Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of two municipal entities that plaintiffs alleged were discharging polluted stormwater in violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water Act or Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. Although all parties agreed that numerous water-quality standards have been exceeded in the Watershed Rivers, defendants contended that there was no evidence establishing their responsibility for, or discharge of, stormwater carrying pollutants to the rivers. The court concluded that the district court erred with respect to the evidence of discharges by the Los Angeles County Flood Control District into two of the Watershed Rivers where plaintiffs provided evidence that the monitoring stations for the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers were located in a section of the municipal separate storm water sewer systems (ms4) owned and operated by the District and, after stormwater known to contain standards-exceeding pollutants passed through these monitoring stations, this polluted stormwater was discharged into the two rivers. Accordingly, plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the District's liability for discharges into the two rivers and the district court's judgment was reversed. The court held, however, that plaintiffs failed to meet their evidentiary burden with respect to discharges by the District into the Santa Clara River and Malibu Creek where plaintiffs did not provide evidence sufficient for the district court to determine if stormwater discharged from an ms4 controlled by the District caused or contributed to pollution exceedances located in these two rivers. Similarly, plaintiffs did not delineate how stormwater from ms4s controlled by Los Angeles County caused or contributed to exceedances in any of the Watershed Rivers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on these claims.

Plaintiffs, commercial fishermen, brought an action against defendant, who was the Commissioner of the Fisheries for the State of Alaska (Commissioner), asking the district court to declare that certain regulations, which shorten the fishing year and limited the number of salmon that commercial fishermen could harvest, were unconstitutional as a taking of property without just compensation and as a violation of plaintiffs' due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner, holding that plaintiffs lacked a property interest in their entry permits, that they had expressly waived any right to compensation with respect to their shore leases, and that they had not suffered a due process violation. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed. The court held that under Alaska law, plaintiffs have only a license, and not a protected property interest, in the entry permits. The court also held that plaintiffs contractually waived their right to challenge the regulations when they signed their lease agreements and the court declined to analyze their claims on the merits. The court further held that Alaska Statutes section 16.43.150(e) did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

West Coast Seafood Processors Association (WCSPA) appealed from the district court's denial of its motion to intervene as a defendant in this case, in which the NRDC challenged the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) program to preserve groundfish species off the coast of California, Oregon, and Washington. The Magistrate Judge denied the motion as untimely because of the age of the litigation where WCSPA sought to intervene when the case was already eight years old. While that appeal was pending, however, the underlying litigation -the dispute between NRDC and NMFS- fully ran its course. At issue was whether WCSPA could appeal the denial of its motion to intervene when the district court had entered final judgment on the underlying lawsuit. The court held that the WCSPA's appeal was moot where it was not reasonable to expect that the dispute about timeliness would arise again and where the intervention controversy did not evade review because the intervention dispute was not "inherently limited in duration" nor "likely always to become moot." Accordingly, the appeals were moot and no exceptions to mootness could revive them.

This case stemmed from the NRDC's complaint against the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) alleging that SCAQMD violated the Clean Air Act (CAA), section 173(c), by distributing invalid credits from its offset accounts under Rules 1304 and 1309.1 of the Regulation XIII rules; that SCAQMD violated Regulation XIII as well as section 173(c) by maintaining invalid credits in its offset accounts; and that SCAQMD violated the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule approving Regulation XIII and section 173(c) by failing to track emission reductions to show it maintained positive account balances in its offset accounts. The NRDC appealed the district court's grant of SCAQMD's motion to dismiss the NRDC's claims against (SCAQMD). The court held that the district court did not err in determining it lacked jurisdiction under section 304 of the CAA over the alleged violations of section 173(c). The court also held that the district court did not err in concluding that the NRDC otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted where Regulation XIII did not contain validity requirements for SCQMD's internal offsets and the EPA rules did not require SCAQMD to use a tracking system. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgments.

This suit followed BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.'s (BPXA) temporary shut-down of its pipelines and oil production in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, upon its discovery of a leak in a pipeline located in its Prudhoe Bay Eastern Operating Area. Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of purchasers of BP p.l.c. shares, subsequently brought a class action suit against BPXA alleging claims arising under Sections 10(b), 18, and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act (SEC), 15 U.S.C. 78b(b), 78r, and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5. Both parties appealled in part from the judgment of the district court. The court held that BPXA's breach of a contractual promise of specific future conduct, even though the contract was filed in conjunction with SEC reporting requirements, was not a sufficient foundation for a securities fraud action. The court declined plaintiff's invitation to review other issues that were not certified for interlocutory appeal. In light of the court's conclusion that breached contractual obligations did not constitute misrepresentations by BPXA that were actionable under the securities laws, the court did not reach the issue of scienter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Appellants formerly maintained railroad tracks on a parcel of land in Stockton, California, that was contaminated by petroleum. The petroleum was spilled at a nearby industrial site and migrated onto the property via an underground french drain that appellants had installed in order to remove water from the roadbed. At issue was whether appellants were liable for the contamination of the property under the law of nuisance or under California's Polanco Redevelopment Act (Act), Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459 et seq. The court held that there was no evidence that appellants actively or knowingly caused or permitted the contamination as required for nuisance liability and liability under the Act's Water Code provision, Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459(h). The court also held that appellants were not "owners" of the property under the Act's Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a), provision when the contamination occurred. The court further held that, because the record established no genuine issue of material fact as to appellants' liability, appellants were entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, the court need not reach any of the damages issues on appeal or cross-appeal.

