Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

South Branch Solar, L.L.C. sought approval to build a 130-megawatt solar-powered electric generation facility in Hancock County, Ohio, on approximately 700 acres of agricultural land. The project included solar panels, related equipment, and infrastructure. Local government officials and residents had varied reactions, with some supporting the facility for its economic and environmental benefits and others expressing concerns about impacts on land use, aesthetics, property values, wildlife, and local drainage systems. Travis Bohn, who lives near the project site, opposed the project and intervened in the proceedings.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed South Branch’s application, which included environmental studies and mitigation plans. After a public hearing and extensive opportunity for public input, the board staff recommended approval subject to 50 conditions. A joint stipulation was agreed to by South Branch, the board staff, the county commissioners, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, but not by Bohn. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Board issued an order granting the certificate. Bohn unsuccessfully sought rehearing, arguing that the Board misapplied statutory criteria, failed to require adequate wildlife and flood analysis, and improperly weighed local opposition and economic impacts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Board’s order using a standard that allows reversal only if the order was unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that the Board’s determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(6)—concerning environmental impact, minimum adverse impact, and public interest—were supported by sufficient probative evidence and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s approval of South Branch’s application and affirmed the order granting the certificate. View "In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A community group challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the Regents of the University of California for UC Berkeley’s 2021 long range development plan and a specific student housing project at People’s Park. The plaintiffs alleged that the EIR failed to sufficiently analyze certain environmental impacts, including noise from student parties and the consideration of alternative sites for the housing project, in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Alameda County denied the group’s petition and entered judgment for the Regents. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal initially agreed with the plaintiffs on two issues: the EIR should have evaluated noise impacts from student parties and considered alternative locations for the housing project. Both parties sought review in the California Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition on one issue, it granted the Regents’ petition on the two issues where the plaintiffs had prevailed. During the pendency of the appeal, the Legislature enacted new statutes specifically addressing and abrogating the appellate court’s holdings on noise and site alternatives for residential projects. The California Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court’s decision on those two issues, holding that the legislative changes rendered the EIR adequate and directed judgment in favor of the Regents.After remand, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, arguing they had been a “successful party” by securing important legal precedent. The trial court denied the motion, finding the plaintiffs did not achieve their litigation objectives. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five affirmed, holding that because the Supreme Court reversed the rulings on which the plaintiffs claimed success, those opinions were no longer citable precedent and the plaintiffs did not qualify as a successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

A nonprofit environmental organization sued a manufacturer of feminine hygiene products, alleging that the company marketed certain products as “organic” or “made with organic ingredients” in violation of California’s organic products law. The complaint claimed that these products, such as period underwear, pads, and panty liners, contained much less than the minimum required percentage of certified organic materials, and included several synthetic or non-organic components not permitted under state and federal organic standards. The organization sought to prevent the manufacturer from advertising and selling these products as organic within California.The Superior Court of Alameda County granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the manufacturer. The court reasoned that California’s organic products law, known as the California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA), did not apply to personal care products like the ones at issue, but only to specifically enumerated items such as agricultural products, cosmetics, and pet food. Based on this interpretation, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims failed as a matter of law and entered judgment for the defendant.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case de novo. It concluded that the statutory text, legislative history, and public policy underlying COFFA support a broad interpretation. The Court held that COFFA applies to all products sold as “organic” or containing “organic” materials within California, including feminine hygiene and personal care products, unless specifically exempted. The Court rejected the argument that such products are categorically excluded and emphasized the statute’s intent to regulate consumer organic claims broadly. The judgment of the trial court was therefore reversed. View "Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a property owner in Sonoma County who, after a fire, conducted timber operations under an emergency waiver of waste discharge requirements. Following observations of waste discharge violations and failure to comply with cleanup orders, the regional water quality control board issued notices of violation and ultimately imposed administrative civil liability, assessing a penalty of $276,000. The property owner did not file a petition with the State Water Resources Control Board within the statutory 30-day period to seek review of the regional board’s order.Subsequently, the property owner filed a writ petition in Sonoma County Superior Court to challenge the civil liability order, and later requested the State Board to review the order on its own motion under Water Code section 13320. The State Board declined to exercise its discretionary review. The property owner amended his writ petition to add the State Board as a party, alleging abuse of discretion in its refusal to review. The State Board and the regional board demurred, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the State Board’s discretionary decision was not subject to judicial review. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for the respondents.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the State Board’s decision not to exercise its discretionary authority to review a regional board order under Water Code section 13320 is not subject to judicial review. The court rejected arguments that this interpretation violated the separation of powers doctrine, concluding that the State Board’s action was not quasi-judicial and did not adjudicate the parties’ rights. The court confirmed that only regional board orders, not the State Board’s discretionary refusals, are eligible for judicial review under the statutory scheme. View "Bareilles v. State Water Resource Control Board" on Justia Law

