Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP and other plaintiffs incurred cleanup costs at a site on the Kalamazoo River in Michigan due to pollution from paper mills. In 1995, Georgia-Pacific and other companies formed the Kalamazoo River Study Group (KRSG) and sought a declaration of shared liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA § 107. In 1998, the district court declared KRSG members, including Georgia-Pacific, liable for the entire cost of response activities at the site. Subsequent judgments in 2000 and 2003 confirmed this liability.In 2010, Georgia-Pacific filed a lawsuit against NCR Corporation, International Paper Company, and Weyerhaeuser Company, asserting claims under both CERCLA § 107(a) and § 113(f) for cleanup costs. The district court found NCR and International Paper liable and apportioned liability among the parties. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Georgia-Pacific’s § 113(f) claims were time-barred and that Georgia-Pacific could not pursue § 107(a) claims for costs within the scope of the 1998 judgment.On remand, the district court vacated its judgment under § 113(f) but re-entered a declaratory judgment under § 107, declaring Georgia-Pacific, International Paper, and Weyerhaeuser liable for future response costs. International Paper and Weyerhaeuser appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s declaratory judgment under § 107. The court held that Georgia-Pacific could not pursue a § 107(a) claim for costs within the scope of the 1998 judgment, as those costs were recoverable only under § 113(f). The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the scope of the 1998 judgment and allowed Georgia-Pacific to bring § 107(a) claims for costs outside that scope. View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

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Several hundred children in Benton Harbor, Michigan, suffered from elevated lead levels in their blood after drinking lead-contaminated water from the city’s public water system for three years. Plaintiffs, represented by their guardians, filed a lawsuit against various state and city officials, as well as two engineering firms, alleging that these parties failed to mitigate the lead-water crisis and misled the public about the dangers of the drinking water. The claims included substantive-due-process and state-created-danger claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law negligence claims.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the complaint in full. The court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a violation of their constitutional rights and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their federal claims against the city and state officials and the state-law claims against one of the engineering firms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the state officials, finding that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that these officials acted with deliberate indifference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the claims against the city officials and the City of Benton Harbor, finding that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that these officials misled the public about the safety of the water, thereby causing the plaintiffs to drink contaminated water. The court also reversed the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against the engineering firm and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor" on Justia Law

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Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (TGP) proposed constructing a 32-mile natural gas pipeline across several Tennessee counties, which would involve crossing numerous waterbodies. TGP applied for a § 404 permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), a § 401 water quality certification from the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), and a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Corps issued the § 404 permit, allowing TGP to discharge materials into waterbodies during construction.The Corps issued public notices and received comments on TGP’s application. TGP responded to these comments, explaining its assessment of alternative routes and crossing methods. FERC issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement, concluding that the Pipeline would not result in significant environmental impacts. TDEC issued a § 401 water quality certification, and FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The Corps then issued the § 404 permit with special conditions, including requirements for TGP to use the least impactful trenching techniques and obtain approval before using blasting methods.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Corps' decision. The court held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing the § 404 permit. The Corps properly assessed practicable alternatives to open-cut trenching, determined that TGP’s proposed rock-removal methods were the least environmentally damaging practicable alternatives, and correctly relied on TDEC’s § 401 water quality certification. The court also found that the Corps provided sufficient support for its conclusions regarding suspended particulates and turbidity and adequately assessed the cumulative effects of the Pipeline’s construction. The court denied the petition for review. View "Appalachian Voices v. Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation’s (TDEC) issuance of a water quality certification to Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (TGP) for the construction and operation of a 32-mile natural gas pipeline in Tennessee. The pipeline would cross over one hundred bodies of water and require drilling across rocky terrain. Environmental groups Sierra Club and Appalachian Voices argue that TDEC failed to properly assess TGP’s application and ensure that the pipeline would not cause significant environmental damage.The lower court, TDEC, issued the water quality certification to TGP, authorizing temporary and permanent impacts to various water bodies and wetlands. TDEC imposed several conditions on TGP to minimize environmental disruption, including selecting the least impactful trenching techniques and obtaining written authorization before using controlled blasting. Petitioners filed a timely Petition for Review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing that TDEC’s issuance of the certification violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that TDEC did not violate the APA. The court held that TDEC adequately evaluated the water quality certification application and reasonably explained its decision-making process regarding waterbody crossings, rock removal methodology, downstream sedimentation, trench excavation, and baseline conditions of waterbodies. The court concluded that TDEC’s actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or inconsistent with its regulations. Consequently, the court denied the Petition for Review. View "Sierra Club v. Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation" on Justia Law

