Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Environmental organizations challenged the EPA's decision not to revise technology-based pollution limits, guidelines, and standards (ELGs) for seven specific industrial categories under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The petitioners argued that the ELGs for these categories were outdated and did not reflect advances in pollution control technology.The EPA's decision was based on its Effluent Guidelines Program Plan 15, which used a Category Ranking Analysis to prioritize ELGs for revision. This analysis ranked industries based on the concentration and total load of pollutants discharged, using data from discharge monitoring reports (DMR data) from direct dischargers. The EPA did not consider data from indirect dischargers or unregulated pollutants in this analysis. The EPA concluded that revising the ELGs for the seven categories was not a priority based on this analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the EPA's refusal to revise the ELGs constituted final agency action and was reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court found that the EPA's reliance on the Category Ranking Analysis was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider advances in pollution control technology, pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers, and unregulated pollutants. The court also found that the EPA's decision regarding the plastics molding and forming category was arbitrary and capricious due to inadequate explanation.The court granted the petition for review in part, remanding the case to the EPA to reconsider its decision or provide a fuller explanation. The court emphasized that the EPA must offer a reasoned justification for its decisions consistent with the CWA and APA. View "Waterkeeper Alliance v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Interim Storage Partners (ISP) applied for a license to build a facility in West Texas to store spent nuclear fuel. During the licensing process, a Texas government agency and Fasken Land and Minerals, a private business, submitted comments on the draft environmental impact statement prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Fasken also sought to intervene in the licensing proceeding but was denied by the NRC. Fasken challenged this denial before the full Commission and the D.C. Circuit but was unsuccessful.In September 2021, the NRC granted ISP a license to build and operate the storage facility. Texas and Fasken sought review of the NRC's licensing decision in the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit vacated ISP's license, allowing Texas and Fasken to challenge the NRC's decision despite not being parties to the licensing proceeding.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Texas and Fasken were not entitled to judicial review of the NRC's licensing decision because they were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding. The Court emphasized that under the Hobbs Act, only a "party aggrieved" by a licensing order of the Commission may seek judicial review. To qualify as a party, one must be the license applicant or have successfully intervened in the proceeding. Since Texas and Fasken did not meet these criteria, they could not obtain judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded the case with instructions to deny or dismiss the petitions for review. View "Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its denial of small refinery exemption petitions under the Clean Air Act's (CAA) renewable fuel program. The CAA requires most domestic refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels, with a phased exemption scheme for small refineries. Following a Supreme Court decision in HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn., the EPA reconsidered and ultimately denied 105 exemption petitions in 2022, based on its interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" and an economic theory that Renewable Identification Number (RIN) costs are passed through to consumers.The small refineries challenged these denials in multiple regional Circuits. Most Circuits either dismissed the challenges for improper venue or transferred them to the D.C. Circuit. However, the Fifth Circuit retained jurisdiction, ruling that the EPA's actions were locally applicable and not based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect, as the EPA still examined refinery-specific facts before issuing denials.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit. The Court concluded that the EPA's interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" and its RIN passthrough theory were determinations of nationwide scope or effect that formed the core basis for the denials. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit erred in retaining jurisdiction, and the case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Environmental Protection Agency v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) disapproval of state emissions-control plans submitted by Oklahoma and Utah. The EPA disapproved these plans, asserting that they did not comply with the Clean Air Act's (CAA) "Good Neighbor" provision, which requires states to prevent their emissions from significantly contributing to air quality problems in other states. The EPA aggregated its disapprovals into a single rule and claimed that the rule was nationally applicable, or alternatively, that it was based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.The states and energy-industry petitioners challenged the EPA's disapprovals in regional Circuits. The EPA moved to dismiss these challenges or transfer them to the D.C. Circuit. Four out of five Circuits found that regional Circuit review was proper. However, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and transferred the challenges to the D.C. Circuit, reasoning that the EPA's omnibus rule constituted a single, nationally applicable action.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the Tenth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions, not nationally applicable. The Court further held that the "nationwide scope or effect" exception did not apply because the EPA's disapprovals were based on state-specific, fact-intensive analyses rather than on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Applicants sought an Act 250 permit to construct a farm store on Route 5 in Hartland, Vermont. The proposed project includes a 9000 square-foot, two-story building with a deli, bakery, eating area, and parking lot. The store will sell products primarily from the applicants' nearby farm, Sunnymede Farm. The project site is a vacant lot near the Interstate 91 interchange, with significant traffic and no existing sidewalks.The District 3 Environmental Commission approved the project and issued the permit. The Hartland Planning Commission (HPC) appealed to the Environmental Division, arguing the project did not meet Act 250 Criteria 9(L) and 10. The Environmental Division granted summary judgment to the applicants, finding the project satisfied both criteria. The HPC then appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the project made efficient use of land, energy, roads, utilities, and other supporting infrastructure, as required by Criterion 9(L). Although the project met the definition of strip development, the court found it would not contribute to a pattern of strip development due to its agricultural nature and specific conditions limiting its use. The court also determined that the project conformed with the local town plan under Criterion 10, despite the HPC's argument to the contrary. The court affirmed the Environmental Division's grant of summary judgment to the applicants. View "In re SM Farms Shop, LLC Permit Appeal" on Justia Law

