, 704. The Navajo Nation filed suit challenging Interior's published guidelines clarifying how it would make surplus and shortage determinations for delivery to Western states of the waters of the Colorado River. The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Nation's claims under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., based on lack of standing where the challenged guidelines did not present a reasonable probability of threat to either the Nation's adjudicated water rights or its practical water needs. The panel also held that the Nation's breach of trust claim sought relief other than money damages, and the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 applied squarely to the claim. Therefore, the panel reversed and remanded as to this issue. Finally, the district court acted within its discretion in refusing post-judgment leave to amend. View "Navajo Nation v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to PG&E and denial of summary judgment to EcoRights with respect to a stormwater pathway. The panel held that the district court erred in applying the antiduplication provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 1006(a), with respect to the stormwater pathway; the absence of a Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., permit requirement did not trigger RCRA's anti-duplication provision; and PG&E failed to identify any legal requirements under municipal permits applicable to it and inconsistent with EcoRights' requested RCRA relief. The panel remanded for the district court to consider EcoRights' arguments with respect to the stormwater pathway that the relevant wastes were "solid wastes" and that PG&E's actions presented an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment under RCRA. Finally, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment as to the tire-tracking pathway. View "Ecological Rights Foundation v. PG&E" on Justia Law

TDY filed a complaint under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1), seeking contribution from the government for its equitable share of the cleanup costs. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of judgment in favor of the United States, which allocated 100 percent of past and future CERCLA costs to TDY. The panel agreed with the district court that some deviation from the allocation affirmed in Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1049, and Cadillac Fairview, 299 F.3d at 1022–23, was warranted by distinguishing facts. However, the panel held that encumbering a military contractor with 100 percent of CERCLA cleanup costs that were largely incurred during war-effort production was a 180 degree departure from the panel's prior case law, and the out-of-circuit authority that the district court relied upon did not warrant such a sharp deviation. In this case, the district court did not adequately consider the parties' lengthy course of dealings and the government's requirement that TDY use two of the hazardous chemicals at issue. Accordingly, the court remanded for additional proceedings. View "TDY Holdings v. United States" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal government properly exercised its authority to regulate hovercraft use on the rivers within conservation system units in Alaska. The panel held that section 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. 3101 et seq., does not limit the Park Service from applying the hovercraft ban on the Nation River in Yukon-Charley because, under the panel's Katie John precedent, Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995), the United States has an implied reservation of water rights, rendering the river public lands. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Sturgeon v. Frost" on Justia Law

Wild Wilderness, a group representing non-motorized users, filed suit challenging the Forest Service's approval of the building of Kapka Sno-Park, alleging that the Forest Service had violated both the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The panel held that the case was neither moot nor lacking redressability; the Forest Service did not violate the NFMA because Kapka Sno-Park was not inconsistent with the Deschutes Forest Plan; and the Forest Service did not violate NEPA because the agency complied with the relevant regulations, completed an environmental assessment, and issued a finding of no significant impact. The panel rejected Wild Wilderness's remaining NEPA challenges. View "Wild Wilderness v. Allen" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's approval of a consent decree between the EPA and the Sierra Club that set a schedule for the EPA to promulgate designations whether geographic areas met national ambient air quality standards for sulfur dioxide under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401. The panel rejected the States' objections to the consent decree, holding that as long as the EPA sticks to the schedule in the consent decree, the Sierra Club will not advance its lawsuit against the EPA. Therefore, the consent decree did not prohibit the EPA from promulgating designations prior to those deadlines, nor did it otherwise constrain the agency's discretion. The panel explained that, because the consent decree did not bind the States to do nor not to do anything, imposed no legal duties or obligations on them at all, and did not purport to resolve any claims they might have, the States could not block the consent decree by merely withholding their consent. View "North Dakota v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the FWS in an action challenging the FWS's determination that the Sonoran Desert Area bald eagle was not a distinct population segment eligible for listing under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1533. The panel held that FWS reasonably concluded that, while the combination of unusual characteristics in a discrete population was sufficient to satisfy the persistence factor, those characteristics did not by themselves necessarily require a conclusion that the desert eagle population segment was ecologically or biologically significant for the bald eagle taxon as a whole; FWS reasonably concluded that if the desert eagle population segment were "extirpated," this would not create a significant gap in the range of the taxon; and FWS directly addressed climate change in its 2012 decision. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the Government's approval of the location, construction, and specifications for a military base in Okinawa, Japan. Plaintiffs sought claims for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the Government's alleged violations of Section 402 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 54 U.S.C. 307101(e), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs have standing to bring declaratory relief claims limited to whether the Government's evaluation, information gathering, and consultation process discharged the Government's obligations under the NHPA and otherwise satisfied the requirements of the APA. The panel also held that plaintiffs' injunctive relief claim did not present a political question. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief did not present a political question; reversed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek declaratory relief; and reversed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief presented a political question. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Mattis" on Justia Law