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The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (Sault Tribe) objected to the district court’s entry of the 2023 Great Lakes Fishing Decree, which resulted from a three-year negotiation among seven sovereigns, including the United States, the State of Michigan, and several Indian tribes. The 2023 Decree aimed to balance the Tribes’ treaty-reserved fishing rights with the preservation of the fishery waters. The Sault Tribe argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the decree without its consent and failed to evaluate the decree’s tribal fishing regulations based on the standard set out in People v. LeBlanc.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan overruled the Sault Tribe’s objections and entered the 2023 Decree, binding the Sault Tribe to its terms. The court concluded that it had the authority to approve the decree based on its continuing jurisdiction and equitable powers, and that the LeBlanc standard did not apply because the decree was a product of negotiation, not unilateral state regulation. The court also found that the Sault Tribe’s specific objections did not show that the decree was unreasonable or inconsistent with the treaty or the law of the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s entry of the 2023 Decree. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising its continuing jurisdiction and inherent equitable power to enter the decree over the Sault Tribe’s objections. The court found that the district court had followed the appropriate legal standards and provided the Sault Tribe with due process by allowing it to file objections, present evidence, and argue its objections in an oral hearing. The appellate court also dismissed as moot the Sault Tribe’s appeal of the district court’s order extending the 2000 Decree, as the 2000 Decree was no longer in effect. View "United States v. Michigan" on Justia Law

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Nearly 20 years after defendants built, sold, and leased back a Rockport Indiana coal-burning power plant, they committed, in a consent decree resolving lawsuits involving alleged Clean Air Act violations at their other power plants, to either make over a billion dollars of emission control improvements to the plant, or shut it down. The sale and leaseback arrangement was a means of financing construction. Defendants then obtained a modification to the consent decree providing that these improvements need not be made until after their lease expired, pushing their commitments to improve the air quality of the plant’s emissions to the plaintiff, the investors who had financed construction and who would own the plant after the 33-year lease term. The district court held this encumbrance did not violate the parties’ contracts governing the sale and leaseback, and that plaintiff’s breach of contract claims precluded it from maintaining an alternative cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a Permitted Lien exception in the lease unambiguously supports the plaintiff’s position and that the defendants’ actions “materially adversely affected’ plaintiff’s interests. View "Wilmington Trust Co. v. AEP Generating Co." on Justia Law

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DTE's Monroe plaint is the largest coal-fired power plant in Michigan; in 2010, DTE undertook a $65 million overhaul. The day before construction began, DTE submitted notice to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality stating that DTE predicted an increase in post-construction emissions 100 times greater than the minimum necessary to constitute a “major modification” and require a preconstruction permit. DTE characterized the projects as routine maintenance,exempt from New Source Review (NSR) under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7475, 7503, and stated that it had excluded the entire predicted emissions increase from its projections of post-construction emissions based on “demand growth.” DTE began construction without an NSR permit. The EPA filed suit. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit held that a utility seeking to modify a source of air pollutants must “make a preconstruction projection of whether and to what extent emissions from the source will increase following construction,” which “determines whether the project constitutes a ‘major modification’ and thus requires a permit.” On remand, the district court again entered summary judgment for DTE, concluding that the EPA had to accept DTE’s projections at face value. The Sixth Circuit reversed. DTE was not required to secure the EPA’s approval of the projections, or the project, before construction, but in proceeding without a permit, DTE acted at its own risk. The EPA can challenge DTE’s preconstruction projections and there are genuine disputes of material fact that preclude summary judgment regarding compliance with NSR’s preconstruction requirements. The court noted that construction is complete and that actual post-construction emissions are irrelevant o whether DTE’s preconstruction projections complied with the regulations. View "United States v. DTE Energy Co." on Justia Law

