Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Jamesway Construction, Inc. was involved in a dispute with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regarding the alleged unauthorized filling of wetlands in Coffee County. After a citizen complaint and subsequent investigation, TDEC issued an order in 2018 assessing damages and penalties against Jamesway, alleging violations under the Water Quality Control Act. Jamesway contested these allegations in a contested case hearing before an administrative law judge. The judge found TDEC failed to prove its case regarding wetland filling and dismissed most damages but imposed a civil penalty for failing to obtain a stormwater permit.Following the initial administrative decision, TDEC appealed to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas. Jamesway moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing TDEC’s notice of appeal was untimely under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act’s 15-day deadline, and the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The administrative law judge denied the motion, finding a 30-day deadline applied. Jamesway then filed a petition for judicial review in the Davidson County Chancery Court, seeking immediate review of this procedural ruling. The chancery court, and subsequently the Tennessee Court of Appeals, ruled in Jamesway’s favor, finding the appeal deadline was 15 days and the Board lacked jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed whether the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(a)(1) to review a preliminary agency decision. The Court held that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction because Jamesway had not shown judicial review of the final agency decision would be inadequate. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas for further proceedings, clarifying that only review of a final agency decision is permitted absent a showing of inadequate remedy. View "Jamesway Construction, Inc. v. Salyers" on Justia Law

Federal and state agencies enacted a rule listing two distinct population segments of the lesser prairie-chicken as "endangered" and "threatened" under the Endangered Species Act. The rule divided the bird’s range into Northern and Southern segments, based on habitat and genetic differences. Conservation groups, including one that originally petitioned for the listing, were active throughout the process. After a change in presidential administration in 2025, the federal government signaled a shift in environmental policy and, in ongoing litigation, ultimately conceded error in applying the "distinct population segment" policy. The government and various state and industry plaintiffs sought to settle by vacating the listing rule.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas consolidated the lawsuits challenging the listing. Conservation groups moved to intervene twice: the first motion was denied because the court found the government would adequately represent their interests, and the second was denied as untimely and for failure to rebut that presumption. Meanwhile, the district court granted the government’s motion for voluntary vacatur and remand, finding the listing rule unlawful due to the agency’s conceded error.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of intervention de novo and the timeliness determination for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the second motion to intervene untimely, as the conservation groups acted promptly after government conduct revealed a divergence of interests. The court found all requirements for intervention of right satisfied and reversed the denial of intervention. However, the Fifth Circuit determined the conservation groups lacked appellate standing to challenge the vacatur and remand of the listing rule, so it did not reach the merits of the district court’s substantive ruling. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Texas v. Dept of the Interior" on Justia Law

A company sought to expand its interstate natural gas pipeline by constructing a new pipeline segment beneath Raritan Bay, New Jersey. This work required dredging the bay floor, which would disturb sediment containing toxic contaminants. Several environmental organizations challenged the state agency’s decision to grant a Water Quality Certification for the project, arguing that the agency reversed a prior denial without adequate explanation, certified the project before resolving essential monitoring and management requirements, inadequately explained how the project would meet state water quality standards, and failed to provide sufficient public participation opportunities.Previously, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) had denied the company’s application in 2019, citing insufficient information to determine compliance with water quality standards, including concerns over contaminants like 4,4’–DDE. The company submitted additional modeling and monitoring plans in subsequent applications, but NJDEP again denied certification in 2020 after New York rejected the corresponding application. In 2025, following New York’s approval, NJDEP granted the Water Quality Certification, imposing several conditions, including post-certification submission of finalized monitoring and adaptive management plans.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the petitions after transfer from the Second Circuit. The court held that NJDEP acted arbitrarily and capriciously by deferring the finalization of material monitoring and adaptive management plans until after certification without requiring agency approval before the start of dredging. The court also found NJDEP failed to adequately explain how the project would comply with water quality standards, particularly regarding toxic contaminant monitoring and shellfish impacts. Accordingly, the Third Circuit granted the petitions, vacated the Water Quality Certification, and remanded the matter to NJDEP for further proceedings. View "Natural Resources Defense Council Inc v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, projects focused on protecting water quality, brought a suit against a clay recycling facility located near Temescal Creek in California, alleging violations of stormwater-permit requirements under the Clean Water Act. The facility, operated by Corona Clay Company, discharged stormwater into Temescal Creek, a tributary of the Santa Ana River. Regulatory authorities had previously issued violation notices to Corona, but no enforcement action was taken by the state. The plaintiffs sought relief for both substantive discharge violations and procedural violations such as monitoring and reporting.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially found in favor of Corona following a trial. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, citing an intervening Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which expanded the scope of the Clean Water Act to include indirect discharges that are the “functional equivalent” of direct discharges. On retrial, the plaintiffs prevailed, and Corona was assessed significant penalties. After the Supreme Court’s Sackett v. EPA decision, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States,” Corona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively sought a new trial. The district court denied both motions, holding that the jurisdictional requirement was met and the issue of whether Temescal Creek qualified as a water of the United States had been conceded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Corona’s post-judgment motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that whether a waterbody qualifies as a “water of the United States” is a merits question, not a jurisdictional one. However, it reversed the denial of Corona’s motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, concluding that the intervening Sackett decision rendered a previously foreclosed issue viable. The panel remanded for further proceedings to determine, under Sackett’s standard, whether Temescal Creek is a water of the United States. View "INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