A company that owns and operates the only landfill in a particular town challenged a local law that required the landfill’s closure by a specified date. The law was enacted after community complaints regarding odors. When the law was first passed, the town’s attorney acknowledged that a State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) review was required, but the Board adopted the law and related SEQRA documents without substantive discussion. After a subsequent law rescinded and then court action reinstated the original law, the landfill owner again brought a proceeding, claiming, among other things, that the Board failed to comply with SEQRA by not taking a “hard look” at environmental impacts.The Supreme Court initially dismissed the action on statute of limitations grounds, but the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed that decision, holding the claim was timely. After the parties resolved all non-SEQRA claims, Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the landfill owner, finding it had standing and that the Board did not properly comply with SEQRA. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding the owner lacked standing because it had not shown it suffered or would suffer an environmental injury. The dissent argued that under Matter of Har Enterprises v Town of Brookhaven and Gernatt Asphalt Products v Town of Sardinia, property owners directly affected by a government action do not need to allege environmental harm to have standing under SEQRA.The New York Court of Appeals held that the landfill owner has standing to challenge the Board’s SEQRA compliance simply by virtue of owning property directly affected by the local law, following the holdings in Har Enterprises and Gernatt Asphalt Products. The Court further declined to review the statute of limitations argument at this stage, as that issue had already been resolved and was not properly before it. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for further proceedings. View "Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. Town of Seneca Falls" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit on behalf of her minor children and a proposed class of individuals who were exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) while attending or working at certain Vermont public schools. The complaint alleged that defendants, as successors to Old Monsanto, manufactured and sold PCBs from facilities outside Vermont to third-party manufacturers, who incorporated PCBs into products such as fluorescent light ballasts and caulk. These products were later used in Vermont schools, where PCBs subsequently leaked into the air, allegedly resulting in toxic exposure.In the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Vermont’s medical-monitoring statute only applied to releases of toxic substances directly from facilities located within Vermont, and did not apply retroactively to exposures or sales occurring prior to the statute’s enactment in 2022. The District Court certified two questions to the Vermont Supreme Court for interpretation of the statute.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the certified questions. The Court held, first, that the sale of a toxic substance from facilities outside Vermont, which was then incorporated into products that leaked PCBs into the air of Vermont schools, qualified as a “release” within the meaning of Vermont’s medical-monitoring statute. Second, the Court held that the statute does not provide a remedy to plaintiffs whose exposure occurred before the statute’s enactment, but it does allow claims against defendants who sold a toxic substance before enactment, if the plaintiff’s exposure occurred after July 1, 2022. The Court provided these answers in response to the certified questions and clarified the scope and retroactivity of the statute. View "Neddo, as Guardian & Next Friend to Z.N." on Justia Law

The case concerns two decisions made by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding air quality standards in the Detroit area under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Michigan sought to redesignate the Detroit area from nonattainment to attainment for the 2015 ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), relying on air quality data from 2019–2021. However, in June 2022, the area recorded exceedances attributed to wildfire smoke from Canada. Michigan requested the EPA to exclude these exceptional-event data points. Meanwhile, Detroit missed its attainment deadline and was reclassified from Marginal to Moderate nonattainment, triggering additional requirements for Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT) implementation.After Detroit missed its attainment deadline, the EPA finalized its determination of nonattainment and reclassified the area as Moderate nonattainment, setting deadlines for Michigan to submit RACT revisions. Michigan submitted its redesignation request before these RACT requirements became effective. The EPA later approved Michigan’s exceptional-events request and redesignated Detroit to attainment, despite Michigan not having implemented the newly required RACT measures for Moderate nonattainment areas. Sierra Club challenged both the EPA’s approval of the exceptional-event exclusion and the subsequent redesignation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed both EPA actions. The court held that the EPA’s approval of Michigan’s exceptional-event request was not arbitrary or capricious, finding that the agency had adequately explained its reasoning and considered the relevant data linking wildfire smoke to the ozone exceedances. However, the court vacated the EPA’s redesignation of Detroit to attainment, holding that the CAA requires a state to satisfy all requirements applicable at the time of redesignation, not merely those in effect when the redesignation request was submitted. Because Michigan had not met the RACT requirements by the time of redesignation, the EPA’s action was contrary to law. Thus, the approval of the exceptional-event request was affirmed, and the redesignation was vacated. View "Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

