Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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The case involved Ricardo Alvarado, who was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His crime was reported by officers who responded to a call that a man was carrying what appeared to be a machine gun in a mobile home park. Alvarado was found with a Ruger AR-556 semi-automatic rifle, and upon investigation, officers discovered that he had two prior felony convictions. He was sentenced to 104 months' imprisonment, including a four-level sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment.Alvarado appealed his conviction and sentence. He contended that his conviction violated the Second Amendment based on the standard articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, an issue he raised for the first time on appeal. He also argued that the evidence did not support a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Alvarado’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The court found that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under Bruen was subject to reasonable dispute and would not disturb Alvarado’s conviction on plain error review. However, the court found that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment. Without record evidence of anyone in proximity to Alvarado’s line of fire, or otherwise facing an imminent risk of harm, the Government could not satisfy Tennessee’s zone of danger requirement. Consequently, Alvarado's sentence was vacated. View "United States v. Alvarado" on Justia Law

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This consolidated opinion, delivered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pertains to the appeals of defendants Richard Tipton and James Roane, Jr. Both were convicted in 1993 and sentenced to death and multiple years in prison for involvement in a drug-related enterprise that also included firearms, murders, and other racketeering activity. They have consistently sought post-conviction relief, and in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, they contested their sentences related to their firearm-related 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions in 1993.The court affirmed the district court's decisions, rejecting the defendants' challenges to their § 924(c) sentences. The court concluded that Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (VICAR) murder constitutes a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). The defendants failed to demonstrate that there was more than a reasonable possibility that the jury did not rely on the valid VICAR murder predicate for any of their § 924(c) convictions. Therefore, the validity of any other alleged § 924(c) predicate did not need to be decided. The court held that the defendants' § 924(c) convictions and sentences were legally sound. View "United States v. Tipton" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions of three South Carolina law enforcement officers who were found guilty of various abuses of power. The trio, Sheriff George Underwood, Chief Deputy Robert Sprouse, and Lieutenant Johnny Neal, were convicted on multiple counts, including financial corruption, civil rights violations, and conspiracy.Underwood used his position as sheriff to enrich himself through illegal means, including forcing deputies to perform work on his personal property while on public payroll. He also orchestrated a scheme with Neal to skim money from the extra compensation meant for deputies at drunk-driver checkpoints. Additionally, Underwood and Sprouse misused county money for personal travel expenses.The court also found that Underwood abused his authority by targeting enforcement against opponents and refusing to investigate offenses reported against friends and supporters. Notably, Underwood unlawfully arrested a citizen for recording a car accident scene, which led to a violation of the citizen's civil rights.After the Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered the corruption, Sprouse and Neal conspired to lie and fabricate documents to cover up their misconduct. The jury convicted the defendants on various counts, and the appeals court affirmed those convictions. The court also ruled that the district court's calculation of restitution for the losses sustained was reasonable. View "United States v. Underwood" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of a pretrial release condition that temporarily barred two defendants from possessing firearms pending trial. The defendants, Jesus Perez-Garcia and John Thomas Fencl, were charged with various felony offenses. The district courts imposed a condition barring them from possessing firearms as part of their pretrial release, arguing that the restriction was necessary for public safety. The defendants appealed, arguing that this condition infringed on their Second Amendment rights.The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the firearm condition was constitutional. The court reasoned that the Bail Reform Act of 1984's firearm condition on pretrial release is consistent with how courts have historically balanced the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees with public safety considerations. The court also pointed out that the nation has a long history of temporarily disarming criminal defendants facing serious charges and those deemed dangerous or unwilling to follow the law. Therefore, the court held that the temporary disarmament of the defendants was justified by this historical tradition. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision in a case involving Defendant Joseph Glaum, who appealed an amended criminal judgment and the denial of his request to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. Glaum claimed that the court had abused its discretion in denying his request to withdraw his pleas, arguing that the court had misapplied the factors for considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11. He also made claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and asserted that the six issues preserved for appeal by his conditional pleas were wrongly decided by the court.The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factors outlined in State v. Lium, and did not clearly err in determining that Glaum did not meet his burden to show a fair and just reason to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. The court also concluded that the record was inadequate to determine Glaum’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Glaum further argued that his right to a speedy trial under the federal constitution was violated. The court applied the balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo to evaluate this claim, considering the accused’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether there was any prejudice to the accused. Upon balancing these factors, the court found that Glaum had not shown a violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant the State’s motion to amend the information and denied Glaum’s motion for continuance, finding that the court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or misinterpret or misapply the law. View "State v. Glaum" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the decision of the District Court of Ramsey County in a case involving a man, James Driver, who was charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, reckless endangerment, and driving under suspension or revocation. Driver appealed his conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove he was the operator of the vehicle involved in the chase and that the vehicle was driven in a way that showed extreme indifference to human life. He also argued that the State had presented irrelevant evidence and made an improper opening statement about dismissed theft and trespassing charges, thus prejudicing his case.The Supreme Court disagreed, indicating that the district court did not err in denying Driver's motion for a new trial or his motion for judgment of acquittal. The court ruled that the district court had not abused its discretion in these decisions, and that there was substantial evidence to support Driver's convictions. In terms of the opening statement and the presentation of evidence, the court found that the State's actions were proper at the time and that any comments made about the dismissed charges were reasonable given the circumstances. The court also noted that the jury had been instructed to disregard any statements made by counsel that were not supported by evidence. As a result, the court affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Driver's conviction. View "State v. Driver" on Justia Law

