Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, Louis Paolino and Marie E. Issa, own property in Cumberland, Rhode Island, adjacent to a site operated as an automobile recycling business. The neighboring property, owned by J.F. Realty, LLC and operated by LKQ Route 16 Used Auto Parts, Inc., was found to be contaminated. The Department of Environmental Management (DEM) required remediation, leading the defendants, Commonwealth Engineers & Consulting, Inc., to design a stormwater remediation system. Plaintiffs alleged that this system discharged contaminated water onto their property and encroached on it.In prior litigation, the plaintiffs sued the Ferreira defendants in state court for trespass due to contamination. The case was removed to federal court, where federal claims were dismissed, and state claims were remanded. A jury found encroachment but awarded only nominal damages. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, which was partially granted. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief for the encroachment, deeming it de minimis, but ordered a new trial on other issues. In a subsequent trial, the jury found no continuing trespass. Plaintiffs also pursued a Clean Water Act claim in federal court, which was dismissed after a bench trial.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the issues in the current case were precluded by collateral estoppel. The court found that the issue of contamination had been litigated and decided in prior state and federal actions, and the encroachment was previously determined to be de minimis. Thus, the plaintiffs were barred from relitigating these issues. View "Paolino v. Commonwealth Engineers & Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Custer applied for a permit from the South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) to discharge treated wastewater into French Creek as part of an upgrade to its wastewater treatment facility. Preserve French Creek, Inc. (Preserve), a group of local citizens, opposed this discharge. Two years after the permit was issued, a Custer County ordinance was passed by citizen initiative, declaring the discharge of treated water into French Creek a nuisance. Preserve demanded the City cease construction based on the new ordinance, but the City did not comply. Preserve then sought mandamus relief to enforce the ordinance, which the circuit court denied.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Custer County found that the ordinance conflicted with state law, specifically SDCL 21-10-2, which states that actions done under the express authority of a statute cannot be deemed a nuisance. The court concluded that the City’s actions, authorized by the DANR permit, could not be considered a nuisance. The court also rejected Preserve’s estoppel argument, stating that the City and County had no duty to enforce an ordinance that conflicted with state law.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was preempted by state law because it attempted to declare a nuisance something that state law expressly authorized. The court also found that the City and County were not estopped from asserting the ordinance’s invalidity, as their actions in placing the ordinance on the ballot and canvassing the vote were statutorily required and did not constitute an inconsistent position. Therefore, the writ of mandamus was properly denied. View "Preserve French Creek V. Custer County" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a health advisory in 2022 for HFPO-DA, a chemical found in drinking water. The Chemours Company, which uses HFPO-DA in manufacturing, challenged the advisory, arguing it was unlawful. Chemours contended that the advisory violated procedural and substantive requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the nondelegation doctrine.Chemours petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review, invoking the section of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) that allows for review of final actions by the EPA Administrator. Chemours argued that the health advisory was a final agency action, thus subject to judicial review. The EPA, however, maintained that the advisory was not a final action but rather a nonbinding document meant to provide information to decision-makers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the health advisory did not constitute a final agency action because it did not determine any rights or obligations, nor did it have direct and appreciable legal consequences. The court emphasized that the advisory was informational and non-enforceable, and any legal consequences would result from subsequent actions by other entities, not from the advisory itself. Therefore, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the advisory under the SDWA. View "The Chemours Company FC, LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including several states and corporations, challenged a Department of Labor rule that allowed ERISA fiduciaries to consider environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors when making investment decisions if those factors equally serve the financial interests of the plan. This rule was issued following an executive order by President Biden, which counteracted a previous Trump-era rule that prohibited considering non-pecuniary factors in investment decisions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas upheld the Department of Labor's rule, relying on the Chevron deference doctrine, which allows courts to defer to a federal agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. The district court concluded that the rule was not "manifestly contrary to the statute" after affording the Department the deference due under Chevron.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overruled Chevron, thus eliminating the deference previously given to agency interpretations. Given this significant change in the legal landscape, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the new Supreme Court decision. The appellate court emphasized the importance of allowing the district court to reassess the merits without the Chevron framework, ensuring that the lower court's independent judgment is applied to the statutory interpretation of ERISA. View "State of Utah v. Su" on Justia Law

