Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

ONDA filed suit challenging a wind-energy development on the ground that the BLM's environmental review of the project did not adequately address impacts to the greater sage grouse. The court concluded that the BLM’s review did not adequately assess baseline sage grouse numbers during winter at the Echanis site, where the wind turbines are to be installed. Because this error was not harmless, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the BLM and others as to this issue. However, the court concluded that ONDA did not exhaust its argument regarding genetic connectivity where ONDA did not bring the issue to the BLM's attention during the environmental review process. Accordingly, the issue was not exhausted and is not subject to review. View "ONDA v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The Coalition filed suit under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., challenging the issuance of a 2009 Finding Of No Significant Impact based on a 2009 Environmental Assessment for redevelopment of a four-block site owned by the United States Navy in downtown San Diego. On appeal, the Coalition challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Federal Defendants, as well as the denial of the Coalition's motion for summary judgment against the Federal Defendants. In San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, this court held that while “security considerations may permit or require modification of some . . . NEPA procedures,” such modifications do not absolve an agency for its legal duty to fulfill NEPA’s requirements, such as public contribution to the NRC’s decision-making process. The court determined that the NRC’s categorical dismissal of the possibility of a terrorist attack was unreasonable and remanded for further proceedings. In this case, given the government’s assessed general risk of terrorism, the location of the redevelopment project, and the military commands to be housed in the Navy Broadway Complex, the court rejected the Federal Defendants’ arguments against applying Mothers for Peace I and find that they must address the risk of a possible terrorist attack in their NEPA analysis. The court further concluded that Federal Defendants did not abuse their discretion in determining that there was no significant impact from the possible environmental effects of potential terrorism at the Navy Broadway Complex, and a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement is thus not required. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "SDNBCC v. USDOD" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a dispute between Shell and Greenpeace over the search for oil in the Chukchi Sea. The parties now dispute the propriety of a preliminary injunction entered by the district court to protect Shell from certain more vigorous and more intrusive aspects of Greenpeace’s activism. The court did not reach any of Greenpeace's challenges to the injunction because the court concluded that the appeal is moot. Here, the preliminary injunction has expired and will not be renewed. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the FAA's decision that no Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is necessary to commence operating commercial passenger service at Paine Field in Snohomish County. The court held that the scope of the FAA's demand-based projections were not arbitrary and capricious. In this case, the FAA determined that there were no connected actions for this project and petitioners have failed to provide anything more than mere speculation that the FAA’s actions now will lead to more aircraft activity at Paine Field in the future than covered in the Environmental Assessment (EA). Therefore, it was not arbitrary for the FAA to have included no connected actions in the final EA. The court also concluded that the FAA’s Finding of No Significant Impact was not predetermined by the creation of an optimistic schedule for completing the environmental review or statements favoring commercial service at Paine Field. Here, the FAA performed its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370h, obligations in good faith and did not prematurely commit resources to opening the terminal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "City of Mukilteo v. US DOT" on Justia Law

After analyzing the effects of grazing domestic sheep in the Payette, the Service prepared a draft supplemental environmental impact statement (DSEIS), an update to the DSEIS, and a final supplemental environmental impact statement (FSEIS) and Record of Decision (ROD). The Service concluded that there is a significant risk of fatal disease to the small and insular populations of bighorn sheep in the Payette and decided in the ROD to close to domestic sheep grazing approximately 70% of the allotments on which grazing had been permitted. Wool Growers challenged the Service's decision. The court concluded that, because the lack of consultation of the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) did not prevent the Service or the public from considering information about the uncertainties in transmission of disease from domestic to bighorn sheep such as ARS would have offered, and because information about the precise mechanisms of such transmission was not a basis of the Service’s decision, no prejudice resulted from the lack of consultation. The court also concluded that the Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously or abuse its discretion by declining to supplement the FSEIS. Finally, the court rejected Wool Growers’ challenge to the modeling the Service used to analyze bighorn sheep home ranges and movement, and the potential impacts of various management alternatives. Because the Service committed no reversible error in preparing the FSEIS and ROD, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Idaho Wool Growers Ass'n v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706 et seq., challenging FWS's designation of an area of Alaska’s coast and waters as critical habitat for the polar bear. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on two grounds: the district court faulted FWS for failing to identify specifically where and how existing polar bears utilize the relatively small portion of critical habitat designated as Units 2 and 3; and the district court faulted FWS for failing to provide Alaska with adequate justification for adopting a final rule not fully consistent with the State’s submitted comments. The district court vacated the entire designation. In this case, the standard FWS followed, looking to areas that contained the constituent elements required for sustained preservation of polar bears, was in accordance with statutory purpose and hence could not have been arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court concluded that FWS’s designation of Unit 2 as critical denning habitat was not arbitrary and capricious. Unit 2 contains areas requiring protection for both birthing and acclimation of cubs, and FWS adequately explained its treatment of the relatively few areas of known human habitation. The court also concluded that, with respect to Units 2 and 3, FWS's definition of the denning habitat was in accord with the statutory purposes and it was not arbitrary and capricious for FWS to include areas necessary for such related denning needs. The court further concluded that FWS provided adequate justification to Alaska pursuant to section 4(i) of the ESA. Finally, the court concluded that the district court court correctly upheld the no-disturbance zone as a part of Unit 3 because it provides refuge from human disturbance; FWS’s assessment of the potential economic impacts was not arbitrary and capricious; and the district court was correct in denying Alaska’s claim, although the court did not agree with the district court to the extent that it held that Section 7 of the ESA creates any independent duty to consult apart from the requirements of Section 4. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Alaska Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Jewel" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the EPA's Final Rule partially disapproving Arizona's regional haze State Implementation Plan (SIP) submission and promulgating a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) in place of the disapproved SIP elements. The court concluded that EPA reasonably concluded that Arizona’s cost and visibility impact analyses for Coronado suffered from significant analytical defects and that the SIP did not provide a reasoned explanation of the bases for the ultimate best available retrofit technology (BART) determination for Coronado; although Section 169A of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7491(a)(1), affords the states substantial authority to determine BART controls, the combination of these defects provided EPA reasonable grounds upon which to disapprove Arizona’s BART determinations as to nitrogen oxides emissions limits at Coronado; and its partial disapproval of the SIP in this respect was not arbitrary or capricious. The court further concluded that EPA’s visibility improvement assessment was consistent with the statute and regulatory requirements, and supported by the record. Finally, EPA properly promulgated its FIP in the same rule as its partial disapproval of the SIP. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Arizona ex rel. Darwin v. EPA" on Justia Law

Cascadia appealed from the district court's denial of their motion seeking to enjoin the Douglas Fire Complex Recovery Project in the southern Oregon Klamath Mountains. Cascadia conceded that the Service identified the relevant scientific data but argues that compliance with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(3), requires more than merely restating the scientific data. In view of the deference owed to the agency’s determination, and the record evidence of reliable data, the court concluded that the district court’s rejection of Cascadia’s challenge was not an abuse of discretion, legally erroneous, or factually erroneous. The record reflects that the Service indeed relied upon the data of several surveys from an array of surveyors regarding the effect that barred owls have on the spotted owl. Further, the record does not support a finding that the Service failed to use the best available scientific information regarding the effect the wildfire had on the spotted owl’s habitat use, or a finding that the Service’s conclusions were arbitrary. Finally, the court rejected Cascadia's contention that the Service failed to adequately utilize the best scientific information necessary to ensure spotted owl recovery when evaluating the Project and rendering its jeopardy determination. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Cascadia Wildlands v. Thrailkill" on Justia Law