Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Maryland and South Carolina filed lawsuits in state courts against 3M Company and other chemical manufacturers, alleging contamination of their waterways with per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). The states filed separate complaints for PFAS contamination from aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) and non-AFFF products, explicitly disclaiming any connection between the two in their non-AFFF complaints.In the District of Maryland, 3M removed Maryland's non-AFFF complaint to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, arguing that PFAS from its Military AFFF production was indistinguishably commingled with PFAS from its non-AFFF products. The district court remanded the case, giving dispositive effect to Maryland's disclaimer and concluding that 3M's federal work was not implicated. Similarly, in the District of South Carolina, 3M removed South Carolina's non-AFFF complaint, but the district court also remanded, crediting the state's disclaimer and finding no connection to 3M's federal work.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the states' disclaimers were not dispositive in determining the connection between 3M's federal work and the charged conduct. The court concluded that 3M plausibly alleged that PFAS contamination from its Military AFFF production was related to the states' claims, satisfying the nexus requirement for federal officer removal. The court vacated the district courts' decisions and remanded for further consideration of whether 3M met the other elements for federal officer removal, including acting under a federal officer and having a colorable federal defense. View "State of Maryland v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

David L. Murphy Properties, LLC and John Schaffer own property adjacent to Painted Rocks Cliff, LLC on Flathead Lake. Painted Rocks constructed a dock after obtaining a permit from Lake County. Murphy Properties claimed the dock violated the Lakeshore Protection Act, interfered with their prescriptive easement, and constituted a nuisance.The Twentieth Judicial District Court dismissed Murphy Properties' Lakeshore Protection Act claim against Lake County and granted summary judgment in favor of Painted Rocks on all claims. The court found that the dock did not interfere with navigation or lawful recreation under the Act, as Murphy Properties could still access the cove with smaller watercraft. The court also ruled that Murphy Properties could not establish a prescriptive easement because their use of the cove was not exclusive, given the public's right to use the waters. Additionally, the court dismissed the nuisance claim, as it was contingent on the alleged violation of the Lakeshore Protection Act.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's rulings. The court held that the Lakeshore Protection Act does not mandate denial of a permit if a project impacts navigation or recreation, but rather favors issuance if it does not. The court agreed that Murphy Properties' use of the cove was not exclusive and thus could not support a prescriptive easement. The court also upheld the dismissal of the nuisance claim, as it was based on the failed Lakeshore Protection Act claim. The judgment in favor of Lake County and Painted Rocks was affirmed. View "David L. Murphy Properties, LLC v. Painted Rocks Cliff, LLC" on Justia Law

