Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Cabot Oil & Gas Company began fracking in Dimock Township, Pennsylvania. By 2009, their operations caused a residential water well explosion, leading to methane gas contamination in local water supplies. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) found Cabot in violation of environmental laws, resulting in the 2009 Consent Order, which mandated corrective actions and a $120,000 penalty. Cabot violated this order by 2010, leading to another consent order and additional fines. Over the next decade, Cabot received numerous violation notices and faced lawsuits, including a 2020 grand jury finding of long-term indifference to remediation efforts, resulting in criminal charges and a nolo contendere plea.Shareholders filed a derivative suit against Cabot’s directors, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties, including failure to oversee operations, issuing misleading statements, and insider trading. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the claims, finding no serious oversight failure or bad faith by the directors, and insufficient particularized allegations to support claims of material misrepresentation or insider trading.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, agreeing that the directors had implemented and monitored compliance systems, and that the shareholders failed to demonstrate bad faith or conscious disregard of duties. The court also found that the statements in Cabot’s disclosures were not materially misleading and that the shareholders did not adequately plead demand futility regarding the insider trading claim. Thus, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims with prejudice. View "Ezell v. Dinges" on Justia Law

The County Commissioners of Boulder County and the City of Boulder filed a lawsuit against Exxon Mobil Corporation and three Suncor Energy companies, alleging that the defendants' fossil fuel activities contributed to climate change, causing harm to Boulder’s property and residents. Boulder sought damages for public and private nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy, claiming that the defendants knowingly contributed to climate change while misleading the public about its impacts.The case was initially filed in Boulder County District Court but was removed to federal district court by the defendants. The federal district court remanded the case back to state court, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision. The Boulder County District Court then denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, rejecting their arguments that Boulder's claims were preempted by federal law, including the Clean Air Act (CAA) and federal common law.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that Boulder's claims were not preempted by federal law. The court held that the CAA displaced federal common law in this area, and thus, federal common law did not preempt Boulder's state law claims. The court also determined that the CAA did not preempt Boulder's claims under principles of express, field, or conflict preemption. Consequently, the court discharged the order to show cause and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, without expressing any opinion on the ultimate merits of Boulder's claims. View "Cnty. Comm'rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy U.S., Inc." on Justia Law

Floyd Ruffin, a shoreline clean-up worker in Louisiana following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, was diagnosed with prostate cancer five years later. Ruffin sued BP, alleging that his exposure to crude oil during the clean-up caused his cancer. He designated Dr. Benjamin Rybicki, a genetic and molecular epidemiologist, as his expert to establish causation. Rybicki claimed that Ruffin was exposed to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in crude oil, specifically pointing to benzo(a)pyrene as a carcinogen.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana excluded Rybicki’s testimony, finding it inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court concluded that Rybicki failed to identify a harmful level of exposure to PAHs necessary to cause prostate cancer and noted several methodological flaws in his analysis. Consequently, the court granted BP’s motion for summary judgment, determining that Ruffin lacked the necessary evidence to prove causation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of Rybicki’s testimony and the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that Rybicki’s testimony was inadmissible due to significant analytical gaps. The court noted that Rybicki’s testimony did not establish a link between PAHs and prostate cancer, as his analysis focused on benzo(a)pyrene, which Ruffin did not specifically claim to have been exposed to. Additionally, the court emphasized that general causation requires showing that a substance is capable of causing the specific injury in the general population, which Rybicki’s testimony failed to do. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of the expert testimony and the summary judgment in favor of BP. View "Ruffin v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP and other plaintiffs incurred cleanup costs at a site on the Kalamazoo River in Michigan due to pollution from paper mills. In 1995, Georgia-Pacific and other companies formed the Kalamazoo River Study Group (KRSG) and sought a declaration of shared liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA § 107. In 1998, the district court declared KRSG members, including Georgia-Pacific, liable for the entire cost of response activities at the site. Subsequent judgments in 2000 and 2003 confirmed this liability.In 2010, Georgia-Pacific filed a lawsuit against NCR Corporation, International Paper Company, and Weyerhaeuser Company, asserting claims under both CERCLA § 107(a) and § 113(f) for cleanup costs. The district court found NCR and International Paper liable and apportioned liability among the parties. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Georgia-Pacific’s § 113(f) claims were time-barred and that Georgia-Pacific could not pursue § 107(a) claims for costs within the scope of the 1998 judgment.On remand, the district court vacated its judgment under § 113(f) but re-entered a declaratory judgment under § 107, declaring Georgia-Pacific, International Paper, and Weyerhaeuser liable for future response costs. International Paper and Weyerhaeuser appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s declaratory judgment under § 107. The court held that Georgia-Pacific could not pursue a § 107(a) claim for costs within the scope of the 1998 judgment, as those costs were recoverable only under § 113(f). The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the scope of the 1998 judgment and allowed Georgia-Pacific to bring § 107(a) claims for costs outside that scope. View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

