Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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SCAP petitioned for review of an objection letter sent by the EPA regarding draft permits for water reclamation plants in El Monte and Pomona, California. The court concluded that neither 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) or (F) provides the court subject matter jurisdiction to review the Objection Letter. The court explained that even when a state assumes primary responsibility for issuing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, EPA retains supervisory authority over state permitting programs under 33 U.S.C. 1342(d). In this case, the L.A. Board chose to revise the Draft Permits and retain control of the NPDES permitting process for the Plants, and the permits were issued through the State of California, not EPA. The court concluded that the appropriate avenue for SCAP to seek redress was through the State's review process. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Southern California Alliance of Publicly Owned Treatment Works v. EPA" on Justia Law

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This extensive litigation arose when Arizona clashed with the EPA over its State Implementation Plan (SIP) required under a new regulatory scheme codified in Section 169A of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7491(b). The scheme required each state with emissions impacting protected federal lands to create a SIP describing how the state intended to make reasonable progress toward the national goal to improve air visibility in federal parks and forests. The EPA determined that Arizona could do better in improving visibility even if the SIP listed proposals to manage and reduce emissions from various industrial sources operated within the state. Arizona and several private companies (petitioners) subsequently objected to the EPA's most recent Federal Implementation Plan (FIP), which petitioners claim constituted invalid agency action. The court held that several of petitioners' objections to the FIP were not properly before it because they were not presented to the EPA during the notice-and-comment period. In regard to the remaining objections that were ripe for review regarding regulation of the cement kiln and copper smelters at issue, the court concluded that the EPA's emission-control measures were not arbitrary or capricious and thus constituted valid agency rulemaking. View "Arizona ex rel. Darwin v. EPA" on Justia Law

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Petitioners sought review of the EPA's federal implementation plan (FIP) under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, for the Navajo Generating Station in Arizona. The FIP was promulgated under the EPA's Tribal Authority Rule (TAR) that governs CAA requirements on tribal lands. The court concluded that the federal government's partial ownership of the Station does not eliminate any deference to the EPA's interpretation of the CAA and its implementing regulations; the EPA reasonably interpreted the TAR and the Regional Haze Regulations to conclude that the emission reductions deadline in 40 C.F.R. 51.308(e)(2)(iii) does not apply to FIPs for regional haze that are promulgated in place of tribal implementation plans (TIPs); the court deferred to the EPA's determination that the FIP alternative was "better than BART" for nitrous oxide emissions; and the EPA's decision not to determine best available retrofit technology (BART) for particulate matter was a reasonable exercise of the EPA's discretion under the TAR. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Yazzie v. USEPA" on Justia Law

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The Tribe petitioned for review of the EPA's federal implementation plan (FIP) under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, for the Navajo Generating Station in Arizona. The FIP was promulgated under the EPA's Tribal Authority Rule that governs CAA requirements on tribal lands. The Tribe claimed that it was not adequately consulted about its interests before the plan was promulgated and objected to a proposed closure of the Station in 2044. The court concluded that no authority allowed it to treat this as a duty to consult, stemming from the general trust relationship with the Indian tribes. In this case, the record showed that the EPA did, in fact, consult with the Hopi Tribe throughout the rulemaking process. Furthermore, while the EPA did not participate in the Technical Working Group (TWG) negotiations, the DOI did. The court also concluded that the record belies the Tribe's contention that the EPA failed to analyze each of the five best available retrofit technology (BART) factors. Because the TWG proposal was an alternative to BART, the court concluded that there was no error in the EPA not analyzing the BART factors under the TWG alternative. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "The Hopi Tribe v. USEPA" on Justia Law

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In this interlocutory appeal, the water agencies challenged the district court's grant of partial summary judgment for the Tribe and the United States. The judgment declared that the United States impliedly reserved appurtenant water sources, including groundwater, when it created the Tribe's reservation in California's arid Coachella Valley. The court concluded that in the Winters v. United States doctrine, federal reserved water rights are directly applicable to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams; the Winters doctrine does not distinguish between surface water and groundwater; rather, its limits derive only from the government's intent in withdrawing land for a public purpose and the location of the water in relation to the reservation created; because the United States intended to reserve water when it established a home for the Tribe, the court held that the district court did not err in determining that the government reserved appurtenant water sources—including groundwater—when it created the Tribe's reservation in the Coachella Valley; and the creation of the Agua Caliente Reservation carried with it an implied right to use water from the Coachella Valley aquifer. The court held that state water rights were preempted by federal reserved rights; held that the fact that the Tribe did not historically access groundwater does not destroy its right to groundwater now; and held that state water entitlements do not affect the court's analysis with respect to the creation of the Tribe's federally reserved water right. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water District" on Justia Law

