Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Environmental groups challenged the issuance of a permit by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the development of the Cainhoy Plantation in South Carolina. The plaintiffs argued that the permit violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). They claimed the permit improperly used a habitat surrogate to set the level of anticipated take of an endangered species and was issued after an Environmental Assessment (EA) rather than a more comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they did not have a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court concluded that the Corps' decision to issue the permit based on an EA was reasonable and that the use of a habitat surrogate was justified under the circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the Corps had taken the required "hard look" at the environmental consequences of the project as mandated by NEPA and that the use of a habitat surrogate was appropriate given the impracticality of monitoring the take of individual bats. The court found that the Corps' decision to rely on an EA instead of preparing an EIS was entitled to deference and that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court also noted that the surrogate used by the Service was enforceable and set a clear standard for determining when the level of anticipated take had been exceeded. View "South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The case involves the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association, Inc. (MALA) challenging a final rule issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) that seasonally bans vertical buoy lines used in lobster and Jonah crab trap fishing in certain federal waters off Massachusetts from February 1 to April 30 each year. The NMFS issued this rule to protect the endangered North Atlantic right whales from entanglement in these buoy lines during their foraging period.Previously, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of MALA, holding that the final rule conflicted with a temporary statutory authorization for lobster and Jonah crab fishing contained in a rider to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. The district court found that the final rule did not fall within the exception provided in the rider, which allowed for actions to extend or make final an emergency rule that was in place on the date of the rider's enactment, December 29, 2022. The court concluded that the 2022 emergency rule was not "in place" on that date because it was not actively preventing fishing in the Wedge area at that time.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the 2022 emergency rule was indeed "in place" on December 29, 2022, for the purposes of the rider's exception. The court reasoned that the emergency rule's findings and authority were still relevant and could serve as a basis for future regulatory actions, such as the final rule. Therefore, the final rule was lawful and enforceable under the exception provided in the rider. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Mass. Lobstermen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv." on Justia Law

The Unkechaug Indian Nation and its Chief, Harry B. Wallace, challenged the enforcement of New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations prohibiting the harvesting of American glass eels. They argued that the Andros Order, a 1676 agreement between the Royal Governor of New York and the Nation, allowed them to fish freely and preempted the DEC’s regulations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the DEC from enforcing these regulations against the Nation’s members in their customary fishing waters.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Andros Order is not federal law preempting New York’s fishing regulations. The court also found that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Commissioner Basil Seggos in his official capacity under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims against Commissioner Seggos under the Ex parte Young exception. The court also found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to resolve Daubert motions or privilege disputes before ruling on the summary judgment motions. Finally, the court held that the Andros Order is not federal law binding on the United States because it was entered before the Confederal period, on behalf of the British Crown, and has not been ratified by the United States. Therefore, the Andros Order does not preempt New York’s fishing regulations, and the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Unkechaug Indian Nation v. Seggos" on Justia Law

The City of New Orleans filed a lawsuit against several pipeline operators and Entergy New Orleans LLC, alleging that their oil and gas production and transportation activities caused damage to the City's coastal zone. The City claimed that Entergy allowed its pipeline canals to widen and erode, threatening the City's storm buffer. The lawsuit was filed under Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA).The defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that Entergy, the only in-state defendant, was improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Entergy consented to the removal and argued that it was exempt from SLCRMA’s permit requirements because its activities commenced before the statute's effective date. The City moved to remand the case to state court, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied the motion, dismissed Entergy as a party, and stayed the case pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that Entergy was improperly joined because its activities were exempt under SLCRMA’s Historical-Use Exception, which applies to uses legally commenced before the statute's effective date. The court found no reasonable basis for the City to recover against Entergy, thus disregarding Entergy's citizenship and establishing complete diversity among the parties. The court also rejected the City's argument that it was merely a nominal party representing Louisiana, concluding that the City filed the suit on its own behalf and stood to benefit from a favorable ruling. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of the City's motion to remand. View "New Orleans City v. Aspect Energy" on Justia Law

A group of individuals and West Rockhill Township challenged the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding its approval of a compressor station project by Adelphia Gateway, LLC. The DEP's approval was part of the federal Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act (APCA) enforcement. The challengers sought review from the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board (EHB), which dismissed the appeals, citing the Third Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) for such federal law-related decisions.The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed the EHB's dismissal, holding that the EHB had jurisdiction to review the DEP's decision. The court reasoned that an appeal to the EHB is not a "civil action" under the NGA, which grants the Third Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions challenging state agency decisions under federal law. The court distinguished administrative proceedings from civil actions, noting that EHB appeals are administrative in nature and not subject to the NGA's jurisdictional provision.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision. The court held that the EHB has jurisdiction to review the DEP's permitting decisions under the CAA and APCA. It concluded that EHB appeals are not "civil actions" as defined by the NGA, and thus, the Third Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction does not preempt EHB's review. The court also emphasized that the DEP's decisions are not final until the opportunity for EHB review has passed, aligning with Pennsylvania's statutory framework and the federal Clean Air Act's delegation of authority to state agencies. The case was remanded to the EHB for substantive review of the challengers' appeals. View "Cole v. DEP" on Justia Law

