Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the County of San Diego's adoption of thresholds of significance under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to streamline the evaluation of transportation-related environmental effects for land-use development projects. The County adopted two specific thresholds: one for "infill" projects within unincorporated villages and another for projects generating fewer than 110 automobile trips per day. Plaintiffs, two environmental groups, challenged these thresholds, arguing they were not supported by substantial evidence and did not comply with CEQA requirements.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the County, finding that the infill threshold was consistent with CEQA and that the small project threshold was justified by substantial evidence, as it aligned with recommendations from the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (OPR).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the County's infill threshold was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on unsubstantiated assumptions that infill development would generally result in insignificant vehicle miles traveled (VMT) impacts. The court found that the County failed to provide evidence showing that development in designated infill areas would typically generate VMT below the County average.Similarly, the court found that the small project threshold lacked substantial evidentiary support. The County had adopted OPR's recommendation without providing evidence that projects generating fewer than 110 trips per day would have a less-than-significant transportation impact in San Diego County.The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to grant the petition for writ of mandate, requiring the County to comply with CEQA by providing substantial evidence to support the adopted thresholds. View "Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The case involves the Center for Biological Diversity challenging the United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) approval of Colorado's revised implementation plan for ambient air quality standards. Colorado revised its plan in 2019, changing the wording of a permit requirement for new emission sources and adding language to the definition of a key threshold for evaluating compliance. The Center argued that the revisions would prevent regulators from blocking construction of new sources that generate excessive emissions and allow regulators to disregard emissions during drilling, fracking, and well completion.The EPA approved Colorado's revisions, leading the Center to file a petition for review. The State of Colorado intervened to defend the revisions. The Center contended that the revised permit requirement and the new definition of "commencement of operation" would undermine air quality standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected the Center's first challenge, concluding that the Center had not shown an effect from the revised wording in the permit requirement. However, the court agreed with the Center on the second challenge, finding that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to address the potential emissions during drilling, fracking, and well completion. The court held that the EPA did not independently assess whether the revised definition created a substantive change and remanded the case to the EPA for further explanation without vacating the EPA's prior approval of the revised definition. The court denied the petition for review regarding the revised permit requirement but granted it concerning the revised definition of "commencement of operation." View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

Two environmental organizations challenged a July 2020 Final Environmental Assessment (EA) and Decision and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) issued by Wildlife Services, an agency within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The EA and FONSI authorized a predator damage and conflict management program in Wilderness Areas and Wilderness Study Areas in Nevada. The plaintiffs argued that the program violated the Wilderness Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment in favor of Wildlife Services. The court concluded that predator control in Wilderness Areas to support pre-existing grazing operations was permissible under the Wilderness Act. The court also found that the agency's statewide analysis of the environmental impacts was reasonable and that the agency had adequately considered the potential impacts on public health, Wilderness Areas, and the scientific uncertainty regarding lethal predator damage management (PDM).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the Wilderness Act claim, holding that lethal PDM is permissible in Wilderness Areas when conducted in support of pre-existing grazing operations. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment on the NEPA claim. The court found that the EA failed to take the required "hard look" at the environmental impacts, particularly regarding the geographic scope of the PDM program, the potential impacts on public health, the unique characteristics of Wilderness Areas, and the scientific uncertainty surrounding lethal PDM. The court remanded the case to the district court to direct the agency to reconsider whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required and to produce either a revised EA or an EIS. View "WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION WILDLIFE SERVICES" on Justia Law