Environmental groups challenged the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) approval of the Willow Project, an oil and gas venture in Alaska's northern Arctic. BLM approved the project in 2023, allowing ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. to construct oil and gas infrastructure in the National Petroleum Reserve. BLM prepared a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) after a 2021 remand by the district court, which required BLM to reassess its alternatives analysis. BLM insisted on a full field development standard to avoid piecemeal development, which led to the exclusion of certain environmentally protective alternatives.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of BLM, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act (Reserves Act), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The district court found that BLM had rectified the errors identified in its 2021 order and that the alternatives analysis satisfied NEPA, the Reserves Act, and ANILCA. The court also held that the plaintiffs had standing but had not shown that the defendants violated the ESA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s decision. The court held that BLM did not abuse its discretion in using the full field development standard to avoid the risks of piecemeal development. However, BLM’s final approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it did not provide a reasoned explanation for potentially deviating from the full field development standard. The court also held that BLM’s assessment of downstream emissions complied with NEPA and that BLM did not act arbitrarily in selecting mitigation measures under the Reserves Act. The court found that BLM complied with ANILCA’s procedural requirements and that the ESA consultation was not arbitrary or capricious. The court remanded the NEPA claim without vacatur, allowing BLM to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision. View "SOVEREIGN INUPIAT FOR A LIVING ARCTIC V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT" on Justia Law

Citizens for a Better Eureka (CBE) filed a petition challenging the City of Eureka's decision to redevelop a city-owned parking lot into affordable housing, claiming the project was improperly exempted from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The City Council had adopted a resolution authorizing the reduction or removal of public parking to facilitate the development, citing a Class 12 CEQA exemption for surplus government property sales. CBE argued that the project was unlawfully piecemealed and that the entire redevelopment should be considered under CEQA.The Humboldt County Superior Court dismissed the petition, agreeing with the Wiyot Tribe's motion that the Tribe, selected as the developer for the project, was a necessary and indispensable party to the proceedings. The court found that the Tribe could not be joined due to its sovereign immunity, and thus, the case could not proceed without it.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Tribe was indeed a necessary and indispensable party. The court reasoned that the Tribe had significant interests in the project, having invested time and resources into its development. The court also found that any judgment in favor of CBE would prejudice the Tribe by hindering its ability to proceed with the project. Additionally, the court noted that CBE failed to join the Tribe within the statutory period, further justifying the dismissal. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition. View "Citizens for a Better Eureka v. City of Eureka" on Justia Law

The State of New Jersey sued the Dow Chemical Company in state court for the design, manufacture, marketing, and sale of 1,4-dioxane, a substance alleged to be highly toxic and a likely human carcinogen. Dow used 1,4-dioxane to inhibit 1,1,1-trichloroethane (TCA) to create a cleaning agent for metal. New Jersey claims that Dow’s products containing 1,4-dioxane caused substantial environmental harm. The case centers on whether the lawsuit should be heard in state or federal court.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey remanded the case to state court. The District Court found that Dow was not acting under the United States Government when it produced and sold 1,4-dioxane inhibited TCA. Dow had argued that it acted under the federal government’s direction, citing the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). However, the District Court concluded that Dow’s relationship with the government did not meet the criteria for federal-officer removal, as Dow had independently produced and sold the product before any relevant federal regulations were implemented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that Dow did not satisfy the “acting under” requirement of the federal-officer removal statute. The court explained that Dow’s production and sale of 1,4-dioxane inhibited TCA were not directed, guided, or controlled by the federal government. Dow’s actions were independent and predated the government’s product specifications. Therefore, the case was properly remanded to state court, as Dow could not litigate under the federal-officer removal statute. View "Attorney General New Jersey v. Dow Chemical Company" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) extending the construction deadline for the Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (MVP) Southgate Project. Initially, FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the Southgate Project in June 2020, setting a construction completion deadline of June 18, 2023. However, due to unresolved permitting issues for the Mainline, which Southgate extends from, the construction could not proceed as planned. MVP requested an extension shortly before the deadline, citing delays in Mainline permitting as the reason for not meeting the original deadline.The Commission granted MVP's extension request, finding that MVP had demonstrated good cause due to unavoidable circumstances, specifically the Mainline permitting delays. FERC also maintained that its previous assessments of market need and environmental impacts for the Southgate Project remained valid and did not require reevaluation.Eight environmental organizations petitioned for review, arguing that FERC's decision to extend the construction deadline and its refusal to revisit prior assessments were arbitrary and capricious. They contended that MVP had not made reasonable efforts to advance the Southgate Project and that the market need and environmental impact analyses were outdated.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC reasonably found that MVP had satisfied the good cause standard for the extension, given the permitting and litigation delays with the Mainline. The court also upheld FERC's decision not to revisit its prior findings on market need and environmental impacts, concluding that the information presented by the petitioners did not constitute significant changes in circumstances. Consequently, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Appalachian Voices v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Cascade County discovered petroleum contamination under a county shop complex in 1996 and notified the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). A 2000 report identified the contamination source as four county-owned tanks. The DEQ approved a corrective action plan in 2006, and the County requested the site be designated as a multiple release site for reimbursement eligibility, which the DEQ declined. The County completed remediation in 2008 and submitted receipts to the Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board, but the costs exceeded the statutory maximum for a single release. The Board indicated further reimbursement requests would be denied.The County sought a writ of mandamus to compel the DEQ to assign multiple release numbers, but the DEQ and the County eventually stipulated to dismiss the action in 2013. The County then filed four separate applications for reimbursement in 2014, which the Board denied, stating the DEQ had classified all contaminations under a single release number. The County contested this, and a Hearing Examiner found four discrete releases but ruled the claims were time-barred. The Board adopted most of the Examiner's findings but rejected the conclusion of four releases. The district court later ruled in favor of the County, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, directing the Board to reimburse the County.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the Board had a clear legal duty to review the County's reimbursement claims, despite the County not submitting them in the manner required by Board regulations. The Court held that the Board must review and determine the eligibility of the claims submitted by the County for reimbursement of remediation costs. The District Court's order denying the County's writ of mandamus was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to issue the alternative writ of mandate. View "Cascade v. Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board" on Justia Law