Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

A Puerto Rico limited liability company, Berkey International, LLC, manufactures water filters known as Black Berkey Filters, which contain silver—a substance recognized as a pesticide. Berkey distributed these filters without EPA registration, claiming the silver was intended only to protect the filters themselves, not for pesticidal purposes. Inspections by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revealed that Berkey and associated distributors made claims on product labels and websites indicating the filters could remove viruses, bacteria, and other pathogens, suggesting pesticidal intent. As a result, the EPA issued a Stop Sale, Use, or Removal Order prohibiting Berkey and other distributors from selling or distributing these filters.Reviewing the matter, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico considered Berkey’s request for a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the EPA’s order. The district court evaluated the administrative record, held hearings, and reviewed extensive briefing. The court found that Berkey had not substantiated its claims that the silver was not intended for pesticidal use and denied Berkey’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Berkey’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting Berkey to file an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. Applying a highly deferential standard to the EPA’s technical determinations, the appellate court concluded that Berkey had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, including its assertions of arbitrary and capricious agency action and violations of notice-and-comment and due process requirements. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the EPA had reason to believe Berkey’s filters were unregistered and misbranded pesticidal products under federal law. View "Berkey International, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

After the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) confirmed thousands of federal stockwater rights on federal land, Idaho enacted a series of statutes known as the “stockwater amendments.” These amendments altered water rights rules, including procedures for forfeiture and appurtenance, and imposed new requirements specifically affecting federal stockwater rights. The United States challenged several provisions, arguing that they were intended to divest it of SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and unlawfully discriminated against the federal government. Two groups—the Idaho Legislature and ranching interests—intervened as defendants.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho rejected jurisdictional challenges based on Rooker-Feldman, prior exclusive jurisdiction, Burford abstention, and claim preclusion, holding it could hear the case. On the merits, the district court found Idaho Code § 42-224 constitutional as applied to the United States, but held Idaho Code §§ 42-113(2)(b), 42-502, and 42-504 were facially unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The United States appealed the ruling on § 42-224, while the State Defendants and Ranchers cross-appealed the jurisdictional holdings and the ruling on § 42-113(2)(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional holdings, concluding that neither the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Burford abstention applied. The panel reversed the district court’s finding that § 42-224 was constitutional as applied, holding that it is part of a statutory scheme that unlawfully discriminates against the United States and jeopardizes its SRBA-decreed rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that § 42-113(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it singles out the United States for unfavorable treatment by changing appurtenance rules only for rights associated with federal land. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, awarding costs to the United States. View "USA V. STATE OF IDAHO" on Justia Law

Methylene chloride is a chemical used in various commercial applications, including paint removal and manufacturing of products like air conditioner coolants and EV batteries. While useful, over-exposure to methylene chloride can cause serious health risks, including injury and death. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), determined that nearly all uses of methylene chloride posed an “unreasonable risk of injury to health” and issued a rule severely limiting its manufacture, processing, distribution, and use, allowing only thirteen conditions of use under strict exposure limits.Prior to this rule, EPA had completed risk evaluations for methylene chloride, first in 2020 and then revised in 2022. The revised evaluation adopted a “whole chemical” determination, finding all but one use posed unreasonable risk, and assumed workers did not use personal protective equipment (PPE), contrary to prior practice and OSHA standards. Industry petitioners, including manufacturers and the American Chemistry Council, filed for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that EPA’s determinations and rule were arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. Sierra Club also challenged the rule, asserting EPA did not go far enough to protect vulnerable populations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that EPA’s “whole chemical” risk determination violated TSCA, which requires separate evaluations for each condition of use. The court also held that EPA’s assumption of no PPE use was unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to law. EPA’s exposure limits for methylene chloride were deemed excessively conservative and not supported by the record. The court granted the industry petitioners’ review, vacated EPA’s rule and associated risk determination, denied Sierra Club’s petition, and remanded to EPA for further proceedings. View "East Fork Enterprises v. EPA" on Justia Law

