Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Supreme Court
Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved California regulations under the Clean Air Act that require automakers to produce more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles to reduce emissions. Several fuel producers, including those of gasoline and ethanol, sued the EPA, arguing that the EPA lacked the authority to approve these regulations as they target global climate change rather than local air quality issues. The fuel producers claimed that the regulations would significantly reduce the demand for liquid fuels, causing them monetary injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the fuel producers lacked Article III standing. The court found that the fuel producers failed to demonstrate that automakers would likely respond to the invalidation of the regulations by producing fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles, thus failing to establish redressability.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge the EPA’s approval of the California regulations. The Court found that the fuel producers demonstrated injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The Court reasoned that the regulations likely cause monetary injury to the fuel producers by reducing the demand for gasoline and other liquid fuels. The Court also found that invalidating the regulations would likely redress the injury by increasing the sales of gasoline-powered vehicles and, consequently, the demand for liquid fuels. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law
Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas
Interim Storage Partners (ISP) applied for a license to build a facility in West Texas to store spent nuclear fuel. During the licensing process, a Texas government agency and Fasken Land and Minerals, a private business, submitted comments on the draft environmental impact statement prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Fasken also sought to intervene in the licensing proceeding but was denied by the NRC. Fasken challenged this denial before the full Commission and the D.C. Circuit but was unsuccessful.In September 2021, the NRC granted ISP a license to build and operate the storage facility. Texas and Fasken sought review of the NRC's licensing decision in the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit vacated ISP's license, allowing Texas and Fasken to challenge the NRC's decision despite not being parties to the licensing proceeding.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Texas and Fasken were not entitled to judicial review of the NRC's licensing decision because they were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding. The Court emphasized that under the Hobbs Act, only a "party aggrieved" by a licensing order of the Commission may seek judicial review. To qualify as a party, one must be the license applicant or have successfully intervened in the proceeding. Since Texas and Fasken did not meet these criteria, they could not obtain judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded the case with instructions to deny or dismiss the petitions for review. View "Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas" on Justia Law
Environmental Protection Agency v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C.
The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its denial of small refinery exemption petitions under the Clean Air Act's (CAA) renewable fuel program. The CAA requires most domestic refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels, with a phased exemption scheme for small refineries. Following a Supreme Court decision in HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn., the EPA reconsidered and ultimately denied 105 exemption petitions in 2022, based on its interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" and an economic theory that Renewable Identification Number (RIN) costs are passed through to consumers.The small refineries challenged these denials in multiple regional Circuits. Most Circuits either dismissed the challenges for improper venue or transferred them to the D.C. Circuit. However, the Fifth Circuit retained jurisdiction, ruling that the EPA's actions were locally applicable and not based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect, as the EPA still examined refinery-specific facts before issuing denials.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit. The Court concluded that the EPA's interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" and its RIN passthrough theory were determinations of nationwide scope or effect that formed the core basis for the denials. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit erred in retaining jurisdiction, and the case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Environmental Protection Agency v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C." on Justia Law
Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency
The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) disapproval of state emissions-control plans submitted by Oklahoma and Utah. The EPA disapproved these plans, asserting that they did not comply with the Clean Air Act's (CAA) "Good Neighbor" provision, which requires states to prevent their emissions from significantly contributing to air quality problems in other states. The EPA aggregated its disapprovals into a single rule and claimed that the rule was nationally applicable, or alternatively, that it was based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.The states and energy-industry petitioners challenged the EPA's disapprovals in regional Circuits. The EPA moved to dismiss these challenges or transfer them to the D.C. Circuit. Four out of five Circuits found that regional Circuit review was proper. However, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and transferred the challenges to the D.C. Circuit, reasoning that the EPA's omnibus rule constituted a single, nationally applicable action.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the Tenth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions, not nationally applicable. The Court further held that the "nationwide scope or effect" exception did not apply because the EPA's disapprovals were based on state-specific, fact-intensive analyses rather than on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law
Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County
