Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the City of Jackson, Mississippi's water-related utilities, which faced significant failures. The United States and the State of Mississippi brought enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) against the City for violations, including allowing raw sewage to be discharged into waterways and failing to comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) orders. The district court appointed a federal receiver, Edward Henefin, as interim third-party manager (ITPM) to manage the City's water and sewer systems. Henefin, operating through JXN Water, Inc., developed new utility rates, including a discount for residents receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi ruled that the ITPM's rate-setting activities constituted a federal assistance program under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (FNA), thereby allowing access to SNAP recipient data. The United States and Mississippi opposed this, arguing that such disclosure violated the FNA's privacy protections for SNAP recipients.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ITPM's rate-setting activities did not qualify as a federal assistance program under the FNA. The court emphasized that the term "federal assistance program" implies administration by a federal entity, and the ITPM's authority derived from municipal law, not federal law. The court also noted that the statutory history and context supported a narrow interpretation of "federal assistance program." Consequently, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mississippi v. JXN Water" on Justia Law

In 2015, bipartisan legislation repealed the U.S. ban on crude oil exports, leading to expanded efforts to export U.S. crude oil. This case involves an administrative challenge to a construction permit issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for expanding operations at the Moda Ingleside Crude Export Terminal in Texas. The expansion includes constructing new docks and a turning basin, requiring dredging and discharging material into U.S. waters. The Corps conducted an Environmental Assessment (EA) and approved the permit. Plaintiffs, including Native American tribes and an environmental association, sued to invalidate the permit, claiming violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied summary judgment for the plaintiffs and granted summary judgment for the Corps, concluding that the Corps had adequately studied the environmental impacts of the proposed expansion. The court found that plaintiffs had associational standing but had waived certain claims by not raising them in summary judgment briefing. The court also found that plaintiffs forfeited claims related to increased vessel traffic by not raising them during the notice-and-comment period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its environmental impacts analysis, including its assessment of cumulative impacts and climate change. The court found that the Corps's EA was sufficient and that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was not required. The court also agreed that plaintiffs had forfeited arguments related to increased vessel traffic. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Indigenous Peoples v. U.S. Army" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) disapproval of State Implementation Plans (SIPs) submitted by Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to address interstate air pollution. The EPA disapproved these SIPs, arguing that they did not meet the requirements of the Good Neighbor Provision, which mandates that states prevent their emissions from significantly contributing to nonattainment or interfering with maintenance of national air quality standards in downwind states.The lower courts had not previously reviewed this case. The case was directly brought to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, where the petitioners sought to vacate the EPA's disapprovals. The petitioners argued that the EPA's actions were arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the CAA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petitions for review from Louisiana and Texas, finding that the EPA's disapprovals were justified based on the states' own data and interpretations of the Good Neighbor Provision. The court concluded that the EPA had reasonably considered the relevant issues and provided adequate explanations for its decisions.However, the court granted the petition for review from Mississippi, vacated the EPA's disapproval of Mississippi's SIP, and remanded the matter to the EPA. The court found that the EPA's disapproval of Mississippi's SIP was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on updated data that was not available to Mississippi at the time of its SIP submission. The court held that the EPA failed to reasonably explain its decision to use this updated data in an outcome-determinative manner. View "Texas v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The City of New Orleans filed a lawsuit against several pipeline operators and Entergy New Orleans LLC, alleging that their oil and gas production and transportation activities caused damage to the City's coastal zone. The City claimed that Entergy allowed its pipeline canals to widen and erode, threatening the City's storm buffer. The lawsuit was filed under Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA).The defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that Entergy, the only in-state defendant, was improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Entergy consented to the removal and argued that it was exempt from SLCRMA’s permit requirements because its activities commenced before the statute's effective date. The City moved to remand the case to state court, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied the motion, dismissed Entergy as a party, and stayed the case pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that Entergy was improperly joined because its activities were exempt under SLCRMA’s Historical-Use Exception, which applies to uses legally commenced before the statute's effective date. The court found no reasonable basis for the City to recover against Entergy, thus disregarding Entergy's citizenship and establishing complete diversity among the parties. The court also rejected the City's argument that it was merely a nominal party representing Louisiana, concluding that the City filed the suit on its own behalf and stood to benefit from a favorable ruling. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of the City's motion to remand. View "New Orleans City v. Aspect Energy" on Justia Law

