Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Sisters Nikki Mazzocchio and Angela Kraus filed a federal "public liability action" under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA) against several defendants, alleging that exposure to radioactive waste caused them to develop cancer. The waste had been handled by various entities over the years, including Mallinckrodt, Cotter Corporation, and Commonwealth Edison Company. The plaintiffs claimed negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, and civil conspiracy. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that federal law preempted the state-law claims because federal nuclear dosage regulations provide the exclusive standard of care in a public liability action. The district court denied the motions to dismiss, and the defendants appealed.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs' state-law claims were not preempted by federal law. The court found that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded their case under state tort law standards. The defendants then sought and were granted permission to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that state tort law standards of care are not preempted by federal nuclear dosage regulations in a public liability action under the PAA. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., which established that state tort law applies in cases involving nuclear incidents, despite the federal government's exclusive control over nuclear safety regulation. The court also noted that Congress, through the PAA's 1988 amendments, did not repudiate the role of state tort law in such cases. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, allowing the plaintiffs' state-law claims to proceed. View "Mazzocchio v. Cotter Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves the Center for Biological Diversity's efforts to protect the Canadian lynx, a threatened species, from incidental trapping in Minnesota. The Center sued the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, alleging that the state had not done enough to prevent trappers from accidentally capturing lynx. This led to a proposed consent decree requiring Minnesota to implement additional restrictions on trapping methods to protect the lynx.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case and approved the consent decree over objections from three pro-trapping organizations. These organizations argued that the decree was prejudicial and harmful to their interests and that state law did not permit the adoption of the new regulations in the manner proposed. The district court found the consent decree to be a reasonable compromise that balanced the interests of both parties and had a reasonable relationship to the claims and defenses in the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's approval of the consent decree. The appellate court examined whether the consent decree was procedurally fair and reasonable. It found that the negotiations were conducted in good faith and at arm's length, and that the trappers had ample opportunity to raise their objections. The court also determined that the consent decree was reasonable because it aimed to reduce the number of lynx deaths and furthered the objectives of the Endangered Species Act. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the consent decree and affirmed the judgment. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. MN Trappers Association" on Justia Law

The case involves over 1,420 Peruvian citizens alleging environmental harm due to exposure to toxic substances from the La Oroya Metallurgical Complex (LOMC) in Peru. The plaintiffs claim that Doe Run Resources Corporation and related entities, which purchased LOMC in 1997, failed to reduce lead emissions, resulting in unsafe lead levels and subsequent health issues. The plaintiffs argue that Doe Run's decision-making in the United States led to their injuries.Initially, the plaintiffs filed common law tort lawsuits in Missouri state court, which were removed to federal court and consolidated. The district court dismissed several claims and defendants but allowed the substantive negligence-based claims to proceed under Missouri law. Doe Run filed motions to dismiss based on international comity and to apply Peruvian law, both of which were denied by the district court. The court also denied summary judgment on the safe harbor defense and certified its choice-of-law and comity rulings for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying dismissal under the doctrine of international comity, as the harm occurred in Peru but the alleged conduct occurred in Missouri. The court also found that the Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) between the United States and Peru did not require dismissal, as the plaintiffs' claims were not explicitly addressed by the TPA. Additionally, the court determined that traditional comity factors did not necessitate dismissal, as neither the State Department nor the government of Peru had asserted their positions, and there was no adequate alternative forum in Peru. Lastly, the court concluded that extraterritoriality principles did not warrant abstention, as the plaintiffs' claims were based on conduct within the United States.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Reid v. Doe Run Resources Corp." on Justia Law

