Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

A train carrying hazardous chemicals derailed in East Palestine, Ohio, resulting in a release of dangerous substances into the environment. This incident led to a class-action lawsuit involving nearly half a million residents. After extensive environmental testing and expert analysis, both sides reached a settlement to avoid prolonged litigation. The settlement established a $600 million fund, allowing residents to receive direct payments and, if desired, additional compensation for waiving personal injury claims. Those with extraordinary losses or injuries could submit claims for further individualized consideration.Prior to this appeal, some objectors challenged the settlement, asserting that class counsel should have reviewed and disclosed more expert evidence regarding long-term risks. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, after a fairness hearing, approved the settlement and rejected these objections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that approval, citing the adequacy and fairness of the settlement process and the sufficiency of the evidence considered.A small group of residents who had waived personal injury claims subsequently sought relief from the settlement, alleging fraud and misconduct by class counsel and Norfolk Southern. The Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of relief under Rule 60 for abuse of discretion. The court held that the movants failed to demonstrate fraud on the court, fraud by an opposing party, or extraordinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(3), 60(d)(3), or 60(b)(6). The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. The main holding is that the settlement approval stands and the movants are not entitled to relief from judgment. The disposition by the Sixth Circuit is affirmed. View "In re: E. Palestine Train Derailment" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Homeland Security invoked Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to initiate a border construction project in the Big Bend Sector along the U.S.–Mexico border. Determining this area to be one of high illegal entry, the Secretary exercised statutory authority to waive several environmental and conservation laws to expedite construction. Subsequently, an individual river guide, an environmental nonprofit, and a historic church preservation organization filed suit, challenging the Secretary’s waiver determinations. Their claim focused on the argument that the Secretary violated the major questions doctrine under Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, contending that the waivers exceeded statutory authority.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction, halting the Secretary’s waivers and associated border construction. The court acknowledged its jurisdiction was limited to constitutional claims but concluded that the major questions doctrine constituted a constitutional clear statement rule, grounded in separation of powers, thus qualifying as a constitutional claim. The court additionally found that the respondents’ major questions doctrine claim was likely to succeed, reasoning that the Secretary lacked clear congressional authorization to issue the waivers.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed an application for stay of the District Court’s injunction. The Court granted the stay, holding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondents’ major questions doctrine claim, as the claim did not allege a violation of the Constitution but instead challenged the Secretary’s statutory authority. The Court emphasized that claims asserting the Executive exceeded statutory authority are not constitutional claims, and that the major questions doctrine is a canon of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional cause of action. The Supreme Court also found that the balance of equities favored the Government, given Congress’s clear preference for expeditious border construction. The injunction was stayed pending further proceedings. View "Mullin v. Friends of the Ruidosa Church" on Justia Law

Several chambers of commerce and business associations challenged two California statutes—the Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act (SB 253) and the Climate-Related Financial Risk Act (SB 261)—on First Amendment grounds. SB 253 requires large companies to annually disclose greenhouse gas emissions in three categories: Scope 1 (direct emissions from owned or controlled sources), Scope 2 (indirect emissions from purchased energy), and Scope 3 (indirect emissions throughout the company’s value chain, including suppliers and customers). SB 261 mandates covered companies to publicly disclose climate-related financial risk information, including assessments about their exposure to climate change and related business impacts.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court determined that both SB 253 and SB 261 regulate commercial speech and thus are not subject to strict scrutiny. Applying intermediate scrutiny and, for SB 253, the more deferential Zauderer standard, the district court found that both statutes reasonably advance California’s substantial interests such as providing investors with information and reducing emissions. It concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their First Amendment claims and failed to meet the other requirements for preliminary relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial as to SB 253’s Scope 1 and Scope 2 disclosure requirements, holding these provisions regulate commercial speech and withstand intermediate scrutiny. However, it reversed the denial as to SB 253’s Scope 3 disclosure requirement and SB 261 in its entirety. The court found that Scope 3 disclosures and SB 261 compel noncommercial speech subject to strict scrutiny, which the State could not satisfy. The case was remanded for the district court to determine whether SB 253’s Scope 3 disclosure provisions are severable. View "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. SANCHEZ" on Justia Law