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This case involves a challenge to the Bureau of Reclamation's (BOR) release of Trinity River water from the Lewiston Dam, above and beyond the amount designated in the applicable water release schedule. The Water Contractors filed an amended complaint, alleging that the Federal Defendants violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531; the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321; the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) section 3411(a) and 43 U.S.C. 383; and CVPIA section 3406(b)(23). The district court granted summary judgment for the Federal Defendants. The court concluded that the broad language of the Act of August 12, 1955 (the 1955 Act) authorized BOR to implement the 2013 flow augmentation release—an appropriate measure—to protect fish downstream from the Lewiston Dam, which includes the lower Klamath River; subsequent legislation did not clearly alter or limit the expansive scope of the authority granted by the 1955 Act; and because the BOR acted within its statutory authority, the court reversed as to this issue. The court concluded that, because the BOR intended to aid the lower Klamath River (and not the Trinity River) in implementing the 2013 flow augmentation release, the release did not violate section 3406(b)(23). The court also concluded that the Water Contractors have failed to establish standing to pursue a claim under the ESA. Finally, the BOR neither violated California water law nor the Reclamation Act in implementing the 2013 flow augmentation release, and thus the BOR did not violate section 3411(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Haugrud" on Justia Law

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CBD filed suit alleging that EPA violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531, when it reregistered certain pesticide active ingredients and pesticide products without undertaking consultation with the Service as required by section 1536(a)(2) of the ESA (Section 7). The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 136(u), charges EPA with the obligation to register and reregister pesticide active ingredients and pesticide products. At issue are the 31 failure-to-consult Claims for Relief. In regard to the category one sub-claims, the court assumed, but did not hold, that EPA's issuance of a Reregistration Eligibility Decision (RED) is an agency action that triggers Section 7 consultation. The court need not decide whether the issuance of a RED is a triggering action because the court held that all category one sub-claims were properly dismissed by the district court as either time-barred or jurisdictionally barred. In regard to the category two sub-claims, the court concluded that these claims failed to identify an affirmative agency action that would trigger Section 7 consultation and affirmed the district court's dismissal of these claims. In regard to the category three sub-claims, the court agreed with the district court that the completion of pesticide product reregistration is simply a fact, and therefore it cannot trigger Section 7 consultation. Finally, in regard to the category four sub-claims, the court agreed with the district court that pesticide product reregistration is an affirmative agency action, but disagreed that those claims are barred by the collateral attack doctrine and require further amendments to the Second Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs challenge the BLM's approval of the Mt. Hope Project, a proposed molybdenum mining operation near Eureka, Nevada. Plaintiffs argue that the BLM’s review of the Project under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., was inadequate and that the approval of the Project violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1732(b), and the laws governing lands withdrawn under the executive order known as Public Water Reserve No. 107 (PWR 107). The court agreed with plaintiffs' assertion that the BLM’s selection of baseline levels of certain air pollutants was unreasonable and that the BLM’s analysis of cumulative impacts was deficient. The court declined to address plaintiffs' PWR 107 claims because the BLM should be given an opportunity to fix the errors in its analysis of the Project under NEPA before challenges to the approval of the Project itself are entertained, and the proper analysis of the PWR 107 claim turns in large part on whether four springs in the area of the Project are “covered” by PWR 107, but the BLM’s position on that question is unclear. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to vacate the record of decision and remand to the BLM. View "Great Basin Resource Watch v. BLM" on Justia Law

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Appellants appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees on Appellants' claims under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321. Appellants argue that Appellees' environment impact analysis for a new underground light rail line project in downtown Los Angeles was inadequate. As a preliminary matter, the court declined to take judicial notice of the three documents on Metro’s website. The court declined to consider Japanese Village’s argument that the mitigation monitoring and report plan (MMRP) was not properly attached to the Record of Decision (ROD). The court rejected Japanese Village's challenges to the adequacy of the mitigation plan included in the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) regarding construction-related noise and vibration; operational noise and vibration; subsidence; and parking. The court also rejected Bonaventure's claims that Appellees (1) failed to analyze Closed-Face TBM construction as a reasonable alternative tunneling method for the Lower Flower portion of the Project in the FEIS; (2) failed to adequately analyze certain impacts and impermissibly deferred certain mitigation analyses in the FEIS; and (3) failed to prepare a Supplemental EIS to analyze nighttime construction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Japanese Village, LLC v. FTA" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the Regional Plan Update (RPU) of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA). The RPU generally restricts future development to areas that are already developed, and sets forth the amount of further development that will be permitted in those areas in the future. As a preliminary matter, the court held that plaintiffs have standing to assert claims that are ripe. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of TRPA where the final EIS for the RPU adequately addressed localized impacts on soil conservation and water quality. Therefore, the EIS’s analysis of the effects of concentrating development was not arbitrary or capricious, and did not violate Regional Planning Compact article VII(a)(2)(A) by failing to address significant environmental impacts of the RPU. The court also held that TRPA reasonably concluded that, in light of anticipated improvements in best management practices (BMP) maintenance, the development permitted in the RPU would have less than a significant effect on water quality. Thus, the TRPA’s assumptions regarding BMPs were supported by substantial evidence and are entitled to deference. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, including the district court's imposition of costs and denial of reimbursement to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice was denied as moot. View "Sierra Club v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency" on Justia Law