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In 1949, the federal government deeded a large parcel to the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District (MWCD), the entity responsible for controlling flooding in eastern Ohio. The deed provided that the land would revert to the United States if MWCD alienated or attempted to alienate it, or if MWCD stopped using the land for recreation, conservation, or reservoir-development purposes. MWCD sold rights to conduct hydraulic fracturing (fracking) operations on the land. Fracking opponents discovered the deed restrictions and, arguing that MWCD’s sale of fracking rights triggered the reversion, filed a “qui tam” suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729. alleging that MWCD was knowingly withholding United States property from the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claim. The court noted recent legislative amendments that replace a fraudulent-intent requirement in two FCA provisions with a requirement that the defendant acted “knowingly,” but concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim even under the more lenient scienter requirement; they did not specify whether or how MWCD knew or should have known that it was in violation of the deed restrictions, such that it knew or should have known that title to the property reverted to the United States. View "Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District" on Justia Law

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In 2012, plaintiffs sued the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321, by implementing a right-of-way vegetation-maintenance policy without conducting the required environmental review. The policy required TVA to cut down all trees within its right of ways that were 15-feet tall or had the potential to grow to 15 feet. TVA right-of-way specialists previously had discretion over which trees to remove. Plaintiffs claim that this policy change is a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” The district court found that the new “policy” was merely a clarification of longstanding practices and that 2012 Categorical Exclusion (CE) documentation adequately considered the environmental impact. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. On remand, instead of compiling an administrative record, TVA moved to dismiss the case because TVA had reverted to the practices that were utilized before the introduction of the 15-foot rule. TVA submitted two affidavits stating that the responsible TVA official had suspended use of the policy; plaintiffs introduced evidence indicating that TVA had not abandoned the policy. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The record evidence suggests that TVA’s challenged policy has a continuing effect, TVA failed to prove that the NEPA claim is moot. View "Sherwood v. Tennessee Valley Authority" on Justia Law

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Pursuant to 30 U.S.C. 185(a), in 1953, the U.S. Forest Service issued Enbridge’s predecessor a permit for use of an 8.10-mile strip within the Lower Michigan National Forest for a crude oil pipeline (Line 5). In 1992, USFS reissued the permit through December 2012, noting that USFS “shall renew the authorization” if the line "is being operated and maintained in accordance with" the authorization and other applicable laws. In 2011-2012, after a different Enbridge pipeline spilled oil into the Kalamazoo River, Enbridge obtained permit amendments to install “emergency flow release device[s]” on Line 5. In 2012, Enbridge requested permit renewal for Line 5. USFS conducted field studies on the potential impact on wildlife and vegetation; contacted the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to confirm compliance with pipeline regulations; and accepted public comments. USFS proposed a categorical exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), from the requirement of an Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment, categorizing the application as replacement of an existing or expired special use authorization, "the only changes are administrative, there are not changes to the authorized facilities or increases in the scope or intensity of authorized activities, and the holder is in full compliance." Sierra Club objected, noting that no EA or EIS had ever been completed for Line 5 because the original permit issued before enactment of NEPA and that intensity of activities along the pipeline had increased. USFS granted a categorical exclusion after considering biological assessment reports and finding “no extraordinary circumstances which may result in significant individual or cumulative effects on the quality of the environment.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, upholding re-issue of Enbridge’s permit. USFS followed appropriate decision-making processes and reached a non-arbitrary conclusion. View "Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv." on Justia Law