A group of seven Utah counties, known as the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition, applied to the U.S. Surface Transportation Board for approval to construct an 88-mile railroad line in Utah's Uinta Basin. This project aimed to connect the oil-rich region to the national freight rail network, facilitating crude oil transportation to Gulf Coast refineries. The Board prepared a 3,600-page Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addressing the project's significant environmental effects and feasible alternatives. However, the EIS did not fully analyze the potential environmental impacts of increased upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed the case after petitions were filed by a Colorado county and several environmental organizations. The D.C. Circuit found numerous violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the EIS, specifically criticizing the Board for not sufficiently analyzing the environmental effects of upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining. Consequently, the D.C. Circuit vacated both the EIS and the Board's final approval order for the railroad line.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision. The Court held that the D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases. The Supreme Court clarified that NEPA requires agencies to focus on the environmental effects of the proposed project itself, not on separate projects that are distinct in time or place. The Court concluded that the Board's EIS complied with NEPA's procedural requirements by addressing the environmental effects of the 88-mile railroad line, without needing to evaluate the impacts of upstream oil drilling or downstream oil refining. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County" on Justia Law
City and County of San Francisco v. EPA
The City and County of San Francisco operates two combined wastewater treatment facilities that process both wastewater and stormwater. During heavy precipitation, these facilities may discharge untreated water into the Pacific Ocean or San Francisco Bay. In 2019, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a renewal permit for San Francisco's Oceanside facility, adding two "end-result" requirements. These requirements prohibited discharges that contribute to violations of water quality standards and discharges that create pollution, contamination, or nuisance as defined by California law. San Francisco challenged these provisions, arguing they exceeded the EPA's statutory authority.The California Regional Water Quality Control Board and the EPA approved the final Oceanside NPDES permit. San Francisco appealed to the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board, which rejected the challenge. The City then petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit, which denied the petition. The Ninth Circuit held that the Clean Water Act (CWA) authorizes the EPA to impose any limitations necessary to ensure water quality standards are met in receiving waters.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Section 1311(b)(1)(C) of the CWA does not authorize the EPA to include "end-result" provisions in NPDES permits. The Court reasoned that determining the specific steps a permittee must take to meet water quality standards is the EPA's responsibility, and Congress has provided the necessary tools for the EPA to make such determinations. The Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit's decision, emphasizing that the EPA must set specific rules for permittees to follow rather than imposing broad end-result requirements. View "City and County of San Francisco v. EPA" on Justia Law
Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.
Peat mining companies sought a Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1311(a), 1362, permit from the Army Corps of Engineers, to discharge material onto wetlands on property that they own and hope to mine. The Corps issued a jurisdictional designation (JD) stating that the property contained “waters of the United States” because its wetlands had a “significant nexus” to the Red River of the North, located 120 miles away. The district court dismissed their appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that the JD was not a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy,” 5 U.S.C. 704. The Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Corps’ approved JD is a final agency action judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act. An approved JD clearly “mark[s] the consummation” of the Corps’ decision-making on whether particular property contains “waters of the United States.” It is issued after extensive fact-finding regarding the property’s physical and hydrological characteristics and typically remains valid for five years. The Corps describes approved JDs as “final agency action.” The definitive nature of approved JDs gives rise to “direct and appreciable legal consequences.” A “negative” creates a five-year safe harbor from governmental civil enforcement proceedings and limits the potential liability for violating the Act. An “affirmative” JD, like issued here, deprives property owners of the five-year safe harbor. Parties need not await enforcement proceedings before challenging final agency action where such proceedings carry the risk of “serious criminal and civil penalties.” The permitting process is costly and lengthy, and irrelevant to the finality of the approved JD and its suitability for judicial review. View "Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co." on Justia Law
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency
The Clean Air Act requires permits for stationary sources, such as factories and powerplants. The Act’s “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD) provisions make it unlawful to construct or modify a “major emitting facility” in “any area to which [PSD program] applies” without a permit, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C). A “major emitting facility” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” (or 100 tons per year for certain sources). Facilities seeking a PSD permit must comply with emissions limitations that reflect the “best available control technology” (BACT) for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act and it is unlawful to operate any “major source,” wherever located, without a permit. A “major source” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air pollutant,” under Title V of the Act. In response to the Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA promulgated greenhouse-gas (GHG) emission standards for new vehicles, and made stationary sources subject to the PSD program and Title V, based on potential GHG emissions. Recognizing that requiring permits for all sources with GHG emissions above statutory thresholds would render the programs unmanageable, EPA purported to “tailor” the programs to accommodate GHGs by providing that sources would not become newly subject to PSD or Title V permitting on the basis of their potential to emit GHGs in amounts less than 100,000 tons per year. The D.C. Circuit dismissed some challenges to the tailoring rule for lack of jurisdiction and denied the rest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the Act does not permit an interpretation requiring a source to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of potential GHG emissions. The Massachusetts decision held that the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” includes GHGs, but with respect to PSD and Title V permitting provisions, EPA has employed a narrower, context-appropriate meaning. Massachusetts did not invalidate the long-standing constructions. “The Act-wide definition is not a command to regulate, but a description of the universe of substances EPA may consider regulating.” The presumption of consistent usage yields to context and distinct statutory objects call for different implementation strategies. EPA has repeatedly acknowledged that applying PSD and Title V permitting requirements to GHGs would be inconsistent with the Act’s structure and design, which concern “a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.” EPA lacked authority to “tailor” the Act’s unambiguous numerical thresholds to accommodate its GHG-inclusive interpretation. EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require sources that would need permits based on emission of conventional pollutants to comply with BACT for GHGs. BACT, which has traditionally been about end-of-stack controls, may be fundamentally unsuited to GHG regulation, but applying BACT to GHGs is not "disastrously unworkable," and need not result in a dramatic expansion of agency authority. View "Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 960, contains a provision (section 9658) that preempts statutes of limitations applicable to state-law actions for personal injury or property damage arising from the release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant into the environment. Section 9658 adopts the discovery rule, so that statutes of limitations begin to run when a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the harm was caused by the contaminant because person who is exposed to a toxic contaminant may not develop or show signs of resulting injury for many years. CTS sold property on which it had stored chemicals as part its operations as an electronics plant; 24 years later, owners of parts of that property and adjacent landowners, sued, alleging damages from the stored contaminants. CTS moved to dismiss, citing a state statute of repose that prevented subjecting a defendant to a tort suit brought more than 10 years after the defendant’s last culpable act. Because CTS’s last act occurred when it sold the property, the district court granted the motion. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the statute’s remedial purpose favored preemption. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that section 9658 does not pre-empt state statutes of repose. Statutes of limitations promote justice by encouraging plaintiffs to pursue claims diligently and begin to run when a claim accrues. Statutes of repose effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from liability after a legislatively determined amount of time and are measured from the date of the defendant’s last culpable actor omission. Under the language of the statute, pre-emption is characterized as an exception to the regular rule that the “the statute of limitations established under State law” applies; it is proper to conclude that Congress did not intend to preempt statutes of repose. View "CTS Corp. v. Waldburger" on Justia Law
Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P.
The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for pollutants at levels that will protect public health, 42 U.S.C. 7408. Once EPA establishes NAAQS, it designates “nonattainment” areas; each state must submit a State Implementation Plan, (SIP), within three years of any new or revised NAAQS. From the date EPA determines that a SIP is inadequate, EPA has two years to promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). SIPs must comply with a Good Neighbor Provision, and “contain adequate provisions ... prohibiting .. . any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will ... contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with respect to” NAAQS. In response to flaws in its 2005 Clean Air Interstate Rule, identified by the D. C. Circuit, EPA promulgated the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (Transport Rule), curbing nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions in 27 upwind states to achieve downwind attainment of three NAAQS and providing that an upwind state contributed significantly to downwind nonattainment if its exported pollution produced at least one percent of a NAAQS in a downwind state and could be eliminated cost-effectively. EPA created an annual emissions “budget” for each upwind state and contemporaneously promulgated FIPs allocating each state’s budget among its pollution sources. The D.C. Circuit vacated the rule as exceeding EPA’s authority. The Supreme Court reversed. The CAA does not require that states be given another opportunity to file a SIP after EPA has quantified interstate pollution obligations. Disapproval of a SIP, without more, triggers EPA’s obligation to issue a FIP within precise deadlines. That EPA had previously accorded upwind states a chance to allocate emission budgets among their sources does not show that it acted arbitrarily by refraining to do so in this instance. The Good Neighbor Provision does not dictate a method of apportionment, so EPA had authority to select from among reasonable options; nothing precludes the final calculation from relying on costs. By imposing uniform cost thresholds on regulated states, the rule is efficient and is stricter on states that have done less pollution control in the past and does not amount to “over-control.” View "Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P." on Justia Law