Teddy and Melanie Scott filed a lawsuit against Dyno Nobel, Inc., alleging that Teddy suffered serious injuries from exposure to a toxic gas cloud negligently emitted from Dyno’s nitric acid plant in Louisiana, Missouri. The incident occurred on March 20, 2015, when an equipment failure during a startup led to the release of nitrogen oxide gas, which enveloped Teddy while he was working at a nearby plant. Teddy experienced immediate physical symptoms and has since suffered from ongoing health issues, including irritable larynx syndrome, headaches, and back pain. Melanie claimed loss of consortium due to Teddy’s injuries.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri initially granted summary judgment in favor of Dyno, concluding that Dyno owed no duty of care to Teddy. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed this decision, finding that the issue of foreseeability, which determines duty, should be decided by a jury. On remand, a jury trial resulted in a verdict for the Scotts, awarding Teddy $13,750,000 in compensatory damages and $30 million in punitive damages, and Melanie $3 million in compensatory damages. Dyno’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment in part. The appellate court found that the jury had sufficient evidence to determine that Dyno’s actions created a foreseeable risk of harm and that Dyno breached its duty of care. However, the court reversed the award of punitive damages, concluding that the Scotts did not provide clear and convincing evidence that Dyno acted with a culpable mental state necessary for punitive damages under Missouri law. The case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment omitting the punitive damages award. View "Scott v. Dyno Nobel, Inc." on Justia Law

The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation (MHA), an Indian nation of three affiliated tribes, appealed the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approval of eight applications for oil drilling by the Slawson Exploration Company, Inc. next to Lake Sakakawea, MHA's sole source of drinking water. MHA challenged the approvals under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that BLM's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious due to an insufficient record and by precluding MHA from further developing the record about the threat the project posed to MHA's health and welfare.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to BLM and Slawson, dismissing the case with prejudice. The court found that BLM had engaged in reasoned decision-making and had evaluated all relevant factors. It noted that the agency placed the responsibility on Slawson to comply with tribal law without impeding MHA's ability as a sovereign to enforce its laws. The court also found that BLM's decision not to evaluate tribal law did not impact tribal sovereignty. The court concluded that MHA's jurisdiction over Slawson's project was not a relevant factor to the approvals and therefore further development of the record was not required.Furthermore, the court found that MHA was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as there was no dispute of material fact and MHA had adequate opportunities to submit evidence. Therefore, the court ruled that MHA had received all process required by the Constitution, laws, and agency regulation. View "Mandan, Hidatsa & Arikara Nation v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

Facing a tight deadline from the Ninth Circuit, the Environmental Protection Agency banned the use of chlorpyrifos on food crops. Two environmental groups petitioned the EPA in 2007 to have all tolerances revoked. In denying the petition, the EPA concluded that their objections were “not supported by valid, complete, and reliable evidence.”   The Eighth Circuit granted the petitions, finding that the EPA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court explained that in this case, the EPA believed it lacked discretion or at least acted that way. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion had already narrowed its options down to two: revoke the tolerances or modify them. With little time to act, the agency ruled out the second option, leaving only revocation by default. In doing so, however, it misread the statute and misunderstood the “scope of its discretion”. Therefore, the court set aside the decision as arbitrary and capricious. Further, the court explained that a partial ban was a real alternative for the EPA. It could have canceled some registrations and retained others that satisfied the statutory safety margin. View "RRVSG Assoc. v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

EEE Minerals, LLC, and a Trustee for The Vohs Family Revocable Living Trust, sued the State of North Dakota, the Board of University and School Lands, and the Board’s commissioner in a dispute over mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. Plaintiffs alleged that state law related to mineral ownership was preempted by federal law and that the defendants had engaged in an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiffs’ mineral interests. Plaintiffs sought damages, an injunction, and declaratory relief. The district court dismissed the action.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs contend that the Flood Control Act impliedly preempts the North Dakota statute because the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” The court explained that it is not convinced that the State’s determination of a high-water mark, and the attendant settling of property rights under state law, stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the objectives of the Flood Control Act. The court wrote that the interests of the United States and the goals of the Flood Control Act are unaffected by a dispute between the State and a private party over mineral rights that were not acquired by the federal government.   Further, the court explained that Plaintiffs have not established that the United States will be prevented from flooding or inundating any land covered by the 1957 deed in which the State claims ownership of mineral interests under state law. The Flood Control Act would not dictate that property rights be assigned to Plaintiffs. View "EEE Minerals, LLC v. State of North Dakota" on Justia Law