CCA filed suit challenging Amendment 40 to the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan and the Final Rule implementing that amendment. Amendment 40 was proposed as a means to address problems that had arisen with the red snapper fishery, and the Final Rule contains measures to establish two components within the recreational sector for Gulf of Mexico red snapper: a federal charter component and a private angling component. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants and intervenors. The court concluded that Amendment 40 does not create a separate quota for charter fishing. Rather, Amendment 40 subdivides the recreational sector into private and charter components. The court also concluded that, although the Council’s analysis does not offer quantitative predictions of the effects that Amendment 40 might have on the fishing community, the Council used the best available data to reasonably “assess, specify, and analyze” the likely economic and social effects of Amendment 40. Finally, the court concluded that the selection of data ranges used to calculate quota allocations was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Coastal Conservation Association v. U.S. Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

The Commission issued two citations to Noranda and assessed penalties for the citations. Noranda's upper management and counsel later realized that the assessment had been paid even though Noranda apparently had intended to contest the citations rather than pay the assessment. Noranda petitions for review of the Commission's order denying a motion to reopen, seeking to adjudicate the citation and penalty on the merits. Because the Commission has not applied its "internal processing system" rule consistently, the court found that the Commission abused its discretion by arbitrarily denying Noranda’s motion to reopen. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the court noted that the Commission may very well deny Noranda’s motion to reopen, but it must do so with more clarity than it showed in the first instance. View "Noranda Alumina, LLC. v. Perez" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Katrina, Congress directed the Corps to close the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MR-GO) as a federal navigation project and restore the surrounding ecosystem. The Corps sought a cost-sharing arrangement with Louisiana. Louisiana objected and filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2), contending that the Corps’ decision, expressed in two Corps reports to Congress, was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion because the relevant statutes require the federal government to bear 100 percent of the costs. The district court agreed with Louisiana and rejected a statute of limitations challenge to the suit and concluded that the relevant statutes unambiguously require the Corps to bear all of the costs of deauthorizing the MR-GO. The court bifurcated the limitations issue and found Louisiana’s APA challenge to the closure portion of the deauthorization project timely filed, but dismissed the challenge to the Corps’ decision concerning the ecosystem restoration project because the agency has not taken final action under the APA. On the merits, the court reversed the district court’s judgment that overturned the required cost-sharing between Louisiana and the Corps, which constitutes a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutes. View "Louisiana State v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenge the EPA's action disapproving Oklahoma’s and Texas’s plans for controlling regional haze and imposing EPA’s own plans instead. The court denied EPA’s motion to dismiss or transfer because the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, gives jurisdiction over petitions for review to the courts of appeal generally and because the Act’s forum selection clause designates the regional circuit as the appropriate venue for this challenge. The court granted the motion for a stay pending resolution of the petitions for review on the merits because petitioners have demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits, because they are likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a stay while EPA has not shown similar injury from the issuance of a stay, and because the public interest weighs in favor of a stay. View "State of Texas v. EPA" on Justia Law

Landowners challenged the Service's final designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. The district court granted summary judgment for Landowners on the issue of standing and granted summary judgment for the Service on the merits. The court concluded that Landowners have standing to challenge the Service’s critical-habitat designation. The court also concluded that the designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat was not arbitrary and capricious nor based upon an unreasonable interpretation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531, where the Service reasonably determined (1) that designating occupied habitat alone would be inadequate to ensure the conservation of the dusky gopher frog and (2) that Unit 1 is essential for the conservation of the frog. Even if the court assumed that Landowners are correct that the economic benefits of exclusion outweigh the conservation benefits of designation, the Service is still not obligated to exclude Unit 1. That decision is committed to the agency’s discretion and is not reviewable. Because Landowners concede that the critical habitat provision of the ESA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, the court can likewise conclude that the application of the ESA’s critical habitat provision to Unit 1 is a constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause power. Finally, the court concluded that the Service was not required to complete an environmental impact statement before designating Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog, and Landowners lack standing to sue to enforce the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Markle Interests v. US Fish & Wildlife Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Exxon, alleging that Exxon violated the federal permits governing operations at the Baytown industrial complex thousands of times over a nearly eight year period. The district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law denying most of plaintiffs’ claims and declining to order any relief. Exxon's Baytown industrial complex is governed by the five federal operating permits issued under Title V of the the Clean Air Act (CCA), 42 U.S.C. 7661a-7661d. The court concluded that the district court erred in its analysis of Exxon’s liability under Counts I through IV and abused its discretion in assessing three of the CAA’s mandatory penalty factors. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for assessment of penalties based on the violations that are properly considered “actionable” in light of this opinion. View "Environment Texas Citizen Lobby v. ExxonMobil" on Justia Law