A group of residents in the District of Columbia challenged amendments to the District’s Comprehensive Plan, a document that guides land use decisions. The 2021 amendments, enacted after a lengthy planning and public comment process, increased land use densities in certain neighborhoods, prompting concerns among residents about potential harms such as increased risk of displacement, infrastructure strain, and changes to neighborhood character. The residents sued, alleging that the Mayor’s Office of Planning failed to produce an adequate environmental assessment and did not give proper consideration to their Advisory Neighborhood Commissions.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed the complaint and dismissed it with prejudice, finding that none of the plaintiffs had standing. The court determined that the alleged injuries were too hypothetical and amounted to generalized grievances rather than concrete, particularized harm. Additionally, it concluded that there was no causal link between the Office of Planning’s actions and the claimed injuries, and that the injuries were not redressable because the court could not prevent implementation of the enacted Plan.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed that the appellants lacked standing, holding that none had alleged an injury-in-fact that was sufficiently concrete or imminent. The court explained that most harms were generalized or speculative and not tied to any specific development project at the time the Plan was enacted. However, the appellate court found that the Superior Court erred in dismissing the suit with prejudice; dismissals for lack of standing should be without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing but remanded for the trial court to revise the judgment to reflect that it is without prejudice. View "Booth v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a limited partnership, initiated an action in 2019 against the State of Connecticut and its Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection, alleging unreasonable delays in processing applications for reimbursement under the underground storage tank petroleum clean-up program. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel payment for approved claims and adjudication of pending claims, as well as damages for alleged constitutional violations and unlawful taking of property.The Superior Court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing sovereign immunity. On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the dismissal as to the mandamus claim and remanded for further proceedings, but affirmed dismissal of the damages claims. Following remand, the plaintiff amended its complaint to seek only a writ of mandamus for payment of approved claims. The trial court denied this request, finding the plaintiff did not show a complete and immediate right to payment. The Appellate Court affirmed, and the plaintiff was granted certification to appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.After certification was granted, the legislature enacted Public Act 25-168, which cancelled all applications under the program, transferred remaining funds to the state’s general fund, and repealed the statutory scheme governing the program. The Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that these legislative actions rendered the plaintiff’s appeal moot, as no practical relief could be granted. The court dismissed the appeal and vacated the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court pertaining to the writ of mandamus, but declined to vacate prior judgments in unrelated claims from earlier proceedings. View "Aldin Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted a periodic review of the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and particulate matter, as required by the Clean Air Act. After an extensive eleven-year process, EPA decided to retain the existing standards for nitrogen oxides and particulate matter, while lowering the secondary standard for sulfur oxides. EPA also issued a memorandum explaining its view that the new rule would not change air quality or emissions and thus would have no effect on endangered species or their habitats.Previously, EPA published its proposed rule in April 2024, followed by the final rule in December 2024. The agency’s no-effect determination stated that the revisions would not trigger additional emissions reductions or affect listed species. The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) challenged EPA’s rule, arguing that the agency violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) by failing to consult with federal wildlife agencies before issuing the rule. CBD asserted that ongoing and cumulative pollutant effects could harm species, and that EPA’s effects determination was both arbitrary and untimely.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that CBD had standing to bring the challenge, but ultimately determined that EPA’s no-effect finding was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. The court explained that the rule would not cause any changes to air quality or emissions, and thus would not trigger consultation obligations under the ESA. The court also held that EPA’s timing of the effects determination was appropriate under regulatory requirements. The main holding is that EPA reasonably determined the rule would have no effect on protected species or critical habitat, and the petition for review was denied. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