A company sought approval to construct a 500 kW solar-energy project in Randolph, Vermont. The proposed project required a certificate of public good (CPG) from the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC). A portion of the project's infrastructure, such as its access road and interconnection line, would be located on land with slopes exceeding 25%. Local and regional planning commissions, as well as the Town of Randolph Selectboard, initially supported the project and jointly requested the site be designated as a “preferred site.” After neighbors raised concerns that some panels would be located on steep slopes in conflict with the Town Plan, the applicant agreed to revise the project so that no panels would be built on slopes over 25%. The Town conditioned its continued support on this revision and on receiving the final site plan.The PUC’s hearing officer initially recommended denying the CPG due to uncertainty about whether the Town’s conditions regarding slope measurement had been met. The PUC rejected this recommendation, refocusing on whether the Town itself was satisfied with the conditions. The applicant subsequently provided a letter from the Town confirming its support and satisfaction with the conditions. The PUC found the project's compliance with soil-erosion control measures sufficient, particularly in light of a stormwater permit issued by the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR), and ruled that the project would not unduly interfere with the region’s orderly development. The PUC granted the CPG; the neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, giving deference to the PUC’s expertise and factual findings. The Court affirmed the PUC’s grant of the CPG, holding that the PUC correctly applied the legal standards under 30 V.S.A. § 248, properly considered the Town Plan’s land-conservation measures, reasonably relied on the Town’s assurances and ANR’s permit, and did not misapply its own rules regarding “preferred site” status. View "In re Petition of Randolph Davis Solar LLC" on Justia Law

Several environmental organizations sued a California county, alleging that the county’s operation of the Lopez Dam and Reservoir had harmed the threatened South-Central California Coast steelhead trout by altering water flows and degrading downstream habitat. The steelhead population in Arroyo Grande Creek depends on high, pulsing freshwater flows for migration and spawning, but the dam’s operational schedule reduced these flows, impeded migration, and facilitated predatory species’ access to the creek. The plaintiffs claimed that these practices violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) by causing unlawful “take” of steelhead and also breached California Fish & Game Code section 5937, which requires dam operators to maintain fish in “good condition.” The creek is also home to two other ESA-listed species: the California red-legged frog and the tidewater goby.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted a mandatory preliminary injunction, compelling the county to take affirmative actions such as changing flow releases and implementing new habitat protection measures. The court ordered the county to consult with federal agencies about these measures but did not specifically weigh the potential harm to the frog and goby, which the county argued might result from the new water release schedule. Both sides presented competing expert evidence on the impact to all three species.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. The appellate court held that when mandatory injunctive relief under the ESA could benefit one protected species while potentially harming another, the district court must consider the balance of equities and public interest as they relate to the other listed species. The court clarified that this balancing does not include economic or developmental interests but is limited to the welfare of other endangered or threatened species. Because the district court had not conducted this analysis, the injunction was vacated for further proceedings. View "SAN LUIS OBISPO COASTKEEPER V. COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO" on Justia Law

A California nonprofit organization focused on preventing deceptive environmental claims filed a lawsuit against a manufacturer of feminine hygiene products. The organization alleged that the manufacturer labeled and advertised certain products, including period underwear, pads, and panty liners, as “organic” or “made with organic cotton” in violation of the California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA). The complaint stated that these products contained less than the minimum required percentage of certified organic materials and included nonagricultural and nonorganically produced components not permitted under state or federal organic standards.The case was first heard in the Alameda County Superior Court. The manufacturer moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that COFFA applies only to agricultural products, cosmetics, and pet food—not to personal care products such as feminine hygiene items. The Superior Court agreed with the manufacturer and granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that COFFA did not govern the products in question. The nonprofit timely appealed that decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that COFFA applies broadly to all products sold as “organic” or containing “organic” materials in California, unless specifically exempted, and that the statute’s plain language encompasses feminine hygiene products. The court found no basis for an implied exception for personal care products and determined that the trial court erred in its interpretation. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, clarifying that COFFA’s standards and labeling requirements apply to the manufacturer’s products at issue. View "Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael" on Justia Law