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The case involves an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County, California, denying Francisco Carrillo's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The motion was based on the claim that Carrillo did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence.Carrillo, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of assault with a firearm following a trial. He was sentenced to serve 301 days in jail and granted formal probation for five years. However, when Carrillo later admitted to a probation violation and received an additional 90 days in jail, his total term of imprisonment exceeded one year, thereby qualifying his conviction as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), leading to mandatory deportation.Arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence, Carrillo filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Carrillo failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudicial error due to his lack of understanding, as he did not show a reasonable probability that he would have acted differently had he been aware of the immigration consequences.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's order but modified it to be without prejudice. This means that Carrillo could file another motion asserting grounds not raised in his initial motion. The appellate court agreed that Carrillo did not understand the potential immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. However, it found that Carrillo failed to prove that this misunderstanding prejudiced his decisions at trial or during his sentencing hearing. View "People v. Carrillo" on Justia Law

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In this case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, the petitioner, Eddie Gomez, Jr., sought to challenge a Superior Court judge's denial of his request to disqualify another judge, Judge Kimberly Menninger, who was set to consider his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.Gomez had previously appeared before Judge Menninger for his arraignment, where he pleaded guilty to one count of attempted murder and two enhancements. Following the plea agreement, Judge Menninger dismissed the remaining counts and enhancements, sentencing Gomez to 11 years in prison. Later, Gomez filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 and subsequently filed a peremptory challenge to disqualify Judge Menninger from ruling on this resentencing petition.However, Judge Jonathan S. Fish denied the peremptory challenge, stating it was untimely and that Judge Menninger, as the sentencing judge, was required to handle the resentencing under section 1172.6. Gomez then sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal, but his petition was denied.Upon review of the case, the Court of Appeal held that Gomez's peremptory challenge was indeed untimely. The court reasoned that the resentencing proceeding was a continuation of the earlier criminal action, and therefore Gomez was not entitled to file a peremptory challenge at the resentencing stage. The court affirmed that when the judge assigned to examine and rule on the resentencing petition is the same judge who presided at the petitioner's earlier criminal action, the petitioner is not entitled to peremptorily challenge that judge. As a result, the court denied Gomez's petition for a writ of mandate. View "Gomez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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The case in question involves Dale Edward Lehman, Jr., who was convicted for knowingly permitting a minor to ingest methamphetamine, a violation of Minnesota Statute § 152.137, subd. 2(b) (2022). Lehman appealed, arguing the state failed to provide evidence proving he knew the minor in question, identified as A.D., was under the age of 18. Lehman also argued the court failed to instruct the jury to evaluate whether he knew A.D. was underage. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, stating the statute did not necessitate proof of the defendant's awareness of the minor's age.Lehman's case reached the Supreme Court of Minnesota, where he petitioned for a review. The Supreme Court stated it did not need to resolve the statutory interpretation issue raised by Lehman, as the circumstantial evidence was inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than Lehman's guilt. The Court took into consideration Lehman's longstanding relationship with the minor's family, his frequent visits to their home, and his statements indicating he knew the minor was underage. The court concluded that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that Lehman knew A.D. was under the age of 18 at the time he provided her with methamphetamine.The Court, therefore, affirmed the decision of the appellate court but on different grounds, maintaining Lehman's conviction. View "State vs. Lehman" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed a case in which Robert John Kaiser had been convicted of second-degree felony murder for the death of his infant son. Kaiser sought postconviction relief, arguing that two expert witnesses for the State had presented false evidence at his trial. The district court granted a new trial, determining that the expert testimony at issue was indeed false and that the jury might have reached a different conclusion without it. The State appealed this decision, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial.The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the lower court's decision, stating that the district court had not abused its discretion. It held that the Larrison test, which is used to determine the legitimacy of claims of witness recantation or false trial testimony, was the appropriate legal standard for this case. The court found that the expert testimony presented at Kaiser's trial was factual and false, thus meeting the requirements of the Larrison test. The court further found that the jury might have returned a different verdict without the false testimony. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the decision of the lower courts to grant Kaiser a new trial. View "Kaiser vs. State" on Justia Law