A developer proposed constructing a 12-unit residential condominium in downtown Lafayette, California, on a parcel mostly occupied by a vacant, dilapidated convalescent hospital. The City of Lafayette determined the project was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review, classifying it as infill development. Nahid Nassiri, who owns an adjacent office building, challenged this decision, arguing the site had value as habitat for rare species and that the project would significantly affect air quality.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially granted Nassiri's petition, finding insufficient evidence to support the City's determination that the site had no value as habitat for rare species. However, the court rejected Nassiri's other claims regarding general plan consistency, air quality effects, and mitigation measures. The developer and the City filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the project site, as defined by recent case law, did not include the area with potential habitat. The trial court granted the motion, leading to the denial of Nassiri's petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the City's determination that the project site had no value as habitat for rare species, specifically the oak titmouse and Nuttall’s woodpecker. The court also upheld the City's finding that the project would not significantly affect air quality, dismissing Nassiri's reliance on a health risk assessment that did not accurately reflect the project's construction characteristics. Lastly, the court declined to address the "unusual circumstances" exception to the CEQA exemption, as Nassiri did not properly raise this issue in the trial court. The judgment was affirmed. View "Nassiri v. City of Lafayette" on Justia Law

The case involves the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) developing a rulemaking package to join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from power plants. The RGGI Regulation faced opposition from the Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) and other state officials, leading to litigation. Three nonprofit environmental organizations (Nonprofits) sought to intervene in the litigation to defend the RGGI Regulation, citing environmental and health concerns.The Commonwealth Court initially denied the Nonprofits' application to intervene, ruling that their interests were adequately represented by DEP. The court also granted a preliminary injunction against the RGGI Regulation. Nonprofits appealed both the denial of intervention and the preliminary injunction.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case. It found that the Nonprofits had established a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation, based on the testimony of their members regarding the adverse health and environmental impacts of CO2 emissions. The court determined that DEP did not adequately represent the Nonprofits' interests, particularly because DEP had not invoked the Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA) in its defense of the RGGI Regulation.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision denying the Nonprofits' application to intervene, allowing them to participate as parties in the ongoing litigation. However, the appeal from the preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot because the Commonwealth Court had already issued a permanent injunction against the RGGI Regulation, superseding the preliminary injunction. View "Shirley v. PA Legislative Reference Bureau" on Justia Law

Healthy Gulf and other environmental groups challenged the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) decision to authorize the construction and operation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in southwestern Louisiana. They argued that FERC did not properly address certain requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA). Specifically, they contended that FERC inadequately explained its failure to determine the environmental significance of the project's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and failed to adequately assess the cumulative effects of the project's nitrogen dioxide (NO2) emissions. However, they acknowledged that FERC did consider alternatives to the project.The Commission had issued a final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and authorized the project, finding it environmentally acceptable and consistent with the public interest. Petitioners requested a rehearing, which was deemed denied by operation of law when FERC did not respond timely. They then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that FERC inadequately explained its failure to determine the significance of the project's GHG emissions and failed to properly assess the cumulative effects of the project's NO2 emissions. The court noted that FERC's reliance on the Significant Impact Levels (SILs) to assess cumulative effects was insufficient and that FERC did not adequately consider the significance of GHG emissions using available methodologies. However, the court upheld FERC's consideration of alternatives to the project, finding that FERC had provided sufficient reasoning for rejecting the proposed alternatives.The court granted the petitions in part, denied them in part, and remanded the case to FERC for further consideration without vacating the authorization order. The court instructed FERC to provide a more thorough explanation of its GHG emissions analysis and to properly assess the cumulative effects of NO2 emissions. View "Healthy Gulf v. FERC" on Justia Law