Six men, including two law enforcement officers and four members of a towing crew, responded to a tractor-trailer accident in St. Francis County, Arkansas, in April 2018. The accident involved an Old Dominion Freight Line truck transporting a 565-pound barrel of formic acid, a hazardous material. Although federal law did not require placarding for this volume, Old Dominion’s driver failed to disclose the presence of hazardous material when asked by emergency responders. The responders were subsequently exposed to toxic fumes, resulting in permanent respiratory and related injuries. All six men sought emergency medical care and later brought negligence claims against Old Dominion and its driver, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The St. Francis County Circuit Court held a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs, awarding them $75 million in compensatory damages and finding no liability for punitive damages. The defendants' post-trial motions for a new trial or remittitur were denied by operation of law. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and ordered a new trial, finding the compensatory damages unsupported by substantial evidence. The parties petitioned for review, which the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted, treating the case as if originally filed there.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and vacated the court of appeals’ opinion. It held that, given the immediate and acute toxic exposure, a heightened causation standard was not required, and that the evidence—including expert medical testimony—was sufficient to support the jury’s proximate cause finding. The court further held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not preempted by federal law, the professional-rescuer’s doctrine did not bar recovery, and the evidentiary and procedural rulings below were not abuses of discretion. Finally, the court found the damages award was supported by substantial evidence and was not so excessive as to shock the conscience. View "OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC. v. MCMILLION" on Justia Law

The case concerns two ranching entities in Nevada that challenged plans issued by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to gather and remove excess wild horses from specified areas—the Little Fish Lake Joint Management Area and the Stone Cabin Complex. After BLM determined that the populations of wild horses in these areas significantly exceeded the established Appropriate Management Levels (AML), it developed multi-year Gather Plans that detailed procedures for removal, population control, and subsequent maintenance actions. The plaintiffs asserted that these plans failed to satisfy the requirement of the Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act, which directs BLM to “immediately remove excess animals from the range so as to achieve appropriate management levels.”The United States District Court for the District of Nevada consolidated the plaintiffs’ challenges and reviewed them under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government officials, concluding that the Gather Plans did not violate the immediacy requirement of the Wild Horses Act. The plaintiffs timely appealed the district court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the statutory language “immediately remove excess animals” to mean removal as promptly as logistically and reasonably possible, taking into account humane treatment and other statutory considerations. The court held that the Act does not require BLM to set a specific timeframe for removal nor prohibit BLM from considering practical constraints in its maintenance actions. The Ninth Circuit found that both Gather Plans complied with the Act’s immediacy requirement and rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "COLVIN AND SON, LLC V. BURGUM" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations challenged the issuance of a Clean Water Act Section 404 permit by the United States Army Corps of Engineers for a large mixed-use development on the Cainhoy property in Charleston, South Carolina. The property comprises over 9,000 acres, including more than 2,500 acres of wetlands. The development plan would impact 181.5 acres of wetlands, while the remainder would be protected through conservation measures. The Corps, after a multi-year review process, assessed numerous alternatives—including off-site locations, on-site alternatives, a plan proposed by the plaintiffs known as the Dover plan, and a no action alternative—and ultimately determined that the proposed project was the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative (LEDPA).The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed the plaintiffs’ challenge, which argued that the Corps’ LEDPA determination was arbitrary and capricious because it did not consider alternatives that would impact fewer acres of wetlands. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision, dismissed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim, and granted summary judgment for the Corps and intervening landowners. The court found that the Corps had conducted a thorough alternatives analysis and that its decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that jurisdiction for challenges to final agency action such as this arises under the APA, not the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision. However, the court found the jurisdictional error harmless because both statutes require the same standard of review. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the Corps’ LEDPA determination was not arbitrary or capricious because it thoroughly evaluated all relevant alternatives and provided a rational explanation for its decision. View "South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

TVA, a federally owned power provider, undertook a project to replace aging coal-fired units at its Kingston plant in Tennessee with a new gas-fired facility, aiming to retire all coal units by 2027 and add 1,500 megawatts of reliable power. TVA considered alternatives, including continuing with updated coal units and constructing solar facilities, but ultimately chose the gas plant, entering a preliminary agreement for gas supply before completing its final environmental review. Construction began in April 2024, and six months later, three conservation groups challenged TVA’s actions, alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), particularly regarding the range of alternatives considered and alleged precommitment to the gas plant.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in part for both sides. The court found TVA met NEPA’s requirements for environmental analysis and cost evaluation but held TVA violated NEPA by considering only one feasible alternative and by precommitting to the gas plant via its supply agreement. The court vacated TVA’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and Record of Decision, effectively requiring TVA to halt construction. TVA sought a stay of the vacatur order, first with the district court and then with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted TVA’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. The court held TVA likely to succeed on the merits, finding the district court misinterpreted NEPA’s “range of alternatives” requirement and erred in its reading of the precommitment issue. The court also concluded that the district court likely chose the wrong remedy by vacating the EIS and Record of Decision, given the procedural nature of NEPA and the lack of viable alternatives. The stay will allow TVA to continue construction while the appeal is resolved. View "Appalachian Voices v. TVA" on Justia Law