Denver Water, a municipal utility, faced a projected water shortage and vulnerability due to overreliance on its South System. To address these concerns, Denver Water proposed expanding Gross Reservoir by raising the dam, which would increase storage capacity and allow diversion of water from the Fraser and Williams Fork Rivers. Because the project would impact wetlands, Denver Water applied for a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers in 2003. The Corps conducted a fourteen-year review, considering environmental and logistical impacts, and ultimately issued the permit in 2017. Denver Water began and substantially completed the $600 million expansion by 2026, but was unable to fill the reservoir due to litigation.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the project after Save the Colorado and other environmental groups challenged the Corps’s permit under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The plaintiffs alleged the Corps defined the project’s purpose too narrowly, failed to adequately analyze costs, and did not sufficiently consider climate change’s impact on feasibility. The District Court agreed, finding violations of both statutes, vacating the permit and environmental reviews, and issuing a permanent injunction against water diversion and further enlargement activities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit examined whether the Corps’s review and permitting decisions were arbitrary or capricious. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Corps appropriately considered multiple related project purposes and reasonably evaluated cost and climate change impacts. The court found that the Corps’s determinations were supported by the record and not arbitrary or capricious. The main holding was that the Corps did not violate the CWA or NEPA, thus the district court’s judgment was reversed, the permanent injunction vacated, and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment against the plaintiffs. View "Save The Colorado v. Graham" on Justia Law

Jamesway Construction, Inc. was involved in a dispute with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regarding the alleged unauthorized filling of wetlands in Coffee County. After a citizen complaint and subsequent investigation, TDEC issued an order in 2018 assessing damages and penalties against Jamesway, alleging violations under the Water Quality Control Act. Jamesway contested these allegations in a contested case hearing before an administrative law judge. The judge found TDEC failed to prove its case regarding wetland filling and dismissed most damages but imposed a civil penalty for failing to obtain a stormwater permit.Following the initial administrative decision, TDEC appealed to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas. Jamesway moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing TDEC’s notice of appeal was untimely under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act’s 15-day deadline, and the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The administrative law judge denied the motion, finding a 30-day deadline applied. Jamesway then filed a petition for judicial review in the Davidson County Chancery Court, seeking immediate review of this procedural ruling. The chancery court, and subsequently the Tennessee Court of Appeals, ruled in Jamesway’s favor, finding the appeal deadline was 15 days and the Board lacked jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed whether the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(a)(1) to review a preliminary agency decision. The Court held that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction because Jamesway had not shown judicial review of the final agency decision would be inadequate. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas for further proceedings, clarifying that only review of a final agency decision is permitted absent a showing of inadequate remedy. View "Jamesway Construction, Inc. v. Salyers" on Justia Law

Federal and state agencies enacted a rule listing two distinct population segments of the lesser prairie-chicken as "endangered" and "threatened" under the Endangered Species Act. The rule divided the bird’s range into Northern and Southern segments, based on habitat and genetic differences. Conservation groups, including one that originally petitioned for the listing, were active throughout the process. After a change in presidential administration in 2025, the federal government signaled a shift in environmental policy and, in ongoing litigation, ultimately conceded error in applying the "distinct population segment" policy. The government and various state and industry plaintiffs sought to settle by vacating the listing rule.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas consolidated the lawsuits challenging the listing. Conservation groups moved to intervene twice: the first motion was denied because the court found the government would adequately represent their interests, and the second was denied as untimely and for failure to rebut that presumption. Meanwhile, the district court granted the government’s motion for voluntary vacatur and remand, finding the listing rule unlawful due to the agency’s conceded error.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of intervention de novo and the timeliness determination for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the second motion to intervene untimely, as the conservation groups acted promptly after government conduct revealed a divergence of interests. The court found all requirements for intervention of right satisfied and reversed the denial of intervention. However, the Fifth Circuit determined the conservation groups lacked appellate standing to challenge the vacatur and remand of the listing rule, so it did not reach the merits of the district court’s substantive ruling. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Texas v. Dept of the Interior" on Justia Law