Two environmental groups, WildEarth Guardians and Western Watersheds Project, challenged a decision by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) to open new domestic sheep grazing allotments, known as the Wishbone Allotments, in the Rio Grande National Forest, Colorado. The groups argued that the allotments posed a high risk of disease transmission to local populations of Rocky Mountain bighorn sheep, which are vulnerable to diseases from domestic sheep.The USFS had previously vacated larger grazing allotments in 2013 and 2015 due to high risks to bighorn sheep, based on a "risk of contact model" (RCM). However, in 2017, the USFS decided to open the Wishbone Allotments despite the RCM predicting a high risk of contact. The USFS justified this decision by considering additional local factors, such as geography and herding practices, which they claimed would mitigate the risk. The environmental groups objected, arguing that these local factors were unsupported by scientific data.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the groups' petition, finding that the USFS did not violate the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The groups then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.The Tenth Circuit found that the USFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the Wishbone Allotments. The court held that the USFS failed to provide a reasoned explanation for downgrading the RCM's high-risk rating based on local factors, which lacked scientific support. The court also found that the USFS did not adequately consider the cumulative impacts on neighboring bighorn sheep herds. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case to determine the appropriate remedy. View "WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service" on Justia Law

Several hundred children in Benton Harbor, Michigan, suffered from elevated lead levels in their blood after drinking lead-contaminated water from the city’s public water system for three years. Plaintiffs, represented by their guardians, filed a lawsuit against various state and city officials, as well as two engineering firms, alleging that these parties failed to mitigate the lead-water crisis and misled the public about the dangers of the drinking water. The claims included substantive-due-process and state-created-danger claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law negligence claims.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the complaint in full. The court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a violation of their constitutional rights and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their federal claims against the city and state officials and the state-law claims against one of the engineering firms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the state officials, finding that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that these officials acted with deliberate indifference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the claims against the city officials and the City of Benton Harbor, finding that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that these officials misled the public about the safety of the water, thereby causing the plaintiffs to drink contaminated water. The court also reversed the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against the engineering firm and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor" on Justia Law

