Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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The Service listed three antelope species – the scimitar-horned oryx, addax, and dama gazelle – as endangered. On the same day that the Service designated the antelope species as endangered, it issued a blanket exemption for qualifying domestic entities and individuals that breed the antelope species in captivity. The district court determined that the Captive-Bred Exemption violated Section 10(c) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. President Obama then signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. G, tit. I, 127, 128 Stat. 5, 315-16 (Section 127), which reinstated the Captive-Bred Exemption. Friends of Animals filed suit alleging that the Reinstatement Rule violates the Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and that Section 127 violates the United States Constitution. The district court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment and denied Friends of Animals' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that, under FEC v. Akins, Friends of Animals has informational standing to pursue its claims, so there is no jurisdictional impediment to this lawsuit. The court rejected Friends of Animals' claims on the merits, concluding that Congress acted within its constitutional bounds when it passed Section 127. Therefore, the court concluded that there can be no doubt that the Service was fully authorized to reinstate the Captive-Bred Exemption. View "Friends of Animals v. Jewell" on Justia Law

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Petitioners challenge the NRC's rule and generic environmental impact statement (GEIS) concerning the continued, and possibly indefinite, storage of spent fuel from nuclear power plants in the United States. Petitioners contend that the NRC failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court concluded that the NRC appropriately characterized its rule and considered alternatives and mitigation measures; the GEIS sufficiently analyzes the impacts of continued storage of spent nuclear fuel where the GEIS considered essentially common risks to reactor sites and the NRC evaluated the probability of failure to site a repository, the GEIS assessed the cumulative impacts of the continued storage of spent nuclear fuel, the NRC did not ignore short-term high-volume leaks, and the NRC's waiver process ensures consideration of site-specific impacts; and the NRC's assumptions are not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "State of New York v. NRC" on Justia Law

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NRDC challenged the NRC's denial of NRDC’s request for a hearing and subsequent application for a waiver, asserting this process was inconsistent with the procedural rigor mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The denial thwarted NRDC’s attempt to intervene in the license renewal proceeding for Exelon’s Limerick nuclear power station where NRDC sought to present “new and significant” information regarding severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMAs) relevant to Limerick. The court found that the Commission reasonably concluded that NRDC's request to intervene was a challenge to a general rule - 10 C.F.R. 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L) (Rule (L)) - improperly raised in an individual adjudication. The court further stated that, contrary to NRDC’s view, while NEPA requires agencies to take a hard look before approving a major federal action, it does not mandate adoption of a particular process for doing so. Because NRDC failed to show its contentions were unique to Limerick, NRDC also was not entitled to a waiver. Therefore, the Commission’s actions were not arbitrary and capricious, and the court denied the petition. View "NRDC v. NRC" on Justia Law

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The Association has successfully applied to the District’s Historic Preservation Review Board to have the former Spingarn Senior High School designated a historic landmark. Next to Spingarn is Langston Terrace, a 13-acre public housing complex built in the 1930s as segregated housing for African Americans. The Association now challenges the District's development of a streetcar program and Car Barn that would be centered in this neighborhood. The district court rejected the Association's claims in dismissals for failure to state a claim and summary judgment. The City Council passed the “Wire Acts” to allow the construction of aerial wires to supply streetcars with power: Transportation Infrastructure Emergency Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-486; Transportation Infrastructure Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-583; Transportation Infrastructure Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-684 (codified at D.C. Code 9-1171(a)). Determining that the Association has standing, the court concluded that taking into account the Home Rule Act's, District. D.C. Code 1-201.02(a), 1-206.02(a), stated purpose, the Wire Acts do not violate an 1888 statute barring the District from authorizing telegraph, telephone, electric lighting or other wires, D.C. Code 34-1901.01. The court upheld that district court's dismissal of the Association's environmental impact statement (EIS) claim. The court rejected the Association's Equal Protection claim, concluding that the project and the associated site selection appear to have been facially neutral and to serve legitimate government purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Bowser" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs challenged the Service's application of the 2012 Colorado Rule to allow development of a proposed egress ski trail on once-roadless land within the Special Use Permit boundary for the Snowmass Ski Resort in Aspen. The court agreed with the district court that the Service offered ample reasons for its decision to exclude existing designated ski areas from the Colorado roadless inventory, and that the Service’s six-year public rulemaking process satisfied all applicable notice requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment because the Service adequately explained the limited ski-area exclusion and did not violate any applicable notice requirements. View "Ark Initiative v. Tidwell" on Justia Law

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Energy Answers seeks to build a waste incinerator in Arecibo, Puerto Rico. Sierra Club seeks to vacate a 1980 rule promulgated by EPA that implements the Clean Air Act's (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7470 et seq., and 7501 et seq., permitting scheme as it relates here to the regulation of the waste incinerator’s lead emissions. The court concluded that, because Sierra Club does not bring its petition within 60 days of any after-arising grounds, its petition is time-barred under 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition. View "Sierra Club de Puerto Rico v. EPA" on Justia Law

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Appellants filed suit challenging the Service's withdrawal of its 2010 proposal to list the dunes sagebrush lizard, whose habitat is in New Mexico and Texas, as endangered. Between the time the Service proposed listing the lizard and the time it decided to withdraw that proposal, the Service received updated information about the conservation efforts in the two States and by the Bureau of Land Management in New Mexico. Based on this information, the Service concluded that “current and future threats are not of sufficient imminence, intensity, or magnitude to indicate that the . . . lizard is in danger of extinction (endangered), or likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future (threatened), throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” The court concluded that appellants failed to show the Service did not rationally apply its policy in evaluating the Texas plan inasmuch as the Service’s factual conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell" on Justia Law

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Mach Mining petitioned for review of the Commission's final order concluding that two of Mach's regulatory violations under the Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA), 30 U.S.C. 801, were the result of “high negligence” and one violation was also “significant and substantial.” Mach operates a longwall coal mine that releases more than 1 million cubic feet of methane daily. An inspector issued a citation to Mach based on coal that had accumulated around two conveyor belts and the inspector concluded that the accumulations violation was the result of high negligence and was "significant and substantial." Mach also received a violation for locating battery charging stations in primary escapeways. The inspector investigating the charging station concluded that the violation was a result of Mach's high negligence. The court rejected Mach's arguments based on mitigating circumstances and denied the petition for review, concluding that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings for the "high negligence" and the "significant and substantial" determinations. View "Mach Mining, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, two membership organizations, filed suit alleging that federal agencies unlawfully neglected to manage stocks of river herring and shad in the Atlantic Ocean from New York to North Carolina. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no basis for judicial review of the Fishery Council’s decision. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs' claims are not subject to judicial review under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C. 1801(b)(3), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

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Friends petitioned the Service to list certain species of sturgeon as endangered or threatened. The Service went more than 12 months without making any determinations – initial or final – on Friends’ petition. The district court held that Friends did not give the Service adequate notice before suing and dismissed the complaint. Because Friends did not wait until after the issuance of the positive initial determinations to provide 60 days’ notice of the allegedly overdue final determinations, its suit seeking to compel the final determinations is barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Friends of Animals v. Ashe" on Justia Law