Plaintiffs, 25 members of the Achuar indigenous group dependent for their existence upon the rainforest lands and waterways along the Rio Corrientes in Peru, and Amazon Watch, a California corporation, sued Occidental Peruana ("OxyPeru") in Los Angeles County Superior Court for environmental contamination and release of hazardous waste. OxyPeru's headquarters were located in Los Angeles County but OxyPeru removed the suit to federal district court where it successfully moved for dismissal on the ground that Peru was a more convenient forum. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the suit on the basis of forum non conveniens. The court reversed the dismissal and held that the district court failed to consider all relevant private and public interest factors, entirely overlooking enforceability of judgments factor, which weighed heavily against dismissal. The court also held that the district court correctly assumed that Amazon Watch was a proper domestic plaintiff, but erroneously afforded reduced deference to its chosen forum and ignored the group entirely in the analysis of numerous factors. Therefore, these errors led the district court to misconstrue factors that were neutral or weighed against dismissal, and to strike an unreasonable balance between the factors and deference due a domestic plaintiff's chosen forum. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to impose conditions on its dismissal that were warranted by facts in the record showing justifiable reasons to doubt OxyPeru's full cooperation in the foreign forum.

Plaintiffs sued defendant to enforce the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") unilateral administrative order that commanded defendant to conduct a remedial investigation and feasibility study to assess the site conditions in the Columbia River and to implement a cleanup. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CLERCA"), 42 U.S.C. 9613(h). The court held that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims for penalties for the 892 days of noncompliance with the unilateral administrative order and properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims where subsection (h)(2) did not apply to citizens suits.

Jensen Family Farms, Inc. ("Jensen") sued the Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District ("District"), alleging that the District's Rules 220, 310, and 1010 were preempted by the federal Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.; Rules 220 and 310 violated certain provisions of California law; and the Rules violated Jensen's due process rights. Jensen moved for summary judgment and while it's motion was pending, the district court granted the California Air Resources Board's ("CARB"), California's air pollution control agency, motion to intervene. CARB and the District (collectively, "defendants") subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Jensen appealed the district court's judgment. The principal question in this case, among other questions, was whether the District's rules were preempted by the CAA. The court held that Rules 220 and 310 were not standards or other requirements related to the control of emissions and therefore, not preempted by CAA 209(e). The court also held that Rule 1010 did not apply to any "nonroad engines," as that term was used in the CAA and therefore, was not preempted under section 209(e). The court further held that there was no basis for Jensen's claim under Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, 93116 or Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, 2450 et. seq.; that the Rules did not violate Jenson's due process rights where it admitted that the Rules served the legitimate government interest in minimizing air pollution from diesel engines; and the Rules did not violate California Constitution, Article 13A because Jensen waived this argument in its complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants.

Sierra Forest Legacy and other organizations (collectively, "Sierra Forest") appealed a largely unfavorable summary judgment against them and a favorable but limited remedial order in their National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), 16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq., suit challenging the 2004 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment ("2004 Framework") and the Basin Project, a timber harvesting project approved under the 2004 Framework. The State of California ("California") also appealed a summary judgment against it and a limited remedial order in a related NEPA action. At issue was whether the process of establishing management guidelines governing 11.5 acres of federal land in the Sierra Nevada region complied with both the procedural requirements of NEPA and the substantive restrictions of NFMA. The court affirmed the district court's decision on the merits of Sierra Forest and California's NEPA claim and held that Sierra Forest and California had standing to assert a facial NEPA claim against the 2004 Framework but that the 2004 Framework supplemental environmental impact statement ("SEIS") adequately addressed short-term impacts to old forest wildlife and disclosed and rebutted public opposition. The court also held that the Forest Service did not violate NEPA when approving the Basin Project because the U.S. Forest Service and related federal defendants (collectively, "Federal Service") adequately addressed cumulative impacts of the proposed management act. The court further held that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to update the alternatives from the 2001 Framework SEIS to reflect new modeling techniques used in the 2004 Framework SEIS. However, the court vacated the district court's orders granting a limited remedy and remanded for reconsideration of the equities of a "substantive" injunction without giving undue deference to government experts. The court remanded also because it reversed the district court's decision on Sierra Forests' NFMA claims.