A company sought to expand its interstate natural gas pipeline by constructing a new pipeline segment beneath Raritan Bay, New Jersey. This work required dredging the bay floor, which would disturb sediment containing toxic contaminants. Several environmental organizations challenged the state agency’s decision to grant a Water Quality Certification for the project, arguing that the agency reversed a prior denial without adequate explanation, certified the project before resolving essential monitoring and management requirements, inadequately explained how the project would meet state water quality standards, and failed to provide sufficient public participation opportunities.Previously, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) had denied the company’s application in 2019, citing insufficient information to determine compliance with water quality standards, including concerns over contaminants like 4,4’–DDE. The company submitted additional modeling and monitoring plans in subsequent applications, but NJDEP again denied certification in 2020 after New York rejected the corresponding application. In 2025, following New York’s approval, NJDEP granted the Water Quality Certification, imposing several conditions, including post-certification submission of finalized monitoring and adaptive management plans.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the petitions after transfer from the Second Circuit. The court held that NJDEP acted arbitrarily and capriciously by deferring the finalization of material monitoring and adaptive management plans until after certification without requiring agency approval before the start of dredging. The court also found NJDEP failed to adequately explain how the project would comply with water quality standards, particularly regarding toxic contaminant monitoring and shellfish impacts. Accordingly, the Third Circuit granted the petitions, vacated the Water Quality Certification, and remanded the matter to NJDEP for further proceedings. View "Natural Resources Defense Council Inc v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, projects focused on protecting water quality, brought a suit against a clay recycling facility located near Temescal Creek in California, alleging violations of stormwater-permit requirements under the Clean Water Act. The facility, operated by Corona Clay Company, discharged stormwater into Temescal Creek, a tributary of the Santa Ana River. Regulatory authorities had previously issued violation notices to Corona, but no enforcement action was taken by the state. The plaintiffs sought relief for both substantive discharge violations and procedural violations such as monitoring and reporting.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially found in favor of Corona following a trial. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, citing an intervening Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which expanded the scope of the Clean Water Act to include indirect discharges that are the “functional equivalent” of direct discharges. On retrial, the plaintiffs prevailed, and Corona was assessed significant penalties. After the Supreme Court’s Sackett v. EPA decision, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States,” Corona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively sought a new trial. The district court denied both motions, holding that the jurisdictional requirement was met and the issue of whether Temescal Creek qualified as a water of the United States had been conceded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Corona’s post-judgment motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that whether a waterbody qualifies as a “water of the United States” is a merits question, not a jurisdictional one. However, it reversed the denial of Corona’s motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, concluding that the intervening Sackett decision rendered a previously foreclosed issue viable. The panel remanded for further proceedings to determine, under Sackett’s standard, whether Temescal Creek is a water of the United States. View "INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

A group of residents in the District of Columbia challenged amendments to the District’s Comprehensive Plan, a document that guides land use decisions. The 2021 amendments, enacted after a lengthy planning and public comment process, increased land use densities in certain neighborhoods, prompting concerns among residents about potential harms such as increased risk of displacement, infrastructure strain, and changes to neighborhood character. The residents sued, alleging that the Mayor’s Office of Planning failed to produce an adequate environmental assessment and did not give proper consideration to their Advisory Neighborhood Commissions.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed the complaint and dismissed it with prejudice, finding that none of the plaintiffs had standing. The court determined that the alleged injuries were too hypothetical and amounted to generalized grievances rather than concrete, particularized harm. Additionally, it concluded that there was no causal link between the Office of Planning’s actions and the claimed injuries, and that the injuries were not redressable because the court could not prevent implementation of the enacted Plan.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed that the appellants lacked standing, holding that none had alleged an injury-in-fact that was sufficiently concrete or imminent. The court explained that most harms were generalized or speculative and not tied to any specific development project at the time the Plan was enacted. However, the appellate court found that the Superior Court erred in dismissing the suit with prejudice; dismissals for lack of standing should be without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing but remanded for the trial court to revise the judgment to reflect that it is without prejudice. View "Booth v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a limited partnership, initiated an action in 2019 against the State of Connecticut and its Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection, alleging unreasonable delays in processing applications for reimbursement under the underground storage tank petroleum clean-up program. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel payment for approved claims and adjudication of pending claims, as well as damages for alleged constitutional violations and unlawful taking of property.The Superior Court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing sovereign immunity. On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the dismissal as to the mandamus claim and remanded for further proceedings, but affirmed dismissal of the damages claims. Following remand, the plaintiff amended its complaint to seek only a writ of mandamus for payment of approved claims. The trial court denied this request, finding the plaintiff did not show a complete and immediate right to payment. The Appellate Court affirmed, and the plaintiff was granted certification to appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.After certification was granted, the legislature enacted Public Act 25-168, which cancelled all applications under the program, transferred remaining funds to the state’s general fund, and repealed the statutory scheme governing the program. The Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that these legislative actions rendered the plaintiff’s appeal moot, as no practical relief could be granted. The court dismissed the appeal and vacated the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court pertaining to the writ of mandamus, but declined to vacate prior judgments in unrelated claims from earlier proceedings. View "Aldin Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State" on Justia Law