Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from the EPA's administration of a cap-and-trade program regulating the production and consumption of hydrochlorofluorcarbons (HCFCs) under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7671d(c), 7671e(b). The program entailed overall caps on production and consumption of various HCFCs for each year, as well as EPA-administered baseline allowances of HCFCs for each participating company. Companies were then permitted to transfer their allowances subject to certain statutory and regulatory restrictions. Honeywell complained that certain 2008 transfers made by their competitors Arkema and Solvay were deemed to permanently increase those competitors' future baseline allowances of HCFCs. The court concluded that Honeywell's claim was foreclosed by the court's decision in Arkema, Inc. V. EPA, which held that the EPA, having approved the 2008 interpollutant transfers, had to honor them in the future at least so long as the EPA continued to set baselines by considering the historical usage of HCFCs by participating companies. The Arkema Court necessarily concluded that permanent interpollutant transfers were permissible under the statute. Absent en banc review, the court must adhere to circuit precedent. Because Honeywell's other challenges to the 2008 transfers were meritless, the court denied the petition for review. View "Honeywell International, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

ARTBA challenged the EPA's regulations relating to nonroad engines and vehicles several years after the regulations were promulgated. As such, ARTBA's challenges to the regulations were time-barred under the Clean Air Act's, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), 60-day filing period. ARTBA also challenged the EPA's approval of California's State Implementation Plan, but that challenged must be brought in the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "American Road & Transportation v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of two final rules, promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7501-7509a, 7513-7513b, which governed implementation of the national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for "fine" particulate matter. The court held that the EPA erred in applying the provisions of Subpart 1 of Part D of Title 1 of the Act rather than the particulate-matter-specific provisions of Subpart 4 of Part D of Title I. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

Appellees sued to compel the Service to comply with deadlines set forth in the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3), for determining whether to list species as endangered or threatened. As the case neared settlement, the Safari Club moved to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 in the order to oppose the settlements which would include three species that its members hunt. On appeal, the Safari Club challenged the district court's denial of intervention, contending that it qualified for intervention as of right, as well as permissively. Because the Safari Club failed to identify a violation of a procedural right afforded by the ESA that was designed to protect its interests, the district court did not err in ruling that the Safari Club lacked standing and therefore was ineligible to intervene as of right. The court affirmed the decision of the district court without reaching the Safari Club's objections to the settlement agreements. View "In re: Endangered Species Act Section 4" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's rulemaking regarding hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). At issue was whether section 112(c)(6) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7412(c)(6), required the EPA to impose the same stringency levels in standards for non-112(c)(6) HAPs occurring at section 112(c)(6) sources that it did for section 112(c)(6) HAPs. The EPA rejected the claim that section 112(c)(6)'s cross-reference to section 112(d)(2) required that the EPA subject all HAPs emitted by a section 112(c)(6) source to standards at the stringency level specified by section 112(d)(2). The EPA also made clear that, despite language in the Gold Mine Rule arguably suggesting that it covered "fugitive emissions" - namely emissions from certain sources - in fact the rule did not address such emissions. The court rejected petitioners' claims challenging the EPA's rulemaking and affirmed the EPA's order. View "Desert Citizens Against Pollution, et al v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

Sierra Club challenged a determination of the EPA, which announced that it had met the regulatory obligations imposed on it by section 112(c)(6) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7412(c)(6). The court concluded that the determination was a legislative rulemaking subject to the notice-and-comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553. Because the EPA issued the determination without providing notice and opportunity for comment, the court vacated and remanded for the agency to follow those procedures. View "Sierra Club v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a petition to review the EPA's August 2011 implementation of the statutory good neighbor requirement, the Transport Rule, also known as the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, which defined emissions reduction responsibilities for 28 upwind States based on those States' contributions to downwind States' air quality problems. The court held that the Transport Rule exceeded the EPA's statutory authority (1) by using the good neighbor provision to impose massive emissions reduction requirements on upwind States without regard to the limits imposed by the statutory text and (2) by departing from its consistent prior approach to implementing the good neighbor provision and violating the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., because it did not allow the States the initial opportunity to implement the required reductions with respect to sources within their borders. View "EME Homer City Generation, L.P v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Fish and Wildlife Services, an agency in the Department of the Interior, removed the West Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel from the list of endangered species. Friends of Blackwater filed a complaint in the district court claiming (1) promulgation of the delisting rule violated the Endangered Species Act by ignoring the objective, measurable criteria in the Recovery Plan and (2) the Rule itself was arbitrary and capricious. The district court entered summary judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the Service violated the Act by removing the squirrel from the list of endangered species when several criteria in the agency's Recovery Plan for the species had not been satisfied. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the district court erred by interpreting the Recovery Plan as binding the Secretary of the Interior in his delisting decision; and (2) the Service's action was not arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. View "Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Several states and state regulatory agencies, together with corporations and industrial associations, petitioned for review of the EPA's rule entitled "Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Sulfur Dioxide" and of the subsequent denial of petitions for reconsideration of the standard. Petitioners contended (1) the EPA failed to follow notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, and (2) the agency arbitrarily set the maximum sulfur dioxide concentration at a level lower than statutorily authorized. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal dismissed the petitions in part and denied them in part, holding (1) the challenge to the rulemaking procedure was not within the Court's jurisdiction and must be dismissed; and (2) the EPA did not act arbitrarily in setting the level of sulfur dioxide emissions and therefore, the Court denied that portion of the petitions for review. View "Nat'l Envtl. Dev. Ass'n's Clean Air Project v. EPA" on Justia Law

In an earlier decision in this case, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that Movants, a group of Native American tribes and tribal associations who intervened on behalf of petitioners in the underlying Clean Air Act litigation, were entitled to fees and costs under section 307(f) of the Act. When the parties were unable to agree on the amount of fees, Movants filed an updated motion seeking $369,027, including compensation for 1,181 hours of work and for costs. The EPA held that the fee request was excessive. The D.C. Circuit agreed and awarded Movants $108,609 in compensation for attorney time and $3,186 in costs, holding that Movants reasonably expended 356 hours on the litigation. View "New Jersey v. EPA" on Justia Law