Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the Regional Plan Update (RPU) of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA). The RPU generally restricts future development to areas that are already developed, and sets forth the amount of further development that will be permitted in those areas in the future. As a preliminary matter, the court held that plaintiffs have standing to assert claims that are ripe. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of TRPA where the final EIS for the RPU adequately addressed localized impacts on soil conservation and water quality. Therefore, the EIS’s analysis of the effects of concentrating development was not arbitrary or capricious, and did not violate Regional Planning Compact article VII(a)(2)(A) by failing to address significant environmental impacts of the RPU. The court also held that TRPA reasonably concluded that, in light of anticipated improvements in best management practices (BMP) maintenance, the development permitted in the RPU would have less than a significant effect on water quality. Thus, the TRPA’s assumptions regarding BMPs were supported by substantial evidence and are entitled to deference. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, including the district court's imposition of costs and denial of reimbursement to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice was denied as moot. View "Sierra Club v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against the County Defendants in 2008, alleging that the County Defendants were discharging polluted stormwater in violation of the terms of their National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, issued pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C.1251 et seq. The court held in 2013 that as a matter of law, the County Defendants had violated their permit. In 2012, during the pendency of appellate proceedings, the County Defendants sought and received a new NPDES permit from the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board (the Regional Board), which now governs the County Defendants’ stormwater discharges. In January 2015, the County Defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ entire lawsuit on mootness grounds, arguing that the 2012 Permit supplanted the 2001 Permit and therefore relief was not available to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court's dismissal of their claims for injunctive relief. The court held that it has jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). The court also held that plaintiffs' injunctive claims are not moot because the County Defendants are still subject to receiving water limitations, which are substantially the same as the limitations in the 2001 Permit. The County Defendants have not met their burden of making it “absolutely clear” that no violation will recur in the future. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "NRDC V. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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The NMFS used climate projections to determine that the loss of sea ice over shallow waters in the Arctic would leave the Pacific bearded seal subspecies endangered by the year 2095. Plaintiffs filed separate suits challenging the NMFS's listing decision regarding the Okhotsk and Beringia distinct population segments (DPS) of the Pacific bearded seal subspecies under the Endangered Species Act's (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g), citizen suit provision, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. The district court denied relief with respect to the Okhotsk DPS for lack of Article III standing, but granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on their challenge to NMFS’s decision to list the Beringia DPS as a threatened species. The district court vacated the Listing Rule. The court held that, in light of the robustness of NMFS’s rulemaking process, as well as the court's highly deferential standard of review, NMFS’s final rule listing the Beringia DPS as threatened was not arbitrary or capricious, and its listing decision was supported by substantial evidence. Finally, the court concluded that NMFS clearly fulfilled its procedural and substantive obligations under Section 4(i) of the ESA to provide Alaska with a written justification. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Alaska Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

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United Cook filed suit challenging Amendment 12, which removed three historic net fishing areas from the Salmon fishery management plan (FMP), and its implementing regulations as contrary to the Magnuson-Stevens Act's requirement that a Council prepare an FMP “for each fishery under its authority that requires conservation and management,” 16 U.S.C. 1852(h)(1). United Cook also alleged that Amendment 12 was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). At issue on appeal is whether NMFS can exempt a fishery under its authority that requires conservation and management from an FMP because the agency is content with State management. The court concluded that the Magnuson-Stevens Act unambiguously requires a Council to create an FMP for each fishery under its authority that requires conservation and management. The Act allows delegation to a state under an FMP, but does not excuse the obligation to adopt an FMP when a Council opts for state management. Therefore, the court concluded that Amendment 12 is contrary to law to the extent it removes Cook Inlet from the FMP. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions that judgment be entered in favor of United Cook. View "United Cook Inlet Drift Ass'n. V. NMFS" on Justia Law

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Petitioners seek review of the EPA's rule approving Arizona’s Five Percent Plan for airborne particulate matter around Maricopa County. The court upheld the EPA’s determination that the control measures in Arizona’s Five Percent Plan did not need to be updated, and that the 135 exceedances were exceptional events that are excluded from consideration under the EPA’s regulation and guidance documents. The court concluded, however, that it will not defer to the EPA’s interpretation of the contingency measures requirement because, under the plain language of 42 U.S.C. 7502(c)(9), contingency measures are measures that will be taken in the future, not measures that have already been implemented. Accordingly, the court granted in part and denied in part the petition for review. View "Bahr v. EPA" on Justia Law