Oklahoma was authorized by Congress in 2005 to extend its administration of federal environmental programs into Indian country, upon approval by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). For many years, Oklahoma did not invoke this provision. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma expanded the definition of Indian country in the state, Oklahoma requested EPA approval to apply its environmental programs to these areas. The EPA initially granted the request in 2020, then withdrew it to allow for further tribal consultation. After extensive engagement with tribal nations, the EPA issued a new approval in January 2025 with added conditions requiring tribal engagement, but subsequently rescinded those conditions in May 2025 and reissued its approval without them.The Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma challenged the EPA’s May 2025 decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Pawnee Nation argued that the EPA's action was unlawful because the congressional provision authorizing Oklahoma's request, § 10211(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA), had expired in 2009, that the EPA erred by refusing to impose conditions on Oklahoma’s approval, and that the EPA failed to make contemporaneous determinations of Oklahoma’s programs’ compliance with federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit exercised exclusive jurisdiction and denied Pawnee Nation’s petition for review. The court held that § 10211(a) was unambiguous and remains active, not expired. It determined that EPA’s statutory obligation to approve Oklahoma’s request did not permit the agency to impose additional conditions, and found that EPA acted within the provision’s requirements by relying on its previous determinations that Oklahoma’s programs complied with federal law. The court affirmed EPA’s interpretation and approval. View "Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

A private corporation operating oil and water injection wells in the Fruitvale Oil Field sought permission from the California Department of Conservation, Geologic Energy Management Division (CalGEM) to drill and use up to twelve new water injection wells. These wells would dispose of “produced water,” a byproduct of oil production, by pumping it into a deep aquifer. CalGEM concluded that the proposed project was not exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and denied the required Project Approval Letter (PAL). The operator argued that the project qualified for various CEQA exemptions, including a statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects, as well as categorical exemptions for existing facilities and minor alterations to land.The Superior Court of Kern County granted the operator’s petition for a writ of mandate, concluding that the ongoing project exemption applied and ordering CalGEM to find the project exempt from CEQA and issue the PAL. The court also found that class 1 and class 4 categorical exemptions did not apply. The operator’s request for attorneys’ fees was struck down, as the court found it was not eligible under the relevant statute.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported CalGEM’s determination that none of the claimed exemptions applied. The court found the regulatory provision relied on for the ongoing project exemption to be invalid and, even if valid, held that CalGEM’s current approval process involved a greater degree of responsibility and control than existed before 1973, so the exemption could not apply. It further concluded that the categorical exemptions for existing facilities and minor alterations to land were inapplicable because the project involved drilling new wells to significant depths. The appellate court reversed the judgment granting the writ and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "San Joaquin Facilities Management, Inc. v. Dept. of Conservation" on Justia Law

A pipeline company sought approval to construct two new segments of natural gas pipeline in Pennsylvania, requiring several environmental permits from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP), including water quality and erosion control permits. After PADEP conditionally certified the project and subsequently issued the necessary permits following public hearings, a coalition of environmental groups (“Riverkeepers”) challenged the permit issuance, arguing that PADEP failed to ensure compliance with Pennsylvania’s water quality standards and constitutional environmental protections.The Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board held a five-day hearing, reviewed extensive testimony and evidence, and ultimately dismissed the Riverkeepers’ appeal. The Board found no evidence of actual environmental harm or degradation resulting from the pipeline project, rejected the claim that PADEP was required to demand specific water quality data, and credited expert testimony supporting PADEP’s permit decisions. The Board also determined that the regulatory and constitutional standards were met, and that the Riverkeepers had not demonstrated that PADEP’s actions were unreasonable or contrary to law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the Board’s determination under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court clarified that this was the proper standard for reviewing state agency actions taken under federal law, such as the Clean Water Act. Applying this standard, the Third Circuit found that PADEP acted reasonably in issuing the permits, adequately considered water quality and environmental data, and fulfilled its regulatory and constitutional duties. The Court rejected the Riverkeepers’ arguments regarding both regulatory and Environmental Rights Amendment violations, and denied the petition for review. View "Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board" on Justia Law