The Alaska LNG Project sought authorization from the Department of Energy to export up to twenty million metric tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) per year for thirty years. The Department initially authorized the Project to export LNG to free-trade countries in 2014 and later to non-free trade countries in 2015, subject to environmental review. In 2023, the Department issued a final order approving the Project’s export application, concluding that the approval was consistent with the public interest despite uncertainties regarding environmental impacts.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had previously authorized the construction and operation of the Project’s facilities, including an 800-mile pipeline and associated infrastructure, after preparing an extensive environmental impact statement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld FERC’s compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in Center for Biological Diversity v. FERC. The Department of Energy adopted FERC’s impact statement and issued its own supplemental environmental impact statement in response to Executive Order 13990.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Department of Energy’s final order. The court found that the Department had properly adopted FERC’s environmental impact statement and complied with NEPA. The court also upheld the Department’s finding of substantial uncertainty regarding the magnitude of environmental impacts, particularly greenhouse gas emissions and climate impacts, associated with the Project’s exports. The court concluded that the impacts of downstream emissions in foreign countries were not reasonably foreseeable and that the Department’s analysis was supported by substantial evidence.The court denied the petitions for review, affirming the Department of Energy’s authorization for the Alaska LNG Project to export LNG. View "Sierra Club v. DOE" on Justia Law

Steven Gomes filed a lawsuit to invalidate ordinances regulating groundwater use in Mendocino, adopted by the Mendocino City Community Services District (the district). The district argued that Gomes’s claims were barred by res judicata due to a prior case, Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist. (2019) (Gomes I), which challenged the district’s groundwater management program. The trial court found the ordinances contained an invalid attorney’s fee provision but rejected Gomes’s other claims.In Gomes I, the trial court denied Gomes’s petition challenging the district’s 2007 groundwater measures, but the judgment was reversed on appeal. The appellate court found the district had authority to limit groundwater extraction and that the 2007 measures were invalid due to non-compliance with statutory procedures. The district subsequently adopted new ordinances in 2020, which Gomes challenged in the present case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Gomes argued the ordinances imposed fees for groundwater extraction that required voter approval, which the district did not obtain. The court concluded that the claim was not barred by Gomes I, as it involved different ordinances and provisions. The court held that the fees imposed by the district were not for the extraction of groundwater and thus did not require voter approval under section 10710. The judgment was affirmed, except for the invalid attorney’s fee provision. View "Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist." on Justia Law

Griffith Foods International Inc. and Sterigenics U.S. operated a medical supply sterilization plant in Willowbrook, Illinois, emitting ethylene oxide (EtO) over 35 years. In 2018, a report linked these emissions to high cancer rates in the area, leading to over 800 lawsuits against the companies. The plaintiffs alleged that the companies knowingly emitted dangerous levels of EtO, causing various illnesses, including cancer.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois handled the insurance dispute between Griffith, Sterigenics, and National Union Fire Insurance Company. Griffith and Sterigenics sought a declaration that National Union had a duty to defend them under their commercial general liability (CGL) policies. The district court ruled in favor of Griffith and Sterigenics, determining that the pollution exclusion in the CGL policies did not apply because the emissions were authorized by a permit from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court focused on whether the pollution exclusion in the CGL policies applied to the emissions of EtO. The court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms interpreted the pollution exclusion to apply to traditional environmental pollution. However, an Illinois appellate court decision in Erie Insurance Exchange v. Imperial Marble Corp. suggested that emissions authorized by a regulatory permit might not constitute traditional environmental pollution.Given the conflicting interpretations and the significant implications for the insurance industry, the Seventh Circuit decided to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court. The court sought clarification on the relevance of a permit or regulation authorizing emissions in assessing the application of a pollution exclusion within a standard-form CGL policy. View "Sterigenics U.S., LLC v National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg" on Justia Law

Griffith Foods International and Sterigenics U.S. operated a medical supply sterilization plant in Willowbrook, Illinois, emitting ethylene oxide (EtO) over a 35-year period. In 2018, a report revealed high cancer rates in Willowbrook, allegedly due to these emissions. Griffith and Sterigenics faced over 800 lawsuits from residents claiming bodily injuries, including cancer, caused by the emissions. Griffith had obtained permits from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) for the plant's operation, which included EtO emissions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the case. Griffith and Sterigenics sought declarations that National Union Fire Insurance Company had a duty to defend them under their commercial general liability (CGL) policies. The district court ruled in favor of Griffith and Sterigenics, determining that the pollution exclusion in the CGL policies did not apply because the emissions were authorized by IEPA permits. The court relied on the Illinois appellate decision in Erie Insurance Exchange v. Imperial Marble Corp., which found ambiguity in the pollution exclusion when emissions were permitted by regulatory authorities.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court acknowledged the importance of the pollution exclusion in CGL policies and the precedent set by the Illinois Supreme Court in American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms. The Seventh Circuit noted the conflicting interpretations between Koloms and Imperial Marble regarding the scope of the pollution exclusion. Given the significant implications for Illinois law and the insurance industry, the Seventh Circuit decided to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court to determine the relevance of regulatory permits in applying the pollution exclusion in CGL policies. View "Griffith Foods International Inc. v National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg" on Justia Law

Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. (SOS) challenged a final order by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) granting the City of Dripping Springs a permit to discharge treated wastewater into Onion Creek. The central issue was the interpretation of TCEQ’s “antidegradation” rules, specifically whether TCEQ should assess water quality degradation by evaluating the water body as a whole or by focusing on numeric changes in individual water-quality parameters. SOS argued for a strict parameter-by-parameter approach, claiming that any significant change in a single parameter, such as dissolved oxygen, should prevent permit approval.The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas upheld the permit’s issuance, finding that TCEQ’s practice of assessing overall water quality conformed to regulatory requirements. The court also rejected SOS’s argument that TCEQ’s final order was invalid for not including a “statement of the underlying facts” supporting its findings.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court held that TCEQ’s whole-body approach to assessing water quality degradation was consistent with the regulatory language, which focuses on overall water quality rather than individual parameters. The court also found that substantial evidence supported TCEQ’s determination that the permitted discharge would not lower Onion Creek’s water quality by more than a de minimis extent. Additionally, the court rejected SOS’s argument that TCEQ’s final order was invalid for lacking specific underlying facts, noting that the order sufficiently informed the parties of the basis for TCEQ’s decision and complied with the relevant statutory requirements. View "Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Jackson, Mississippi's water-related utilities, which faced significant failures. The United States and the State of Mississippi brought enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) against the City for violations, including allowing raw sewage to be discharged into waterways and failing to comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) orders. The district court appointed a federal receiver, Edward Henefin, as interim third-party manager (ITPM) to manage the City's water and sewer systems. Henefin, operating through JXN Water, Inc., developed new utility rates, including a discount for residents receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi ruled that the ITPM's rate-setting activities constituted a federal assistance program under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (FNA), thereby allowing access to SNAP recipient data. The United States and Mississippi opposed this, arguing that such disclosure violated the FNA's privacy protections for SNAP recipients.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ITPM's rate-setting activities did not qualify as a federal assistance program under the FNA. The court emphasized that the term "federal assistance program" implies administration by a federal entity, and the ITPM's authority derived from municipal law, not federal law. The court also noted that the statutory history and context supported a narrow interpretation of "federal assistance program." Consequently, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mississippi v. JXN Water" on Justia Law

The case involves an insurance contribution action under the Oregon Environmental Cleanup Assistance Act (OECAA). The parties are insurers who issued comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance policies to Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc., and Schnitzer Investment Corporation. Schnitzer was named by the federal government as potentially responsible for contamination at the Portland Harbor Superfund Site. Continental Casualty Company and Transportation Insurance Company (together, Continental) paid defense costs on behalf of Schnitzer and sought contribution from Schnitzer’s other insurers, including Employers Insurance Company of Wausau (Wausau) and Century Indemnity Company (Century).The Multnomah County Circuit Court ruled that Wausau was still liable for contribution despite a settlement agreement with Schnitzer. The court found that Schnitzer had already obtained a federal judgment against Continental for all unpaid defense costs, and thus Schnitzer no longer had a claim for those costs against Wausau. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wausau’s settlement with Schnitzer was a settlement of the environmental claim, which barred Continental’s contribution claim.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the term "the environmental claim" in ORS 465.480(4)(a) refers to the specific environmental claim that has been paid by the targeted insurer. Since Schnitzer had already recovered the defense costs from Continental, Schnitzer had no remaining claim for those costs against Wausau that it could settle. Therefore, Wausau’s settlement did not extinguish Continental’s right to seek contribution for the defense costs it had paid. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Insurance Co." on Justia Law