An Alaska hunter challenged a state regulation that allocates permits for hunting Kodiak brown bears, with at least 60% reserved for Alaska residents and no more than 40% for nonresidents, who must generally hunt with a professional guide. The hunter argued that this allocation grants nonresidents a special privilege in violation of the Alaska Constitution’s principle of equal access to fish and game and that it fails to manage resources for the maximum benefit of Alaskans.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, upheld the regulation, concluding that it did not grant an exclusive right to nonresidents and that the allocation system was within permissible bounds. The court found that the regulation did not exclude residents from hunting and that the allocation balanced various interests, including economic benefits and conservation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the regulation did not violate the equal access clauses of the Alaska Constitution. It reasoned that treating residents and nonresidents differently does not, in itself, violate the constitution, and that the regulation did not grant nonresidents an unconstitutional special privilege. The court also found that the state could consider economic benefits when managing wildlife resources and that the Board of Game had taken a hard look at the relevant factors, including conservation and economic benefits, when establishing the permit system. Thus, the regulation was consistent with the constitutional duty to manage resources for the maximum benefit of Alaskans. View "Cassell v. State of Alaska, Department of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization challenged the United States Forest Service's approval of a forest thinning project in the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest, Washington. The project aimed to reduce wildfire risk and improve forest health through various treatments, including tree thinning and prescribed burns. The organization argued that the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by not reopening the public comment period after significant changes were made to the project following a wildfire, and by failing to consider a reasonable range of alternatives and the cumulative effects of the project.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service, finding that the agency had complied with NEPA requirements. The court held that the Forest Service was not required to repeat the public comment process and that the Environmental Assessment (EA) considered a reasonable range of alternatives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the Forest Service was not required to repeat the public comment process because the changes made to the project did not pose new environmental questions or render the public's comments on the Draft EA irrelevant. The court also found that the Forest Service considered a reasonable range of alternatives and that the use of condition-based management did not inherently violate NEPA.However, the court reversed the district court's decision regarding the cumulative effects analysis. The Ninth Circuit held that the EA's discussion of cumulative effects was insufficient because it did not consider the cumulative effects of the Twisp Restoration Project in combination with the Midnight Restoration Project, which was originally part of the same project. The court remanded the case for the district court to order the Forest Service to remedy the deficiencies in the EA and determine whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is necessary. View "North Cascades Conservation Council v. Forest Service" on Justia Law

A solar energy company, Harvey Solar I, L.L.C., applied to the Ohio Power Siting Board for a certificate to construct a solar-powered electric-generation facility in Licking County, Ohio. The project faced opposition from a local citizens group, Save Hartford Twp., L.L.C., and 11 nearby residents, who raised concerns about the environmental and economic impacts of the project, including visual impacts, flooding, wildlife disruption, noise, water quality, and glare.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed the application and conducted an evidentiary hearing. The board staff investigated the potential impacts and recommended approval with conditions. The board ultimately granted the certificate, subject to 39 conditions, including requirements for visual screening, floodplain coordination, wildlife impact mitigation, noise control, and stormwater management.The residents appealed the board's decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing that the board failed to properly evaluate the project's adverse impacts and that Harvey Solar did not provide sufficient information as required by the board's rules. They contended that the board's decision was unlawful and unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the board had acted within its statutory authority and had not violated any applicable laws or regulations. The court determined that the board had sufficient evidence to make the required determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A) and that the conditions imposed on the certificate were reasonable and appropriate. The court affirmed the board's order granting the certificate for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the solar facility. View "In re Application of Harvey Solar I, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The case involves the County of San Diego's adoption of thresholds of significance under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to streamline the evaluation of transportation-related environmental effects for land-use development projects. The County adopted two specific thresholds: one for "infill" projects within unincorporated villages and another for projects generating fewer than 110 automobile trips per day. Plaintiffs, two environmental groups, challenged these thresholds, arguing they were not supported by substantial evidence and did not comply with CEQA requirements.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the County, finding that the infill threshold was consistent with CEQA and that the small project threshold was justified by substantial evidence, as it aligned with recommendations from the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (OPR).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the County's infill threshold was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on unsubstantiated assumptions that infill development would generally result in insignificant vehicle miles traveled (VMT) impacts. The court found that the County failed to provide evidence showing that development in designated infill areas would typically generate VMT below the County average.Similarly, the court found that the small project threshold lacked substantial evidentiary support. The County had adopted OPR's recommendation without providing evidence that projects generating fewer than 110 trips per day would have a less-than-significant transportation impact in San Diego County.The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to grant the petition for writ of mandate, requiring the County to comply with CEQA by providing substantial evidence to support the adopted thresholds. View "Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law