Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a conservationist organization, filed suit under the Clean Water Act (the "Act"), 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1), alleging that defendants violated a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit that governed industrial storm water discharges at three scrap metal recycling facilities that defendants operated. Defendants claimed that two statutory bars, 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(6)(A)(i)-(iii) and 1365(b)(1)(B), prohibited plaintiff's citizen suit. The court concluded that section 1365(b)(1)(B) did not bar this action because the 2007 and 2008 proceedings aimed to enforce only laws other than the Act. The court also concluded that the statutory bar under section 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) did not apply to plaintiff's claims because California has commenced no administrative penalty proceeding that was comparable to a proceeding by the EPA under section 1319(g). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cal. Sportfishing v. Chico Scrap Metal" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concerned the 1999 Final Rules, identifying which navigable waters within Alaska constituted "public lands," promulgated by the Secretaries to implement part of the Alaska National Interstate Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. 3101-3233. The court concluded that Katie John I was a problematic solution to a complex problem, in that it sanctioned the use of a doctrine ill-fitted to determining which Alaskan waters were "public lands" to be managed for rural subsistence priority under ANILCA; but Katie John I remains the law of this circuit and the court, like the Secretaries, must apply it the best it can; in the 1999 Rules, the Secretaries have applied Katie John I and the federal reserved water rights doctrine in a principled manner; it was reasonable for the Secretaries to decide that the "public lands" subject to ANILCA's rural subsistence priority included the waters within and adjacent to federal reservations; and reserved water rights for Alaska Native Settlement allotments were best determined on a case-by-case basis. View "John v. Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants alleging that they had failed to adequately evaluate the effects of the Mudflow Vegetation Management Project on the Northern Spotted Owl's critical habitat, in violation of section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits as to its ESA claim that defendants arbitrarily or capriciously approved the Mudflow Project. Plaintiff's challenge was premised on a misunderstanding of regulatory terms, an unsupported reading of a duty to consider cumulative effects under section 7(a)(2), and selected portions of the record taken out of context. View "Conservation Congress v. U.S. Forest Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants claiming that the BLM's management of grazing within the Breaks Monument violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1701-1787; Proclamation No. 7398, 3 C.F.R. 7398; and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. The court held that the BLM reasonably interpreted the Proclamation to not require programmatic changes to grazing management policies and that the Breaks environmental impact statement complied with NEPA. The court held, however, that the environmental assessment for the Woodhawk Allotment violated NEPA by not considering a reasonable range of alternatives that included a no- or reduced-grazing option. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Western Watersheds Project v. Abbey" on Justia Law

This appeal involved the USDA's regulation of Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA), a plant genetically modified by the Monsanto Company and Forage Genetics International to be resistant to the herbicide glyphosate (Roundup). At issue was the Record of Decision (ROD) issued by APHIS, which unconditionally deregulated RRA on the ground that it was not a "plant pest" within the meaning of the term in the Plant Protection Act (PPA), 7 U.S.C. 7701-7772. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the statute did not regulate the types of harms that plaintiffs complained of, and therefore, APHIS correctly concluded that RRA was not a "plant pest" under the PPA. Once the agency concluded that RRA was not a plant pest, it no longer had jurisdiction to continue regulating the plant. APHIS's lack of jurisdiction over RRA obviated the need for the agency to consult with the FWS under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531, and to consider alternatives to unconditional deregulation under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. Accordingly, the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the Agencies, challenging changes to the Survey and Manage Standard (Standard) of the Northwest Forest Plan. Plaintiffs and the Agencies negotiated a settlement which the district court approved and entered in the form of a consent decree. D.R. Johnson appealed, contending that the district court's approval of the consent decree was an abuse of discretion. At issue was whether a district court could approve resolution of litigation involving a federal agency through a consent decree, which substantially and permanently amended regulations that the agency could only otherwise amend by complying with statutory rulemaking procedures. Because the consent decree allowed for substantial permanent amendments to the Standard, it impermissibly conflicted with laws governing the process for such amendments. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in approving it in its current form. Finally, D.R. Johnson waived its C & O Act, 28 U.S.C. 1291, argument. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Conservation Northwest v. Sherman" on Justia Law

Defendants, PG&E and Pacific Bell, own and maintain utility poles throughout the San Francisco Bay Area. Plaintiff filed this action against both companies, alleging that the poles discharged wood preservative into the environment in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action under Rule 12(b)(6) where plaintiff failed to state a claim under the CWA because discharges of stormwater from the utility poles were neither a "point source discharge" nor "associated with industrial activity" and where plaintiff failed to state a claim under the RCRA because wood preservation that escaped from the utility poles was not a "solid waste." The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend. View "Ecological Rights Foundation v. PG&E" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a subrogation suit against defendants for recovery of insurance payments to its insured, Taube-Koret, for environmental response costs Taube-Koret incurred in cleaning up pollutants released on its property. The court concluded that plaintiff had no standing to bring suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, section 107(a) because it did not incur any "costs of response" related to the removal or remediation of a polluted site, and because the common law principle of subrogation did not apply to section 107(a); plaintiff could not bring a subrogation claim under section 112(c) because it did not allege that Taube-Koret was a "claimant"; and plaintiff's state law claims were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's third amended complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Systems/ Loral, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the long and contentious process to repair a flood-damaged road in a sensitive area of the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest. Great Old Broads appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Forest Service on Great Old Broads' claims related to the Forest Service's record of decision (ROD) determining the method of restoring the South Canyon Road as part of the Jarbridge Canyon Project. The court held that Great Old Broads exhausted its claims before the Forest Service but that the ROD conformed to the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 1600-1687, Executive Order 11988, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f. The court reversed the district court on its analysis of exhaustion, but affirmed the district court on its alternative decision on the merits as to each of the claims presented. View "Great Old Broads For Wilderness, et al v. Kimbell, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs contended that the BLM violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., and its own regulations, 43 C.F.R. 3809 et seq., by permitting Denison to restart mining operations at the Arizona 1 Mine in 2009, after a 17-year hiatus, under a plan of operations that BLM approved in 1988. The court concluded that the prior panel did not intend that its brief affirmation of a preliminary injunction denial become law of the case; BLM's decision to allow Denison to resume mining under the 1988 plan of operations was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; because the 1988 plan had been approved, BLM's obligation under NEPA had been fulfilled and therefore, BLM did not unlawfully withhold required agency action; BLM's update of the reclamation bond should not be set aside as not in accordance with law or without observance of procedure required by law as plaintiffs contended; BLM's invocation of the categorical exclusion was not arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Center for Biological Diversity, et al v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law