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Helping Hand and the Center petition for review of the EPA's final decision granting Sierra Pacific a prevent of significant deterioration (PSD) permit for construction of a new biomass-burning power plant at its lumber mill in California. Because EPA properly took the requisite hard look at Sierra Pacific’s proposed design and the key purpose of burning its own biomass waste, the court held that EPA reasonably concluded that consideration of solar or increased natural gas would disrupt that purpose and redefine the source. Therefore, the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and Helping Hand’s petition is denied. Because EPA was largely relying on its own guidance, acting at the frontiers of science, the court deferred to the agency’s determination regarding the supplemental greenhouse best available control technology (BACT) analysis. In this case, Sierra Pacific’s application went through an extensive process to issue a reasoned PSD permit for its new biomass burning boiler. EPA properly defined the project and rejected control technologies that redefined the project with thoughtful and reasonable explanations. The Bioenergy BACT Guidance EPA applied to the greenhouse gas emissions from Sierra Pacific’s new facility is rational and thoroughly consistent with EPA’s prior guidance. View "Helping Hand Tools v. EPA" on Justia Law

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In 2013, BLM adopted a new Recreation Area Management Plan (RAMP) where the 26,098-acre North Algodones Dunes Wilderness tract would remain closed to off-road vehicles, as would 9,261 acres of milkvetch critical habitat. BLM additionally prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) analyzing the 2013 RAMP, and consulted with the Service pursuant to section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. As a result, the Service issued a new Biological Opinion finding that the 2013 RAMP was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the milkvetch or desert tortoise. The Center brought challenges under the ESA; the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.; the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1701–1785; the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.; and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for BLM on all but one issue. The court concluded that the ESA does not require Biological Opinions to contain Incidental Take Statements for threatened plants. Therefore, the court need not consider separately the Services' interpretation of the statute. The court rejected the Center's remaining claims, concluding that the Center has failed to demonstrate that BLM’s emissions analysis was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Center for Bio. Diversity v. BLM" on Justia Law

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Glacier challenges the fee imposed on it by the NMFS pursuant to the agency’s cost recovery program developed under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1853(a). The final regulations required members of a catcher-processor coop to pay a percentage of the revenue earned by each vessel as a fee to NMFS. The court concluded that, because the catcher-processor coop permit is a limited access privilege, and Glacier can reasonably be said to be a “holder” of that permit, NMFS had the authority to collect a fee from the individual members of the coop, including Glacier. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to NMFS on this issue. Because NMFS’s regulations include the Council’s definition of incremental costs as net costs with and without the trawl rationalization program, NMFS complied with section 1853a(e), and the court rejected Glacier’s argument to the contrary. Finally, the court concluded that NMFS’s calculation of the 2014 cost recovery fee of the catcher-processor sector was inconsistent with NMFS’s own regulations. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the extent it upheld NMFS’s fee calculation and remanded to the agency to re-determine that fee in accordance with its regulations. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Glacier Fish Co. v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs challenge the NMFS's decision to calculate the amount of their initial share of the total allowable catch of Pacific whiting based on their participation in the fishery prior to 2003 and 2004, respectively, rather than on their much greater participation in the years immediately before 2010, when the regulations implementing this program were issued. The court concluded that NMFS's decision to apply the 2004 control date to processors was not arbitrary or capricious; with respect to the proposed decision on the 2003 and 2004 end dates for allocating quota shares, NMFS explained its analysis of dependence; because NMFS adequately took into account “dependence on the fishery” under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act), 16 U.S.C. 1853 (b)(6)(B), and “investments in, and dependence upon, the fishery” under section 1853a(c)(5)(A)(iii), its decision was not inconsistent with those statutory requirements; nor was NMFS’s decision inconsistent with the related standards identified by Pacific Dawn; because NMFS reasonably determined that retaining the 2003 and 2004 end dates would be the least disruptive to current fishing practices, its conclusion was not inconsistent with Objective 14 of the Groundfish Management Plan; and the court rejected Pacific Dawn's argument that NMFS’s decision was inconsistent with its practices in other fisheries, where NMFS had concluded that more recent participation reflected greater dependence on the fishery. Therefore, because NMFS properly considered the relevant factors and reasonably decided to maintain the 2003 and 2004 end dates, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Pacific Dawn LLC v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs' fouth amended complaint alleged that, in addition to dumping hazardous substances into the Columbia River, Teck also emitted hazardous substances into the air, in violation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3). The Ninth Circuit issued Center for Community Action & Environmental Justice v. BNSF Railway Co., which held that emitting diesel particulate matter into the air and allowing it to be “transported by wind and air currents onto the land and water” did not constitute “disposal” of waste within the meaning of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. The court held that the owner-operator of the smelter can not be held liable for cleanup costs and natural resource damages under CERCLA. The court concluded that, while plaintiffs present an arguably plausible construction of “deposit” and “disposal,” Carson Harbor Vill Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., compels the court to hold otherwise, and while Center for Community Action does not totally foreclose plaintiffs’ interpretation of CERCLA, its textual analysis of 42 U.S.C. 6903(3) is persuasive. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's orders denying Teck’s motion to strike and/or dismiss and motion for reconsideration, and remanded for the processing of plaintiffs’ remaining claims. View "Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals" on Justia Law