Michael and Elizabeth Dailey filed an appeal with the Environmental Court of the First Circuit in July 2022, challenging a 2022 decision by the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). The decision involved a seawall allegedly constructed within the conservation district. The BLNR raised jurisdictional issues, citing Act 48 of 2016, which mandates that such appeals be filed directly with the Supreme Court of Hawaii. The Daileys argued that their case involved shoreline setback issues under HRS Chapter 205A, which would allow the environmental court to have jurisdiction.The environmental court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating it did not have the authority to transfer the case to the Supreme Court. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the appeal arose under HRS Chapter 183C and not HRS Chapter 205A Part III, and thus should have been filed directly with the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Hawaii reviewed the case and determined that the Daileys' appeal did not involve the HRS Chapter 205A shoreline setback exception. Therefore, the Supreme Court had exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The court also held that the environmental court had the inherent and statutory power to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ordered the environmental court to transfer the appeal nunc pro tunc to the date it was originally filed, allowing the appeal to proceed in the Supreme Court under the Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Dailey v. Department of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco operates two combined wastewater treatment facilities that process both wastewater and stormwater. During heavy precipitation, these facilities may discharge untreated water into the Pacific Ocean or San Francisco Bay. In 2019, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a renewal permit for San Francisco's Oceanside facility, adding two "end-result" requirements. These requirements prohibited discharges that contribute to violations of water quality standards and discharges that create pollution, contamination, or nuisance as defined by California law. San Francisco challenged these provisions, arguing they exceeded the EPA's statutory authority.The California Regional Water Quality Control Board and the EPA approved the final Oceanside NPDES permit. San Francisco appealed to the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board, which rejected the challenge. The City then petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit, which denied the petition. The Ninth Circuit held that the Clean Water Act (CWA) authorizes the EPA to impose any limitations necessary to ensure water quality standards are met in receiving waters.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Section 1311(b)(1)(C) of the CWA does not authorize the EPA to include "end-result" provisions in NPDES permits. The Court reasoned that determining the specific steps a permittee must take to meet water quality standards is the EPA's responsibility, and Congress has provided the necessary tools for the EPA to make such determinations. The Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit's decision, emphasizing that the EPA must set specific rules for permittees to follow rather than imposing broad end-result requirements. View "City and County of San Francisco v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Center for Biological Diversity and 350 Colorado challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule that partially approved Colorado’s plan to reduce ozone pollution. The Clean Air Act required Colorado to lower ozone levels by July 2021, but the state failed to meet this deadline. Petitioners argued that the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s plan violated the Clean Air Act in three ways: by approving the plan after the deadline, by including state-only emissions reductions, and by violating the anti-backsliding provision.The EPA approved Colorado’s reasonable-further-progress demonstration and motor-vehicle-emissions budget, determining that the state showed emissions reductions of at least three percent per year from 2018 to 2020. The EPA also found that the SIP’s projected emissions reductions were based on creditable, federally enforceable measures and complied with the anti-backsliding mandate. Petitioners argued that the EPA’s approval was unlawful because the state failed to attain the required ozone levels by the deadline and included non-federally enforceable control measures in its calculations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the EPA did not act unlawfully in approving Colorado’s reasonable-further-progress demonstration after the state missed its attainment deadline. The court found that reasonable-further-progress demonstrations are distinct from attainment demonstrations and that the EPA’s approval was based on compliance with reasonable-further-progress requirements. The court also held that the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s motor-vehicle-emissions budget was lawful, as it was consistent with reasonable-further-progress requirements. Additionally, the court found that the EPA’s approval did not violate the anti-backsliding provision, as the SIP revisions would not increase emissions and would not hinder attainment.The court denied the petition for review, upholding the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s plan. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

A labor union, representing hotel and restaurant employees, challenged the environmental assessments (FEAs) for two condominium hotel projects developed by PACREP LLC and PACREP 2 LLC in Waikiki, Honolulu. The union argued that the FEAs were insufficient under the Hawaii Environmental Policy Act (HEPA) because they failed to discuss the potential use of condo-hotel units as permanent residences and improperly segmented the environmental review process for the two projects.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit ruled in favor of PACREP, granting summary judgment on the grounds that the FEAs were sufficient and the cases were moot because the projects were completed. The court also denied the union's motions for summary judgment, which argued that the environmental review was improperly segmented and that the FEAs were insufficient.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii reviewed the case and held that the union's claims were not moot because effective relief in the form of proper environmental review could still be granted. The court also determined that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied. The court found that the environmental review for the two projects was improperly segmented under the double independent utility test, as the development of the second project (2139) was a necessary precedent for the first project (2121).The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of PACREP and the City and denying the union's motions for summary judgment. The case was remanded to the circuit court to determine whether the FEAs for the two projects were sufficient in addressing the environmental effects as one combined project and, if not, whether a new environmental assessment or environmental impact statement was required. View "Unite Here! Local 5 v. Pacrep LLC" on Justia Law