Golden Pass LNG Terminal, LLC was authorized to export up to 937 billion cubic feet per year of liquified natural gas (LNG) from a facility in Texas, with 129 billion cubic feet restricted to countries with a free-trade agreement (FTA) with the U.S. In 2022, the Department of Energy (DOE) removed this FTA-based restriction. The Sierra Club challenged this removal, arguing that it would increase actual exports, leading to more shipping traffic and harming the aesthetic and recreational interests of a member living near the facility.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved the facility's expansion in January 2021, and DOE approved increased exports to FTA countries in June 2021. DOE later approved exports to non-FTA countries in 2022, which Sierra Club opposed. After DOE denied Sierra Club's rehearing request, Sierra Club sought judicial review of the orders allowing greater exports to non-FTA countries.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and focused on the issue of constitutional standing. The court found that Sierra Club failed to provide evidence or argument in its opening brief to show that removing the FTA-based restriction would likely increase export volumes. The court noted that Sierra Club's arguments in its reply brief were insufficient to establish standing, as they were not patently obvious and irrefutable. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for review due to lack of Article III standing. View "Sierra Club v. DOE" on Justia Law

The case involves trade associations representing manufacturers of children's products challenging Oregon's Toxic-Free Kids Act (TFKA) and its implementing regulations. The TFKA requires the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) to maintain a list of high priority chemicals of concern for children's health and imposes reporting and removal requirements for these chemicals. The trade associations argued that these state requirements are preempted by the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) and the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA).The United States District Court for the District of Oregon partially dismissed the trade associations' claims and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The district court concluded that the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) had not exercised independent judgment or expertise to trigger the express preemption provisions of the FHSA or CPSA for all 73 chemicals listed by the OHA. Therefore, the trade associations' facial challenges failed because they could not show that the Oregon statute and its regulations were invalid in all their applications.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the FHSA and CPSA did not expressly preempt the TFKA and its regulations because the CPSC had not promulgated regulations for all the chemicals at issue. The court also found that the CPSA did not impliedly preempt the TFKA through principles of conflict preemption. The court concluded that the state law did not interfere with the federal regulatory scheme and upheld the district court's judgment. The decision was affirmed. View "AMERICAN APPAREL & FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION, INC. V. BADEN" on Justia Law

Space Exploration Holdings (SpaceX) applied for a license from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to operate 29,988 low-altitude non-geostationary orbit satellites for its second-generation Starlink system. The FCC conditionally approved the license for 7,500 satellites, citing the public interest in improving broadband access. The approval was contingent on SpaceX obtaining a favorable finding from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regarding compliance with power flux-density limits to prevent signal interference.DISH Network Corporation and the International Dark-Sky Association opposed the license. DISH argued that SpaceX's satellites would cause unacceptable interference and that the FCC unlawfully delegated its authority to the ITU. The FCC dismissed DISH's evidence, relying on SpaceX's self-certification and the ITU's eventual verification. The FCC also granted an interim waiver allowing SpaceX to begin operations before the ITU's finding, citing public interest. The International Dark-Sky Association argued that the FCC failed to conduct an environmental review as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The FCC concluded that its regulations did not require such a review and denied the request.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC's decision to license SpaceX's satellites was lawful and reasonably explained. The court found that the FCC was not required to independently verify SpaceX's self-certification and that the interim waiver was justified by public interest considerations. The court also determined that the FCC did not unlawfully delegate its authority to the ITU, as the ITU's role was limited to fact gathering and compliance verification. Regarding the environmental review, the court held that the FCC reasonably concluded that SpaceX's mitigation efforts and the FAA's environmental assessment of rocket launches were sufficient to avoid significant environmental impacts.The court affirmed the FCC's order licensing SpaceX's Gen2 Starlink satellites. View "International Dark-Sky Association, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law