Several cities in Minnesota alleged that a chemical in refined coal tar that was used in pavement sealants contaminated their stormwater ponds. They filed an action seeking damages from refiners and manufacturers of the tar. The “refiner” defendants take raw coal tar and refine it into a product used by the “manufacturer” defendants to create pavement sealants. The district court dismissed all of the claims against the refiners and dismissed all but three of the claims against the manufacturers. The Cities moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for entry of final judgment against the refiners. The district court, however, denied the motion because the Cities had not “demonstrated a danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.” The Cities then entered into an agreement with the manufacturers, which provided that the Cities would conditionally dismiss their claims against the manufacturers. The Cities then appealed the district court’s decision dismissing claims against the refiners, and some of the refiners cross-appealed.   The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that this conditional dismissal of the Cities’ claims against the manufacturers does not create a final decision under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291. The whole purpose of pairing the voluntary dismissal with the tolling agreement was to provide for reinstatement of the claims in the event of reversal—that is, to make the dismissal conditional. The court wrote that its only power to prevent the manipulation of appellate jurisdiction is a rigorous application of the final judgment requirement. View "City of Burnsville v. Koppers, Inc." on Justia Law

In June 1949, Axel Anderson conveyed to L.S. Youngblood a ½ mineral interest in several tracts of land in Mountrail County, North Dakota (“the Disputed Lands”)In 2011, with the Andersons and Henry Johnson now deceased, grantee Johnson’s successors filed a quiet title action in state court against Nancy Finkle and grantor Andersons’ other successors to resolve the over conveyance, seeking title to a ½ mineral interest in the Disputed Lands (“the Finkle Litigation”).inkle appealed the quiet title order and judgment, arguing that an exception to the Duhig rule that is not at issue in this appeal applied and therefore the trial court should have awarded each side a 1/4 mineral interest in the Disputed Lands. In January 2008, Finkle, a successor to grantor Andersons’ mineral interests, conveyed by oil and gas lease her mineral interest leasehold and operating rights in the Disputed Lands to Montana Oil Properties, Inc. Northern Oil did not participate while Finkle defended the Johnson successors’ quiet title claim and asserted her own deed reformation counterclaim in state court.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendant on the ground that due to an over-conveyance of rights, Plaintiff had not obtained any mineral rights in the subject property when it acquired its interest in a leasehold. Further, the court held that the district court granted summary judgment dismissing Northern Oil’s reformation claim as time-barred by the ten-year statute of limitations in N.D.C.C. Section 28-01-15(2), applying a Supreme Court of North Dakota decision issued after the Finkle Litigation, Western Energy Corp. v. Stauffer, 921 N.W.2d 431, 434-35 (N.D. 2019). View "Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. v. EOG Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

In September 2018, the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation (“the Bureau”) decided to move forward with a water project in North Dakota. The State of Missouri challenged the decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. Sections 701–706, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. Sections 4321–4347, and the Water Supply Act of 1958 (“Water Supply Act”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Water Supply Act itself. Simply put, Congressional approval is Congressional approval. If the Bureau and the other defendants had sufficient project-specific authorization, they need not seek additional approval again under the Water Supply Act. The court further concluded that Missouri has not met its burden to show the Bureau’s reliance on the Garrison Diversion Act was erroneous here. First, Missouri has not shown the Central North Dakota Project is outside the scope of the 1984 Garrison Diversion Final Report. Second, Missouri’s only argument that the Central North Dakota Project involves an out-of-basin transfer is to point to its connection with the Red River Valley Project’s main transmission pipeline. View "State of Missouri v. U.S. Department of Interior" on Justia Law