An environmental group, Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), sued Academy Express, LLC (Academy), a transportation company, alleging that Academy violated the Clean Air Act (CAA) by idling its buses beyond state limits in Massachusetts and Connecticut. CLF claimed that its members were harmed by breathing polluted air from Academy's buses. Academy moved for summary judgment, arguing that CLF lacked associational standing. The district court agreed and granted Academy's motion, holding that CLF could not demonstrate that its members suffered a concrete injury traceable to Academy's conduct.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that only two of CLF's members, Wagner and Morelli, had alleged injuries-in-fact, but their injuries were not traceable to Academy's idling due to the presence of other potential pollution sources in the urban environment. The court did not address the standing of additional members disclosed by CLF after the close of fact discovery or the expert testimony submitted by CLF.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's narrow interpretation of injury-in-fact. The appellate court held that breathing polluted air and reasonable fear of health effects from pollution are cognizable injuries. It also found that recreational harms do not require a change in behavior to be considered injuries-in-fact. The court emphasized that traceability does not require a conclusive link but can be established through geographic proximity and expert testimony.The First Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The district court was instructed to determine the scope of the record, make necessary factual findings, and apply the correct legal standards for injury-in-fact and traceability. The appellate court did not address redressability, leaving it for the district court to consider if necessary. View "Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Academy Express, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Steve Shehyn, owns a 20-acre avocado orchard in Moorpark, California. He alleged that sediment from the Ventura County Public Works Agency and Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1's (collectively, the District) water delivery system permanently damaged his irrigation pipes and orchard. The plaintiff claimed that the sediment was a direct result of the District's water supply facilities' plan, design, maintenance, and operation.The trial court sustained the District's demurrer to the plaintiff's first amended complaint, which included causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and inverse condemnation. The court allowed the plaintiff to amend the breach of contract and negligence claims but sustained the demurrer without leave to amend for the inverse condemnation claim, citing that the plaintiff "invited" the District's water onto his property. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, maintaining the inverse condemnation claim unchanged and indicating his intent to seek a writ of mandamus. The trial court entered judgment for the District after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his contract and negligence claims without prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claim for inverse condemnation. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations that the District's water delivery system delivered a disproportionate amount of sediment to his property, causing damage, supported a claim for inverse condemnation. The court disagreed with the trial court's reliance on Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., stating that the issue of whether the plaintiff "invited" the water goes to the merits of the claim, not its viability at the pleading stage. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. View "Shehyn v. Ventura County Public Works Agency" on Justia Law

Atlantic Richfield Company acquired a mine in Colorado, which had been leaking sulfuric acid into a nearby river. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) intervened in 2000 to stabilize the situation, but the leaks persisted. In 2011, the EPA ordered Atlantic Richfield to build water treatment systems, and in 2021, Atlantic Richfield settled with the EPA, agreeing to continue the cleanup and pay $400,000. Six months later, Atlantic Richfield sued NL Industries, Inc. and NL Environmental Management Services for contribution towards the cleanup costs.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted partial summary judgment in favor of the NL entities, ruling that Atlantic Richfield's claims to recoup part of the cleanup costs were time-barred. Atlantic Richfield appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and determined that the action was one for contribution, not cost recovery. The court noted that the Supreme Court has clarified that cost recovery and contribution are distinct actions. The court found that Atlantic Richfield's claim fell under the contribution category because it sought to recoup expenses following a settlement with the EPA, which required Atlantic Richfield to perform a removal action at the site.The Tenth Circuit concluded that the statute of limitations for contribution actions under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) should apply, even though the specific types of claims listed in that section did not include Atlantic Richfield's situation. The court held that the three-year limitations period for contribution actions applied, making Atlantic Richfield's lawsuit timely. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Atlantic Richfield Co. v. NL Industries" on Justia Law

The case involves Protect the Gallatin River (PTGR) appealing a decision by the Gallatin County Floodplain Administrator to issue a floodplain permit for the Riverbend Glamping Getaway project proposed by Jeff and Jirina Pfeil. The project includes developing a campground with non-permanent structures on an island in the Gallatin River. PTGR argued that the public's right to participate was violated and that the Floodplain Administrator's decision was erroneous.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court of Gallatin County reviewed the case and issued an order on November 13, 2023, resolving competing summary judgment motions. The court denied PTGR's motions for partial summary judgment, granted summary judgment in favor of Gallatin County and the Pfeils regarding PTGR's complaint, and addressed other related claims. PTGR then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Floodplain Administrator did not violate PTGR's right to participate, as the public was given a reasonable opportunity to comment, and the decision not to re-open public comment was not arbitrary or capricious. The court also found that the Floodplain Administrator's participation in the appeal process before the Commission was appropriate and lawful, as it did not involve post hoc rationalizations. Finally, the court held that the Floodplain Administrator's decision complied with the Gallatin County Floodplain Regulations and was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's summary judgment orders. View "Protect the Gallatin v. Gallatin Co." on Justia Law