Venture Global CP2 LNG and Venture Global CP Express sought authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to construct and operate a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminal and an 85-mile pipeline in Louisiana. FERC’s review included extensive environmental analysis in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), resulting in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and a Supplemental EIS (SEIS). Both assessments concluded that, with recommended mitigation measures, the project’s environmental impacts, including those on air quality and the commercial fishing industry, would not be significant.Individuals and advocacy groups challenged FERC’s authorization, raising eleven alleged errors under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and NEPA. After FERC’s initial order in 2024, the challengers sought rehearing. FERC partially granted rehearing to address concerns raised by recent D.C. Circuit decisions and directed additional environmental review, which led to the SEIS. The SEIS found no exceedances of relevant air quality standards for the terminal and compressor station. FERC reaffirmed its authorization in 2025, and subsequent rehearing requests were denied. The challengers then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s interpretation and application of the NGA was lawful and not arbitrary, emphasizing the presumption in favor of terminal authorization under Section 3, absent an affirmative showing of inconsistency with the public interest. The court found FERC’s NEPA analysis reasonable, deferring to FERC’s use of established air quality standards and its reliance on expert agency data. The court also upheld FERC’s treatment of cumulative impacts and harm to commercial fisheries as sufficiently addressed and explained. The petitions for review were denied in full. View "For a Better Bayou v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank) agreed to lend up to $5 billion to support the development of a major liquefied natural gas project in Mozambique. After insurgent attacks in the project area halted operations, Eximbank approved an amendment in 2025 to allow disbursement of funds on a revised schedule. Two environmental organizations, Friends of the Earth U.S. and Justiça Ambiental, argued that Eximbank’s actions violated statutory requirements by failing to provide a notice-and-comment period or disclose certain economic and environmental analyses before approving the amendment. The organizations claimed the project’s restart would intensify local conflict, cause environmental harm, and impair their ability to serve affected communities.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to show standing for most of their claims, including lack of a notice-and-comment period and diversion of organizational resources. However, the district court concluded they had a substantial likelihood of standing on an informational injury theory relating to Eximbank’s failure to provide environmental information, but determined the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits for any of their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the plaintiffs failed to establish organizational standing because their alleged injuries were either not particularized or too attenuated. The court concluded the plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of informational standing for environmental information but failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, because NEPA does not apply to projects with effects entirely outside U.S. jurisdiction and Eximbank’s disclosure obligations were not triggered. The denial of the preliminary injunction was therefore affirmed. View "Friends of the Earth v. Export-Import Bank" on Justia Law

Two synthetic chemicals, PFOA and PFOS—members of the PFAS group often called “forever chemicals”—have been widely used since the 1940s and are highly persistent in the environment and the human body. Scientific studies have linked exposure to these chemicals to serious health conditions, including cancer and developmental delays. In 2024, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) designated PFOA and PFOS as “hazardous substances” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which governs the cleanup of hazardous substances and allows for cost recovery from polluters.This designation was challenged by seven industry groups representing entities that use, transport, or discharge PFOA and PFOS. The challengers argued that EPA misinterpreted CERCLA’s standard for designating hazardous substances, failed to provide adequate notice regarding its cost-benefit analysis, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by regulating in the face of scientific and economic uncertainties. They also argued that the designation violated the Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional doctrines.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that EPA acted within its statutory authority: CERCLA allows EPA to designate substances that “may present substantial danger” upon release, and the agency’s interpretation of “may” as requiring only the possibility, rather than certainty, of substantial harm was consistent with statutory text and precedent. The court concluded that EPA provided adequate notice and opportunity for public comment regarding its cost-benefit analysis, and that the agency’s rulemaking was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court also held that the agency’s actions did not violate constitutional doctrines. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review, upholding EPA’s designation of PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances. View "Chamber of Commerce v. EPA" on Justia Law