A group of individuals and West Rockhill Township challenged the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) approval of a compressor station project by Adelphia Gateway, LLC. The DEP's approval was issued under the federal Clean Air Act (CAA) and Pennsylvania's Air Pollution Control Act (APCA). The challengers sought review of the DEP's decision before the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board (EHB).The EHB dismissed the appeals, agreeing with Adelphia that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), which grants federal courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions for the review of state administrative agency decisions made pursuant to federal law.The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed the EHB's dismissal, holding that the EHB had jurisdiction to hear the appeals. The court reasoned that an appeal to the EHB is not a "civil action" as defined by the NGA, and thus, the EHB's review was not preempted by federal law. The court also noted that the DEP's decision was not final until the opportunity for EHB review had expired or been exhausted.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision. The court held that the EHB has jurisdiction to review the DEP's permitting decisions under the CAA and APCA. The court found that the EHB's review process is an administrative proceeding, not a civil action, and therefore, it does not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts as outlined in the NGA. The court also emphasized that the DEP's decision is not final until the EHB review process is complete or the time to seek such review has expired. View "West Rockhill Twp v. DEP" on Justia Law

Several environmental protection organizations challenged the policies governing oil and gas lease sales conducted by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) on protected sage-grouse habitat. In 2015, BLM amended its land use management plans to prioritize oil and gas leasing outside of sage-grouse habitat. In 2018, BLM revised its guidance documents, limiting the prioritization requirement to situations with a backlog of expressions of interest and shortening public comment periods.The District Court for the District of Montana found that the 2018 Instruction Memorandum (IM) violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and vacated the June 2018 Wyoming lease sale. The District Court for the District of Idaho found that the lease sales violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and FLPMA due to inadequate public participation and vacated the lease sales.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the cases. It held that the Montana district court's vacatur of the 2018 IM was not injunctive and thus not appealable, but the vacatur of the lease sales was injunctive and appealable. The court affirmed that the 2018 IM was inconsistent with the 2015 Plan and that the June 2018 Wyoming lease sale violated FLPMA. The court also affirmed that the Idaho lease sales violated NEPA and FLPMA due to insufficient public participation.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Montana district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the lease sales. However, it found that the Idaho district court abused its discretion in vacating the lease sales and remanded the case, directing the BLM to reconsider the leasing decisions with proper public participation while enjoining surface-disturbing activities in the interim. The court also held that neither district court violated the due process rights of intervenors by vacating the leases. View "MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATION V. HAALAND" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in 2020, which authorized the transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by rail in newly designed tank cars without requiring a permit. LNG is a hazardous material that poses significant risks if released, including explosions, fires, and the formation of ultra-cold gas clouds. The rule did not limit the number of LNG tank cars per train or set a mandatory speed limit, raising safety concerns among various stakeholders.The rule was challenged by a coalition of environmental nonprofits, several states, and the Puyallup Tribe of Indians. They argued that PHMSA did not adequately consider the safety risks and that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) required the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The petitioners contended that the decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that PHMSA's decision not to prepare an EIS was indeed arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that transporting LNG by rail poses a low-probability but high-consequence risk of derailment, which could result in catastrophic environmental impacts. The court emphasized that PHMSA failed to adequately consider the probability and potential consequences of such accidents and did not impose sufficient safety measures, such as a mandatory speed limit or a cap on the number of LNG tank cars per train.The court held that PHMSA's failure to prepare an EIS violated NEPA and vacated the LNG Rule, remanding the case to PHMSA for further proceedings. The court's decision underscores the importance of thoroughly assessing environmental risks and adhering to NEPA's requirements in rulemaking processes. View "Sierra Club v. DOT" on Justia Law

Barry Chrisman was seriously injured when a tree fell on his work vehicle while driving through a riparian management zone (RMZ) in a recently logged forest area. The RMZ, a buffer of trees left standing to benefit wildlife and water quality, was part of the Lugnut timber area managed by the Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Chrisman and his employer sued the State of Washington, Sierra Pacific Industries, and Precision Forestry Inc. for negligence, arguing that the defendants were not immune under the Forest Practices Act of 1974, which provides immunity for forestland owners when a tree required to be left standing in an RMZ falls and causes injury.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were immune under the statute as forestland owners required to leave the RMZ trees standing. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The appellate court held that Sierra and Precision were not forestland owners because they did not have the right to harvest RMZ trees and that only entities with the authority to determine RMZ parameters are entitled to immunity. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the RMZ was properly drawn.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that the defendants are immune under the Forest Practices Act. The court determined that the statute provides broad immunity to forestland owners, including those in actual control of the land with the right to sell or dispose of timber. The court concluded that Sierra and Precision fit the definition of forestland owners and that the immunity applies regardless of whether the RMZ was properly drawn. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. State" on Justia Law

Aclara Meters LLC owned the license for the Somersworth Hydroelectric Project on the Salmon Falls River between New Hampshire and Maine from 2016 to 2023. In 2019, Aclara sought to surrender its license to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). After conducting an environmental assessment, FERC authorized the surrender in 2023. American Whitewater, a conservation organization, requested a rehearing, arguing that two dams from the Project should be removed as a condition of surrender. FERC denied the request, leading Whitewater to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for relief, claiming that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).The Commission's environmental assessment concluded that approving the surrender as proposed would not significantly affect the environment, thus an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was unnecessary. FERC found that removing the dams was unfeasible due to the local municipalities' reliance on the reservoir for water supply and other needs. The Commission also determined that the benefits of keeping the dams outweighed the environmental and recreational benefits of their removal. FERC's decision was based on the public interest, considering the water supply, firefighting needs, and potential impacts on local infrastructure.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and denied Whitewater's petition for review. The court held that FERC's analysis was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Commission reasonably determined that dam removal was unfeasible and appropriately assessed the public interest. The court found that FERC's decision to approve the license surrender without dam removal was supported by substantial evidence and consistent with its policies and precedents. View "American Whitewater v. FERC" on Justia Law